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Papers Presented at a Workshop Held at the Institute for 
Development Studies of the University of Nairobi, 26-29 
March 1979 
ABSTRACT 
The papers presented here were prepared for a Workshop on Price 
and Marketing Controls in Kenya, held at the Institute for Development 
Studies from 26 to 29 March 1979. The purpose of the workshop was to evaluate 
price and marketing controls in Kenya, and bring together parties influencing 
and/or affected by the price and marketing control policies. 
The first part of the workshop was devoted to a search for a 
theoretical framework for analysing price and marketing controls, including 
illegal activities which frustrate the objectives of those policies. A 
paper by the Central Bureau of Statistics outlines consumer price data 
collection in rural and urban areas and how price controls affect the accuracy 
of the cost of living indices. Position papers from the Trade Onion movement, 
the manufacturers' association, the Kenya Consumers' Organisation and the 
Chamber of Commerce show the conflict of interests and diversity of views on 
price and marketing control policy. Other papers cover domestic price effects 
of industrial protection, an evaluation of the role and performance of 
marketing boards, and price control on manufactures, milk, maize, meat, wages, 
and rents. The introduction to the workshop papers outlines the theme 
emerging from the papers and the policy implications, and draws heavily from 
the discussion in the workshop. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE WORKSHOP PAPERS 
By 
J.T. Mukui 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
The main reason for holding a workshop on price and marketing 
controls is the current importance of this topic. The workshop organisers 
were also aware of the debate within government on the role of price controls 
and that the government had appointed a committee to appraise the performance 
of parastatals (Kenya, 1979b). The purpose of this introduction is to link 
the articles presented in the workshop, bring out points raised in the 
discussion, and summarise the emerging issues. The contributors hope that 
this anthology will make a modest contribution to the current debate on the 
topic and help in the search for solutions. 
Price control is not, as most of the literature portrays, only a 
post-World War II phenomenon. The Roman empire, for example, exercised 
various forms of price restraint. In 301 A.D., emperor Diocletian promulgated 
an edict which set maximum prices for 900 commodities, 130 different grades 
of labour, and a considerable number of freight rates (Michell, 1947, p.l). 
However, Diocletian's extensive wage-price control program was conceived in 
passion but reared in ignorance."1" Thirteen years later, the program, in 
shambles, was abandoned and Diocletian abdicated his throne and spent the 
rest of his life in a cabbage patch. 
Since then, controls have been imposed in various parts of the world. 
In centrally planned East European countries, price controls have a wide cover-
age and are an integral part of development planning. The controls have helped 
to stabilise prices, (Portes, 1977) although a complete appraisal requires an 
assessment of both prices and incomes so as to ascertain real improvement in 
economic welfare. 
1. 'The whole of Roman world was being slowly strangled with good inten-
tions. The bureaucracy had grown so highly organised and efficient, so nicely 
©ordered through its various grades of official life, that everybody walked in 
'leading strings to the music of official proclamations. ^Paternalism regulated 
"'everything with its watchful and benignant eye. The triumph of the system may 
ibe seen in the famous Edict of Prices issued by Diocletian in A.D. 301. Here 
!we find scheduled a maximum wage for every kind of service. Death is the pena.U 
for any trader who asks, or any purchaser who pays, a higher price„ No differer 
of locality or season is permitted... .This delightful scheme...was evidently the 
product of a highly efficient Board of Trade which had sat late nights over the 
study of statistics and political economy. Benevolent officials of this type 
swarmed all over the Empire, spying and reporting on one another as well as on 
the general public.' iStoba^.t, 1951pp. 347-8) 
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traders are forced to overcharge and occasionally resort to 'conditional 
sales' - forcing a customer to buy noncontrolled goods or controlled goods 
with higher profit margins as a condition for being sold the nonprofitable 
price controlled good. The effect of price control on traders' margins is 
particularly acute in the rural shops because the rural pattern of demand is 
predominantly for specifically controlled essential products but less acute 
in the urban shops where the turnover is higher and traders sell both 
controlled and noncontrolled products. 
Mukui attempts an empirical analysis of the effects of price 
control on the cost of living, income distribution, and actual selling 
prices. When the price freeze was introduced in late 1971, it had temporary 
success in moderating price increases but later became irrelevant as the 
price controller passed on cost increases to consumers so as not to dis-
courage supply. Again, the price controller is more liberal in awarding 
price increases for luxuries, which is likely to alter the pattern of 
production away from necessities in the longer run and in the short run has 
been responsible for occasional shortages of essentials. In other cases, 
such as meat and charcoal, prices have been depressed below the level they 
would have reached in the atsence of any government intervention. Charcoal 
has been a particularly interesting case in which the relative power of the 
consumers and powerlessness of the producers and traders, most of whom 
operate in the legal twilight of the informal sector, has led to a number 
of dramatic arrests and prosectuions of charcoal traders. By contrast, there 
has not been a single prosecution of a formal sector manufacturing establish-
ment despite the fact that price controls are widely ignored and violated by 
manufacturing firms. There have also been problems in collecting consumer 
prices for charcoal and other products because price quotations from dealers 
often give control levels for fear of prosecution. Olum of the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) confirms this and documents what the CBS is doing to 
ensure accuracy, given that the consumer' price index is supposed to reflect 
actual rather than control prices. In the area of general price controls, the 
implementation of the legislation has been much more arbitrary and inconsis-
tent . 
Hopcraft argues that, inherent in the initial logic for widespread 
quantitative restrictions on imports, with their removal of international 
competitive pressure on Kenyan prices, was the notion that domestic prices 
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could readily be controlled by legislation. His contention is that the 
effect on domestic prices of government interventions in the area of 
industrialisation and trade is inadequately understood, and that the 
divergencies in prices introduced by these interventions tend to push 
economic activity in the opposite direction from government's stated ' . 
policy goals. The quantitative and licencing interventions and restrictions 
have provided large rents to arbitrarily chosen firms, which has led to 
high levels of profitability, but have not improved growth, have worsened 
income distribution, and turned the terms of trade against agriculture. 
The initial policy measure he proposes is to replace these restrictions with 
price related interventions (tariffs, taxes, subsidies, etc.) and remove 
"£he very large anti-export, pro-import-substitution bias that has developed 
in the pricing and incentive structure facing firms as a result of the 
existing government regulations, and the consequent" overvaluation of the 
Kenya Shilling. The problem is that vested interests have developed that 
inhibit policy change in this area. Again, price control may have instilled 
a sense of security among the policy makers which might make them more r'eady to give 
protection. However, whether the government can control such protected 
industries through price control is not the issue: protecting a firm and 
then controlling the prices of its products is like giving something with 
one hand and taking it away with the other. This supports Bonn's assertion 
that price control tries to restore equilibrium between money and goods, not 
by abolishing the causes of the disturbance, but by forbidding people to 
profit from their consequencies (1933, p. 357). 
Oduor-Otieno of the Ministry of Labour gives a brief survey of the 
Kenyan experience with wage and incomes policies, with focus on wages. Since 
1973 when the Wage Guidelines were introduced, wage restraint in the modern 
sector has been a significant element of the government's anti-inflationary, 
employment and equity policies. He concludes that, in the final analysis, 
the structure and degree of inequality is influenced not only by wage policies 
but more so by fiscal policies, the land tenure system, the general institu-
tional setting, etc. Again, there is no guarantee that the increase in a firm's 
profitability arising out of wage moderation will be used to expand employment 
^and not be repatriated overseas. Mukui and Gutto argue that, in a mixed 
economy, rent controls may, in theory, discourage housing construction and 
cause a housing shortage - although this might not have happened in the towns 
in Kenya, because the rent controls are ineffective and largely irrelevant. 
However, there is still a housing shortage in the towns but the cause of this 
shortage lies elsewhere. 
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Aldington proposes measures of appraising the performance of 
agricultural parastatals, which can also be applied to parastatals in other 
sectors as well. Although he does not address himself to the issue of whether 
these agricultural parastatals are necessary in the first place, his pro-
positions are important because the government has a plan of reviewing the 
role of the sixty or so parastatals in Kenya. 
The committee to review statutory boards in Kenya was set up in g 
February 1979 and released its first report in May 1979 (Kenya, 1979b). 
The committee was headed by the economic adviser to the president and most 
of the committee members were permanent secretaries in the ministries that 
coordinate parastatals, including the inspector of statutory boards. It 
was, therefore, not an independent inquiry. The committee members would 
also be reluctant to make critical recommendations on such an important issue 
because they are government employees and would not like to bite the hand 
that feeds them. The major weakness of the report is that it takes too much 
space on how to streamline recruitment and operations of parastatals but does 
not face the fundamental issue which is rore econoir.ie than social or politi-
cal although with political implications. In the case of the Maize and 
Produce Board, for example, the problem is high producer prices which benefit 
the large scale farmers who supply maize to the Board while the poor consumers 
bear the burden through high maize and maize meal prices ; and movement controls 
which hinder regional price equalisation (disregarding transport costs) between 
surplus and deficit areas. In the case of the Kenya Cooperative Creameries 
(KCC), the government tends to allow producer prices to rise while at the same 
time sitting on the consumer price. This implies that some failures of statutory 
boards can not be attributed to the boards' management buf basically result 
from confusing signals and policies of the central government. They are also 
supposed to achieve other objectives like employment creation. Therefore, it 
is difficult to set performance criteria for public enterprises because some 
functions are multiple and vague and cannot be accurately put in shillings and 
cents. A profitable public enterprise may be covering gross inefficiency with 7 even grosser monopoly profits while the loss-maker has pared costs to the bone. 
Schmidt, in his well researched paper which is an abridged version of g 
a more extensive report, analyses the effectiveness of the maize marketing 
control system in attaining its stated objectives. The maize marketing control 
6. The Review of Statutory Boards is reviewed by J.T. Mukui in the The 
Weekly Review, June 8, 1979. 
7. 'The State in the Market', The Economist (London), December 30, 1978, 
p.38. For a thorough analysis of the performance of parastatals in an African 
setting, see chapter 9 of Tony Killick, 1978. 
8. Schmidt, 1979 (forthcoming). 
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legislation creates a system which leads to low operational efficiency as 
reflected in increasing marketing costs, high excess profits, and works 
against the interests of smallholder maize producers ( who do not get access 
to the Maize and Produce Board stores) and poor rural and urban consumers 
(who pay high prices for maize and maize meal). Relaxation of maize 
controls would lead to substantial savings in storage and transport costs and 
would allow consumers in deficit areas to take advantage of cheap grain from 
surplus areas. Under a decontrolled system, the Maize and Produce Board 
would have the function of maintaining the strategic national reserve as well"® 
as acting as a buyer of last resort. 
The papers by Ruigu and McArthur and Smith are on government pricing 
and marketing interventions in the livestock industry, Ruigu evaluates the 
role of the Kenya Cooperative Creameries, a producer-controlled cooperative, 
with a virtual monopoly on milk marketing in the formal market. Ruigu argues 
for seasonally and spatially adjusted producer prices to reflect seasonal and 
spatial variations in production costs to avoid resource misallocation that 
results from the existing regulatory mechanism, McArthur and Smith, present 
a frank discussion of the many statutes and other regulatory measures in the 
meat industry. The effect of controls on beef, for instance, has been to keep 
prices low, which has increased the demand for beef and lowered beef production. 
Some of the papers in this report dwell on the policy implications 
of their research findings. We learn that a high price is not necessarily a 
bad price depending on its implications ior income distribution e.g. in the 
charcoal trade where the charcoal-burners and charcoal-dealers are relatively 
poorer than the urban-based consumers, and in the meat industry where low 
beef prices have put meat production on a declining trend and probably works 
against the interests of the pastoralists in the marginal areas who supply 
cattle for slaughter. 
However, whether the policy makers in Kenya implement recommendations 
given to them is a different matter. Tor example, in the maize industry, 
articles have been written from as far back as 1959 (Miracle, 1959) and 
various commissions of inquiry appointed but their recommendations are never 
implemented. The refusal to take action is itself an action and most likely 
is not out of ignorance but because of the politically powerful vested 
interests that would be hurt by polich changes. We can not, for example, 
IDS/OP 32 
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separate the adverse effects price control has on charcoal and meat producers 
from the fact that the policy favours the urban consumers who are more 
organised, are a political threat, and might claim higher wages from the 
modern sector as a result of the price increases. This is why political 
expediency tends to take precedence over careful economic analysis. 
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RETAIL PRICE CONTROLS: SOME ELEMENTARY THEORY AND 
SOME AFRICAN EXPERIENCES1 
By 
Tony Killick 
Department of Economics 
University of Nairobi 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Concern with the social and economic consequences of inflation has 
induced many governments to introduce statutory controls on the retail prices 
of a wide range of consumer goods. The purpose of this paper is twofold: 
(a) to use elementary economic theory in order to explore what can and cannot 
be achieved by price controls; and (b) to briefly summarise experiences with 
such controls on the African continent. 
2. WHAT CAN PRICE CONTROLS DO? 
The case to be analysed is one of demand inflation, defined simply 
as an excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply at existing prices. 
The proximate causes of this could include excessive monetary expansion, the 
sudden imposition of import controls (reducing supply relative to demand) 
and a crop failure (similarly reducing supply). The government is assumed 
to respond to this situation by imposing retail price controls in order to 
avoid (or mitigate) the effects on the distribution of real incomes that would 
result if prices rose enough to bring demand back into equilibrium with supply. 
In the absence of price controls, there would be a tendency for 
profit margins to rise, with prices going up to an extent not matched by 
changes in costs. Producers and traders would gain at the expense of final 
consumers. In such situations, controls can be seen as an attempt to hold 
prices at, or near to, the levels that would obtain in the absence of excess 
demand. 
Consider now the frame within which control prices must be set. 
The upper limit is obvious: it should be at least slightly below the new 
market-clearing price, otherwise the control is redundant and the resources 
devoted to its preparation and enforcement are wasted. The lower limit is 
a little less clear. If price controls are not to defeat their purpose of 
1. This paper is largely based on a revision of Killick, 1973, which 
is a study of the operation of price controls in Ghana. 
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protecting consumers' real incomes, they must not be set so low that it 
becomes unprofitable to make or distribute the goods in question. Defining 
as 'normal' that level of profits necessary to induce suppliers and traders 
to produce and distribute, the lower limit of the control prices will be that 
level which permits normal profits to be earned. Their potential effective-
ness in holding down prices thus depends on the magnitude of the excess 
profits that would otherwise accrue. 
Two further points about the lower limit. If it is assumed that 
in a former period prices were at an equilibrium that has now been destroyed 
by import restrictions or a crop failure, it may well be thought that the 
lower limit of the price control is indicated by the previous level. However, 
with a reduced supply this is not necessarily correct, depending on the 
supply functions of the producers and distributors. They are likely to need 
somewhat higher prices, because their overheads now have to be spread over 
a smaller turnover, and in order to protect the absolute value of their own 
real incomes. In this situation the normal profit price is likely to lie 
somewhere above the pre-existing equilibrium (although this would not be 
true if there were formerly monopoly profits). Secondly, it has to be 
borne in mind as a practical consideration that the nearer the control price 
is to the lower limit, the greater is the incentive to evade the control. 
Controllers anxious that their actions should be of maximum effectiveness 
should opt for a judicious compromise between what is theoretically possible 
and what is enforceable. 
It is clear, then, that there are real limitations within which 
retail price controls can operate effectively. Only when conditions make 
for large extra-normal profits are controls likely to hold prices down 
substantially. Moreover, their effect may largely be of a once-for-all 
nature: unless there is a tendency for extra-normal profit margins to widen 
over time, controls will be unable to prevent an inflationary upward trend 
of prices. 
Since the coverage of controls is usually confined to a limited 
range of items, it is worth giving some thought to the impact of controls 
on the items left uncovered. Assuming the controls to be effective, there 
will remain an unsatisfied excess of demand for the controlled items. 
People would be willing to spend more on these items but are frustrated from 
doing so by physical shortages. What will they do with this excess of 
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purchasing power? It is theoretically possible that they will save it, 
but it seems more reasonable to expect them to spend most of it on other 
consumer goods and services. Other things being equal, this increase in 
demand for non-controlled goods will cause their prices to rise, and will 
probably increase the profitability of their production and distribution. 
Probably the most common pattern (although one that only1 holds partially 
in Kenya) is for controls to be concentrated on imported goods and local 
manufactures, with the retail prices of most local foodstuffs left to be 
determined by market forces because of the impracticability of enforcing 
controls on such items. With a pattern of controls of this nature, an 
effectively enforced price list is liable to raise local food prices. This 
consideration makes it harder to be confident that controls will influence 
the distribution of income in the desired direction and, especially, that 
they will be egalitarian in effect, for it is the poorest members of society 
who spend the greatest proportion of their income on local foods. 
This obscurity is increased further by the fact that the existence 
of controls eliminates ability to pay as the method of allocating the reduced 
supplies, without putting any alternative rationing device in its place. A 
logical extens ion of controls imposed because of supply shortages is the 
creation of a formal system of rationing to ensure that everyone gets a 'fair 
share', but that solution is not a practical one in the circumstances of 
most countries. Hence the final distribution is undetermined, but the tendency 
would surely be for the relatively well-to-do to get more than their 'fair 
share' because they bring more business to the retailers, are more influential, 
and more likely to be in a position to do a return favour. 
A further case that should be mentioned is when controls are a 
necessary component of a policy designed to restrain the growth of money 
wages and other incomes. Controls can then be seen as part of a more 
broadly based anti-inflation policy, probably designed to prevent a re-
distribution of real incomes in some undesired direction. The effective-
ness of price controls could be greatly enhanced if, for example, their 
existence induced organised labour to reduce its wage demands. Whether the 
exertion of this kind of leverage would reduce income inequalities would 
depend upon the structure of income distribution in the country in question. 
A prices and incomes policy is liable to have effects on income distribution 
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too complex to permit a straight classification into 'egalitarian' or 'in-
egalitarian ' . 
We should also consider the likely effect of controls on the pattern 
of development. Since controls will be effectively limited to only a proportion 
of the multitude of goods and services available in an economy, with others 
uncontrolled (either de jure or de facto), relative prices will be altered. 
This will have an impact on the structure of demand and production but, 
especially, on investment incentives. If for example, the authorities are 
mainly concerned about the impact of inflation on the poor, they are liable to 
concentrate on regulating the prices of wage goods. If they are successful, 
this will have the effect of holding down profit margins on the production 
and distribution of 'essentials' and raising the profitability of uncontrolled 
'luxury' items. Thus, a set of investment incentives will be created which 
will discourage the production of essentials and encourage the production 
of luxuries - precisely the opposite of what would be desirable in order to 
protect the real living standards of the poor. If, in order to avoid this 
consequence, the authorities put up the control prices in order to restore 
returns to investments in the production of essentials, then the controls 
will tend to become redundant, being little, if any, lower than market-clearing 
prices. 
What if the authorities are able to effectively control the prices 
of most goods and services, leaving relative prices largely unaltered? That 
would avoid the distortions just mentioned but might still be adverse to 
economic development. The government would, in this case, be preventing a 
redistribution of national income away from the general consuming public 
in favour of profits. That may well be desirable from the equity point of 
view. But if we accept that firms have larger marginal propensities to save 
and invest than the average consumer, then the net effect will be to restrain 
saving, investment and, presumably, the rate of growth of the economy. A 
familiar trade-off is thus posed between the goals of social justice and 
economic growth. 
To sum up, elementary economic theory suggests the following pro-
positions : 
Controls can only be expected to reduce prices to the extent 
to which extra-normal profits would otherwise be
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Their effect on prices is likely to be mainly once-and-for-all. 
When controls are enforced on only a proportion of goods and 
services, their income distribution effects are liable to be 
unpredictable. They will distort the pattern of investment 
incentives, in probably undesired ways. 
To the extent that controls restrain the aggregate sum of profits, 
they will prevent a redistribution of real income away from the 
consuming public. However, this will also exert a drag on the 
rates of investment and economic growth. 
3. EXPERIENCES IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
This paper is largely extracted : from a study of the operation of 
price controls in Ghana. These were introduced in the early 1960s 
simultaneously with stringent import licensing, in order to protect consumers 
against the price-raising effects of the import controls. They were presented 
to the public in strongly egaliterian terms - the necessity to 'bring the 
prices of the commodities needed by the masses within the reach of everybody'. 
The reality worked out differently, however, and the main conclusions of my 
study were as follows:-
1. The Ghana Government was seeking, with a small staff and limited 
information, to administer a complex set of controls in order to reduce the 
rate of inflation and to provide special relief to the poor. However, 
the price list was not well designed to achieve the latter of these objectives. 
2. The controls were mostly ignored. Only in shops located in the towns 
was there any significant observance; in the rural areas, and on the urban 
markets,they were almost completely disregarded. 
3. The period studied (1963-72) does not appear to have been abnormal; 
the evidence suggests that the controls had been largely ineffectual 
from the outset. Attempts to improve enforcement led to ceortnaption and 
were abandoned. 
Overall, therefore, controls were unable to do more than slightly 
modify the outcome of market forces. A rather efficient degree of competition 
within the distributive system was, however, apparent and this provided 
some safeguard against the rapacious exploitation of the consumer so widely 
feared in Ghana. 
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5. Given the weak enforcement mechanism, the controllers were tying 
to keep distribution margins and final prices too low, and they might have 
had more effect had they been less ambitious. The controls, it seems, could 
digest small nibbles at monopoly profits, but usually tried to bite off more 
than they could chew. 
6. To the extent that controls had any impact at all on the distribution 
of real incomes, they were probably retrogressive, worsening the position 
of the poor relative to the well-to-do. 
One point of interest is that Ghana was widely believed at the 
time of Independence to have been more favourably endowed with human and 
infrastructural resources than practically any other tropical African 
country, and there is evidence to support this view (Killick, 1978, p. 3). 
The educationals system, the civil service, and the administration of 
justice were all reasonably well developed by the late 19 50s. It is true 
that this was a purely relative matter and that by other standards the 
supply of skills and administrative capacity in Ghana was still woefully 
inadequate. But the relevant point here is that Ghana was better equipped 
to make price controls work than most other countries in Africa - the 
implication being that if controls were ineffective in Ghana, the prospects 
were poor for better results elsewhere on the continent. Unfortunately, 
there have been few studies of the operation of controls in other countries. 
The main source of information is in a series of volumes by the International 
2 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Surveys of African Economies. Seven volumes in 
this series are available, published between 1968 and 1977, covering a total 
of 34 African countries. Of these, 26 were reported as administering some 
form of retail price control, although the extent of coverage varied greatly 
between countries. It is possible that controls also existed in some in 
the other eight countries but were simply not mentioned. Lesotho is the 
only state described as deliberately allowing prices to be determined by 
unregulated market forces. 
Price controls, then, are exceedingly common, but are they effective? 
Operating, perhaps, under the diplomatic constraints of an international agency, 
2. In addition to the IMF volumes, see Lewis, 1972, and Oyemakinde, 1973, 
both on Nigeria; and Kimble, 1970, on Tanzania. Unfortunately, this latter 
work does not investigate the effectiveness of Tanzanian controls. See 
also Mukui, 19 78, on Kenya, the results of which are in paper included in 
this report. 
- 18 - IDS/OP 32 
the IMF volumes are reticent on this subject, increasingly so as successive 
volumes have appeared in the series. Nevertheless, they do offer some comments, 
and it is interesting to compare these with the results for Ghana summarised 
above. 
In only two countries, Mauritania and Zambia, did they believe price 
controls to have had much success. In the latter country, controls were limited 
to a small number of imported wage goods such as milk, soap, and margarine, 
and they were operated in conjunction with a wage freeze and a 'restrictive 
fiscal policy'. The comments of the IMF on the situation in Morocco were 
also relatively positive: 'The Government follows a flexible approach in 
administering the price control laws, attempting to moderate pressure on 
prices without causing dislocation through excessively detailed controls.' 
However, they did not say anything about the effects of this approach on 
actual price levels. 
For most of the other countries on which the IMF offers any 
evaluative comments, the general comment is to the effect that controls are 
not effective - a point of some significance, given the wish of the Fund 
to avoid offending member governments. Their comment on the Ivory Coast 
is characteristic of several others: 
For the most part, price controls are not very effectively 
enforced. In Abidjan, competition at the retail level is 
sufficient to prevent excessive profiteering. In the 
interior, where distribution is less satisfactory and prices 
tend to be higher, enforcement of controls is almost impossible 
(1970, p. 258). 
Of Mauritania, they stated that controls had been more effectively 
enforced in recent years, and that 
Price regulations are normally observed by wholesalers and 
shopkeepers in urban areas but are evaded in the small 
local markets. In rural areas the enforcement of price 
regulations presents administrative difficulties and 
is not effective (1970, pp. 350-1). 
Of a number of countries, 'limited administrative machinery' and 
'lack of qualified personnel' were blamed for the ineffectiveness of the 
controls. 
The IMF, of course, has a bias against controls in general, which 
may have coloured the judgements reported above. However, two independent 
studies of price controls in Nigeria also reached negative conclusions. 
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One concluded that 'many traders find it rather easy to disregard price 
control regulations' (Lewis, 1972); the other was simply entitled 'The 
futility of price control in Nigeria' (Oyemakinde, 1973). It is also 
well known that even countries with well developed public services and 
good information flows, such as Britain and the United States, have found 
the enforcement of price controls exceedingly difficult. 
In general, these comments on the operation of controls in other 
African states are similar to mine on Ghana, with controls most likely to 
be obeyed in urban stores, and almost entirely unenforceable in the villages. 
Whether the IMF is right to suggest that shortages of personnel are a major 
explanation of the failure is, however, open to doubt; the Ghanaian 
experience suggests that, because of<corruption,the creation of a price 
I 
inspectorate may create problems rather than solve them. 
The overall conclusion, then,is that in the conditions of tropical 
Africa retail price controls are not likely to be a very useful instrument 
of economic policy. They stand a better chance of being effective j.f 
confined to a rather small number of imported wage goods, as in Zambia, 
and if the controllers are not too ambitious in the extent to which they 
seek to hold down profits and prices, as in Morocco. Overall, though, 
controls are unlikely to provide more than minor support to policies that 
operate directly on the levels of aggregate demand and supply, and on the 
distribution of incomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is already a considerable body of literature on the 
theory of illegal activities together with a few empirical studies.1 The 
few empirical studies, for the obvious reason of the difficulty of getting 
data, are usually well padded with disclaimers regarding accuracy but they 
tend, nevertheless, to bear out .the conclusions of the theoretical studies. 
This paper attempts to bring together the main streams of thought 
in this literature and to put it into a consistent framework in which it is 
hoped an analysis of frustration of price and marketing controls in Kenya 
can be undertaken. Unlike much of the analysis in the literature, the 
analysis here will be concluded in partial equilibrium and will therefore not 
concentrate on the welfare effects deduced from general equilibrium. This 
is considered a more valid approach given the widespread unemployment in the 
economy. 
2. THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 
In the most capsule form, the economic analysis of criminal activities 
takes the following general form: 
a) What is the expected direct net gain from the crime? 
b) What is the probability of getting caught? 
c) What is the probability of getting convicted? 
d) What is the probable sentence received and suffered 
(likelihood of remission)? 
e) What is foregone, directly and indirectly, during 
punishment? 
It Examples with useful references and bibliographies are Bhagwati, 1974, 
and Anderson, 1976. A more comprehensive bibliography is at the end of this 
paper. 
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It must be obvious from the preceeding summary that this is a 
purely mioroeconomic approach to crime seen through the criminal1s eyes. 
It does not consider the damage to society and regards crime as what was 
called by a 'mugger', caught in Harlem, 'pecuniary redistribution'. Nor 
does it consider the theories of optimal prevention and policing (Stigler, 
1970). 
There is an alternative approach, not spelt out in the literature, 
which is to view crime as business. It does not merely cause income 
transfers but actually creates employment, has economies of scale and, in a 
2 
violent way, competes for market shares or market power. A common denomi-
nator of all these crimes is that the criminal is seen as profit maximising 
over some time horizon. He is not as risk averse as his more conventional 
counterpart in everyday business. In fact it is the very fact that he is 
prepared to tolerate some level of gamble that makes him prepared to operate 
outside the law for sufficiently lucrative rewards. 
This introduces a most fundamental point: it is the law which 
determines what is illegal and what is not. This sounds trivial but it leads 
directly to the core of this paper: that price and marketing controls create 
a new group of crimes and we need to know the answers to questions (a) - (e) 
given at the beginning of this section. Professor Krueger suggests an intri-
guing point of departure: 
In many marked-oriented economies, government restrictions on 
economic activity are pervasive facts of life. These restrictions 
give rise to rents of a variety of forms, and people often compete 
for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly legal. 
In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, 
corruption, smuggling, and black markets (1974, p.291). 
We note that the existence of controls gives rise to a new market: 
the buying and selling of access to favoured positions e.g. trade licences 
and import quotas. A hitherto 'free good' - access to a market - becomes 
something over which property rights can be exercised for private benefit 
(Demsetz, 1964). The very fear that the market mechanism was favouring some 
segment of the community which led the government to intervene, was in fact 
being reinforced, and led to the efforts of that segment to maintain its 
position since the rewards grow larger because of the intervention (Krueger, 
1974, p. 302). 
2. Recent films on the Mafia and Cosa Nostra highlight this class of economic 
crimes. 'The Godfather' and 'The Valanchi Papers' might serve as examples. 
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This is a brief summary of the well-known theory of price controls 
and will provide a point of departure for later analysis. 
In a freely operating market, purchases and saleg. plans are brought 
into agreement by a market clearing price. Purchase plans, conventionally 
depicted by demand curves, embody information regarding tastes and preferences, 
planned expenditure on all goods during the period under analysis, the vector 
of all prices (assumed known by the consumer) and the consumer's objective. 
Sales plans, conventionally depicted by supply curves, embody information 
regarding the production possibilities open to the firm (which depend on the 
firm's technology and the time period under consideration), the costs of 
productive factors (including intermediate inputs), and the firm's objective. 
The objectives range from profit maximisation and risk minimisation to 
maximising market share or 'not rocking the boat'. In all cases some time 
horizon is implicit in the firm's decision. 
Where the government considers the market distribution of output 
and, in consequence, resources, to be undesirable, it is forced to provide 
3 
some alternative to the so-called 'consumer sovereignty'. The most usual 
interventions through the market relate to direct and indirect taxes (including 
subsidies) while those that work in contravention of the market are maximum, 
minimum or fixed prices, usually coupled with quotas and licensing in cases 
where minimum prices give rise to surpluses, and rationing where maximum prices 
cause shortages. 
Figure 1: Minimum and'Maximum^Price Controls 
3. See Galbraith, 1972, for a criticism of 'consumer sovereignty' as 
a valid concept. 
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The Government intervention in the market is often for mixed motives 
which are not always easy or possible to harmonise. Examples include efforts 
to induce firms to increase employment while controlling access to complimentary 
factors, or efforts to keep the urban cost of living down while redistributing 
income to the rural areas through high minimum prices for farm produce. The 
government .also has its decision time horizon which may not coincide with 
that of either consumers or producers. We see that the government intervention, 
if it conflicts with the market, means that consumers' or producers' objectives 
are frustrated, and simple theory predicts that the frustrated party will 
seek ways of minimising his loss. 
Intervention may give firms a potentially larger gain than before 
as in the case where the controls create a monopoly. In this case firms may 
bid for the privilege by seeking those willing to 'peddle influence' through 
a range of quasi-corrupt or corrupting practices (gifts, promises of jobs, 
etc.), and In this way the actual monopoly profit is dissipatated. The 
difficulty here is that we have a prisoner's dilemma - if one does not take 
part in the corruption he inevitably loses by being excluded from the market 
in the future (Bacharach, 1976). 
4. CLASSES OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
A consumer or producer will enter into an illegal transaction 
deliberately if it is worth while. I have not said 'thought to be worthwhile' 
since the outcomes of a multitude of transactions embody some element of 
uncertainty which is subsumed in the time horizon of the individual's 
objective function. The broad categories of advantage are relative prices 
and access to profitable activities. Lots of people would not, knowingly, 
perform illegal acts. Their civic and/or moral sense makes the idea of 
contravening the law repugnant, a feeling which more than offsets the potential 
financial gains. Others are dissuaded by the severity of punishments and 
the high likelihood of detection and conviction. In both cases, illegal 
activity is considered not worthwhile. 
Where a potential, worthwhile gain is seen i.e. the person is 
prepared to contravene the law (and frustrate the government's objective), 
a range of strategy choices arise. The precise strategy used will have 
somewhat differing consequences. 
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(a) Blackmarket 
Where there is a shortage caused by a minimum price, there will 
be some consumers who will be willing to pay more in order to get more. 
Figure 2: The Blackmarket equilibrium 
Suppliers may be prepared to increase their sales at more than \ 
the minimum price but they face greater risks and probably incur greater 
costs per unit of increased sales. These extra costs may be bribes or direct 
costs arising from working, say, night shifts and employing extra guards. 
The elasticity of the blackmarket supply curve (SD) will be smaller the greater 
4 B 
the expected punishment from capture. The demand curve, too, might shift 
since several consumers may cancel their plans to buy above the minimum price 
(Pm^n). The result would be that quantity QL~QT "would be sold illegally at 
price Pg. Note that the blackmarket price is not necessarily above the free 
market price. 
(b) Hoarding 
It is quite possible that P ^ ^ could be the market clearing price 
but there is still a potential gain since some suppliers might withhold part 
of what would have been their 'profit-maximising' output under perfect 
Competition. Thus an artificial shortage is created and if the hoarders are 
4. Zanzibar and Indonesia had laws permitting death penalty for 
smuggling. 
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sufficiently few so as not to compete against each other, they can act as 
perfectly discriminating monopolists, selling each unit at a different price 
according to the bargaining power of the customer. Clearly the greater the 
artificial shortage the more likely the hoarder will be detected. 
5 
(c) Corruption 
If the minimum price is fixed at a level where the representative 
firm in the industry is gaining supranormal profits, there would be an 
Incentive for new firms to enter the business. Again let us assume that P . & m m 
is the short run market clearing price. Conventional theory predicts that 
in the long run new firms would be attracted into the industry, the supply 
curve would shift right and prices would fall. Since this situation is ruled 
out by the imposed price, it follows that existing firms get a virtual rent 
and access to the industry through, say, a licence becomes most attractive. 
The licence, a fixed cost, could absorb the surplus profit but an alternative 
would be to pay the appropriate official a bribe, again a fixed cost, so as 
to ensure a place in the industry. In the limit, the bribe could be so large 
as to remove the rent. In figure 3, ABCD is the supranormal profit which could 
be absorbed by a licence fee or bribe. 
Figure 3. Bribery potential. 
5. A useful discussion of corruption is to be found in Banfield, 197 5, 
and the comments by Reder and Rottenberg in the same issue of that journal. 
From these, corruption can be defined as inducing an agent to betray his trust, 
i.e. sacrifice his principal's interest, by selling rights that he possess 
de facto, but does not possess legally. 
.-;•'»» i 
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The analysis of corruption is also applicable to the earlier cases 
since corruption tends to lower the risks of capture and conviction. It works i ly « 
more on the fixed than variable costs. 
Wherever there is an official limitation of access to profitable 
opportunities (opportunities which may have been created by government actions), 
there is potential for corruption since government officials have control over 
the disposal of lucrative 'property rights'. 
(d) Poaching 
the same temptation exists to circumvent it. If the market price of the 
illegal good is high relative to the average production costs, there are 
profitable opportunities to expand output, albeit illegally and (may be) at 
high costs. It should be noted here that the key is demand more than supply. 
Extra costs incurred in poaching are unlikely to be as large as the extra costs 
incurred in trying to control it. 
(e) Smuggling 
This whole problem arises from restrictions on the movements of goods 
across legal boundaries, either internal or external. 
(i) Tariff Avoidance. With domestic supply and the international supply 
Figure Smuggling Potential. 
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s^^^, Q^ would be, sold,, locally at price P, , Q^ of which would be locally 
produced. If a tariff is introduced for either revenue or protective purposes 
such that the price rises to P , then the domestic supply curve could become 
more elastic as resources are transferred into smuggling. In the limit 
the government gets' no'tariff revenue, S ^ is the International supply curve 
after Imposition of !a tariff and is th'e domestic supply curve that would 
give rise to no tariff revenue. 
(ii) Price Differentials. It is not unusual for neighbouring states to 
have slightly different prices for articles. The differentials tend to 
reflect transport costs where goods are free to move. But where the government 
wishes to pursue some policy such as national self sufficiency or cheap 
food to keep the cost of living down, there are usually controls to stop 
producers from selling in the most favourable market. 
The price differential that results makes for the possibility of 
profitable clandestine traffic in goods, the movement of which is prohibited. 
Generally such trading raises marginal costs and often give rise to domestic 
shortages.^ 
(iii) Monopoly. Where government policy has created a protected monopoly or 
monopsony, it is often to the advantage of Individuals to trade outside 
these organisations. Since monopolies sell at higher than competitive prices 
and monopsonists buy at lower than competitive prices, it is advantageous 
to try and trade directly with customers. 
A monopoly Is remunerative so long as the elasticity of demand is 
greater than one but less than infinity. Clearly the greater the amount of 
competitive goods smuggled in, the less the ability of the monopolist to 
exploit the situation expected from statutory protection. For example, 
Tanzania's General Tyres has undercut Kenya's Firestone on various occasions. 
The monopsonist is often faced'' with two further disadvantages. He 
(or 'it' in the case of a Marketing Board) is used as an agent to collect 
taxes and cesses',' and so is exposed to 1:he' common efforts''"to", avoid these >Y r' ':« 
levies on (usually) smallholder revenues. Furthepmor.e the. legal monopsonist 
is usually charged with the job of 'disposing of surpluses abroad, often at low 
i j 
6. Analysis of recent smuggling on the Kenya-Uganda border is complicated 
by distorted currency exchange rates in addition to price differentials. The 
likelihood of bribery Is.higher the more profitable the activity. At the time 
of the coffee boom, heresay-* evidence-mentioned Uganda' coffee was being bought 
for Ksh 8 and sold In Nairobi for Ksh 25 per kilo; small wonder bribes of Ksh 100 
per truck were recorded. 
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prices and he tries to spread his overheads over the largest number of 
goods and to exploit the domestic market e.g. the Kenya Meat Commission, 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries and Uplands Eacon Factor]/. The less the 
controlled produce ^oing through the controlled outlet, the smaller the 
lucrative domestic market available to the monopolist/mononsonist and the 
higher his unit costs and in consequence the greater the likelihood of 
traders trading illegally. 
Figure 5. Domestic Monopsony and Monopoly 
(f) Extortion 
One of the most important illegal activities arising from the 
introduction of controls (although by no means solely as a consequence 
of them) is extortion where a perfectly normal activity — request for licence 
or permit - is thwarted and replaced by a threat that the relevent document 
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won't be granted. In view of the absolute need of, say, a licence in order 
to function at all, any surplus profit can be 'extorted' from a business. 
This comes about in much the same way as Ricardo's landlords obtained the 
economic rent from any land that was better than the worst that had to be 
cultivated to satisfy demand. A particularly import^ta^ctdioiniinrre'fe^rMtff. 
of trade that is similar to extortion is to be found where a trader with a 
stock of scarce, price controlled goods ostensibly fulfils the law - the 
control price is adhered to - but conceals other rationing devices e.g. only 
those who buy all or some of their other requirements from that trader will 
get the scarce good.. This action, 'full-line forcing', is illegal in 
most countries with Restrictive Practices Acts. 
(g) Blackmail 
Once one has embarked on a course of infringement of the law, no 
matter how mildly, one leaves oneself open to blackmail. A businessman 
cannot afford to have his reputation for honest dealing called in question. 
(h) Protection 
The famous protection rackets of the Chicago of A1 Capone, in the 
Prohibition days of the 1920s and 1930s, don't have a spectacular a counter- ' 
part now, but it seems that 'influence peddling' serves much the same purpose: 
'"Someone" should be given a post, or put on the Board, for the long run health 
of the company or else !' Again the implied threat of closure 
or endless frustration (with no court of appeal) makes this cost one that is 
usually accepted. It has, of course, another side: protection by the powerful 
gives rise to another range of techniques for circumventing government regulations. 
It is clear that, while influence may have a price, it may well be worth it in 
money terms as a short cut round bureaucratic controls which are the necessary 
arm of government policy. 
(i) Civil Disobedience 
Government legislation often favours some segment of the community 
at the expense of some other. The underpriviledged sector often resorts to 
acts which frustrate government in areas other than those which are the 
primary cause of dissatisfaction. 
7. 'The term extortion refers in a general way to the act of obtaining 
payments from some entity in return for not imposing upon that entity some 
harmful effect, where the generator of the external effect receives no direct 
net internal benefit from the act. It is very important to distinguish 
between what we have labelled extortion and other bargaining situations where the 
externality generating party does receive direct net benefits' (Daly and Giertz, 
1975, p. 998). 
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In many of these sorts of illegal activity, the goal is not purely 
monetary and so the relative cost and benefit calculation mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper is made far more difficult. Furthermore the 'criminal' 
may make no effort to conceal what he is doing since his aim is to further 
his cause. A good example was Gandhi's march to the sea to take salt without 
paying tax. Wildcat strikes probably are also aimed at a different class 
of objectives. Those with deviant lifestyles e.g. hippies often aim at 
impeding the smooth running of the community by rejecting certain laws and 
conventions. 
(j ) False Documentation 
Laws which are intended to protect a domestic industry are 
particularly susceptible to being broken by incorrectly invoiced imports. 
By putting a product in a different category, an importer causes customs 
officials to allow potential competitive goods in. One might be tempted to 
-Aaliathi'S: smuggling bptb&£tuai^ cleai^and^sorae goods 
might validly appear in either of two categories. If documents give wrong 
prices or qualities, a number of foreign exchange control regulations can be 
undermined. 
(k) Malfeasance 
Malfeasance could be viewed as bribery but if we consider it 
more carefully, it is closer to theft: an official uses his public office 
to take money from a citizen and pockets the proceeds. This applies whether 
it is selling the 'right to speed on the highway' i.e. accepting a bribe 
rather than giving a speeding ticket, or selling the 'right to view elephants' 
i.e. admitting people to a park and pocketing the proceeds by not issuing 
a receipt. There is usually a serious discrepancy between park gate and park 
lodge tourist counts. This has government revenue effects and probably causes 
a number of adverse externalities - congestion, greater road risks, etc. 
5. CONCLUSION 
* 
This paper has attempted little by way of formal analysis but has 
tried to show how a wide range of illegal activities can be understood in 
the simple context of microeconomics. A more sophisticated model involving 
shadow prices and activity characteristics (Lancaster, 1966) could give some 
light, particularly in so far as moral suasion affects people's perception 
of 'prices' and 'returns'. 
- 32 - IDS/OP 32 
The theme has been that price and marketing controls are usually 
for goals other than those of the markets' normal participants. This 
disruption must be backed with some penalties to stop the erstwhile equilibria 
from being restored. But coupled with these penalties, usually a new range 
of rewards (rents) come into being. The bulk of the suggested analysis 
is that illegal activities in frustration of controls are trades in rights 
created by the laws. 
An economist's simple minded solution to crimes of this nature 
is to work upon the people's objective functions so that they become law-
abiding for motives other than fear. The Justice Department, by increasing 
the probability of capture and conviction, would also play an active part 
in attaining the government objective. 
Perhaps the conclusion reached by Reder can close this paper 
too: 
The point to be emphasized is not that 
private management is better than public, or the 
reverse, but that conflicting lines of authority 
and responsibility beget confusion both of purpose 
and obligation. One result is that corruption 
proliferates because it becomes difficult to identify, 
and the sense of moral outrage that inhibit it is 
correspondingly weakened (197 5, p. 609). 
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THE EFFECT OF THE GENERAL PRICE CONTROL ORDERS ON 
MANUFACTURING 
By 
S. M. Ita 
The Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
From the manufacturers' point of view, the General Price Control 
Orders made under Section 5(l)(c) of the Price Control Act, have been an 
obstacle" to industrial expansion and growth in Kenya since December 1971. 
Contrary to government intentions, the General Price Control Order of 1971 
has not succeeded in lowering consumer prices and its administration 
interferes with incentives to investors and local manufacturers. The 
consumer continues to live with rising prices of goods and services except 
in the case of specifically controlled essential items. Indeed even in the 
case of essential Items, one often hears of traders being taken to courts 
of law for overcharging. 
The statement that administration of price controls has become a 
disincentive to investment and manufacturing might appear ridiculous in 
the light of the growth experienced by the manufacturing sector of the 
economy in the last seven years. At the inception of the General Price 
Control Order of 1971, industry was expected to absorb a large proportion 
of its production costs without passing them on to the consumer. Under-
lying this expectation was the official assumption that industry would 
experience increased productivity as a result of industrial protection and 
the growing domestic market. 
Ironically, however, the system of appraising applications for 
price increases was slow and when at last decisions were made, the price 
increases allowed reflected an attitude of profit control rather than 
price control. Hence the Inability of the manufacturing sector to take 
full advantage of the domestic market available to it. The uneconomic 
prices allowed for by the Price Controller force manufacturers to produce 
low quality products or even drop some product lines. 
Realising that the price control system was slow, the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning replaced L.N. 302 of 1971 with L.N. 314 of 
1974 and L.N. 153 of 1976, both of which were General Price Orders but with 
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some provision for speeding up the system of processing applications for 
price increases. However, the new General Price Orders did not cope with 
the problem. The long delays in processing applications continued and 
applications for price increases continued to pile up at the Price Controller' 
office. 
The problem of price control as a department can not be solved by 
simplified work procedures. There must be an adequate staff to cope with 
the workload in order to avoid long delays in processing applications. 
There must also be an adequate number of field staff to ensure that consumers 
get the benefit of price control. But to establish such a workforce 
requires a substancial government expenditure. 
As mentioned above, price control has been a major constraint 
on profitability and output. When the General Price Contol Order of 1971 
was introduced, the East African market and others within Kenya's neighbour-
hood were open to local industry. This of course has not remained the case 
all through the seven years of General Price Control Orders in Kenya. Our 
market is today confined within Kenya boundaries and industries that had 
established plan capacities in anticipation of an East African market are 
operating far below capacity. The cost of carrying excess capacity is 
surely a limiting factor to the growth of local industry. 
Similarly, during the seven years of General Price Control Orders, 
the costs of industrial inputs have-been rising steeply. In considering 
applications for price increases, the Price Controller must, under the 197 6 
General Price Order, take into consideration only the increases, in costs 
of raw materials and energy. Increases in transport and labour costs as well 
as overheads are not taken into account. This has had serious negative 
effects on profitability and output and is thus an obstacle to growth and 
expansion of local industry. 
The assumption that manufacturers could maintain their levels of 
profitability through increased productivity despite price control does not 
hold true. It is a fact that domestic demand for local manufactures has 
increased during the seven year period. That this is so is supported by 
the fact that local industry maintainediits production level despite the 
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collapse of the East African market. This does not, however, indicate 
increased production; it was merely a shift from export to local sales. 
Similarly, the government expected local industry to increase 
productivity despite price control as a result of measures introduced to 
protect local industry from imports. Like the Price Control Orders, the 
implementation of the protective measures has not been very satisfactory. 
i 
Licences for imports in competition with local manufactures continue to be 
issued, foreign exchange allocations to cover such imports approved, and 
illicit imports have found their way into Kenya from all directions. All 
these have taken away a share of the domestic market, thus reducing the 
chances of local industry benefiting from the protective measures. 
It is common knowledge that price control, like inflation, distorts 
economic incentives, confuses the pattern of development and encourages 
speculation as opposed to productive activity. The Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers has been keeping the government informed of the negative effects 
of price control. The General Price Control Orders discriminates against 
manufacturers as its provisions mainly operate on the ex-factory selling 
price only and not on middlemen or importers of manufactured products. 
The Order does not consider increased costs of production except for raw 
materials and energy. 
The Kenya Association of Manufacturers has often objected to 
broadening of price controls in Kenya. Hence its persistent representation 
to the government for a complete removal of the General Price Control 
Orders. The consumers are at the mercy of the retailer in all horticultural 
products and other consumer and consumer durables not covered by the General 
Price Control Orders. 
We will comment on the role and effect of the Kenya National 
Trading Corporation (KNTC) and other parastatals which, like the KNTC, are 
established to promote production and distribute local products e.g. sugar, 
cement, maize, salt, cotton, sisal, etc. Some of these commodities are 
locally produced industrial raw materials and are an Important component of 
production costs which form the basis for ex-factory prices of industrial 
products. It is no secret that these parastatals are crippled by inefficient 
systems of management which are a cost to the whole economy. Considering that 
many agricultural and industrial products categorised as basic essentials 
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are marketed and distributed by the KNTC and other similar parastatals, 
their influence on the final prices of these products is significant. When 
fixing the prices of these products, the Price Controller takes into account 
a commission and distribution costs of these parastatals. This has the 
effect of denying the consumer the benefit of low prices on basic essential 
products. 
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PRICE AND WAGE CONTROLS IN KENYA 
By 
Frederick E. Omido 
Chairman General 
Central Organisation of Trade Unions 
I would like to start by explaining why the Central Organisation 
of Trade Unions (COTU) which represents the interests of workers:in Kenya 
decided to withdraw its membership from the Price Control Advisory Committee. 
When the Price Control Advisory Committee was set up in early 1972 to 
advise on prices, we hailed the move as a step in the right direction and 
accepted to serve in the Committee. This was because we were convinced 
that this Committee would advise on control of the prices of all commodities. 
COTU had not been made to understand that price increases of many essential 
foodstuffs would be made outside the Committee. 
After accepting membership to the Committee, we came to realise 
that the impression created by the Government concerning the Committee was 
wrong. COTU communicated its feelings to the Government indicating that 
it was prepared to cooperate in search for a formula which would ensure 
that wages, prices, profits and rents were regulated in the interest of 
the nation. We suggested that since the Wage Guidelines were part of an 
incomes policy and required consultations with all the groups concerned in 
order to succeed, the Wage Guidelines should be replaced by a more comprehen-
sive Wage and Incomes Policy. 
COTU proposed specific amendments to the Wage Guidelines which, 
if accepted, would have made us continue our membership in the Price Control 
Advisory Committee. COTU could not however continue its membership of the 
Committee while price control on essential commodities did not fall within 
the powers of this Committee but were dealt with by the Costs and Prices 
Committee where COTU was not represented. This gave the public the impression 
that COTU was a party to all price increases made. COTU officials decided 
to seek the mandate.of COTU members who unanimously demanded that we 
withdraw from the Committee immediately: we withdrew on 18th February, 1974. 
We have not taken part in any meeting of the Price Control Advisory Committee 
since that date. However, COTU is still very much willing to cooperate with 
the Government if the position is reviewed to allow for only one committee 
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to control prices of all essential commodities. COTU also feels that all 
essential commodities should be subject to price control. 
Since August 1973 when the Wage Guidelines were introduced, 
workers' real wages have not increased. The unions have only been allowed to 
claim compensation for price increases and usually have not been fully 
compensated for those price increases. COTU also feels that the Cost of 
Living indices are manipulated in a manner that leaves workers on the losing; 
side. Price fixing by manufacturers is in our view not subject to proper 
Government control and the standards of manufactured goods do not justify 
their high prices. Therefore, the wage controls and the free hand given to 
manufacturers to fix prices favours manufacturers and works against the 
interests of workers. The Wage Guidelines were intended to lead to expansion 
of employment opportunities, but we have no evidence that the profits realised 
by employers go towards attaining this goal. To the contrary, these profits 
end up as higher dividends to both local and foreign investors. The Wage 
Guidelines have led to a decline in the standard of living of the workers 
which will continue to decline as long as the Wage Guidelines are enforced. 
We feel strongly that unless the Wage Guidelines are accompanied by similar 
guidelines on profits and other incomes, the ultimate outcome will be the 
strengthening of classes which is bound to result in a clash between the 
'haves' and the 'have-nots'. 
Failure by the Government to control rents is a very serious matter 
because it has left the workers at the mercy of landlords. There should 
be effective measures to control and even'decrease the current exorbitant 
rents as workers spend about a third of their wages on rent. Also, Govern-
ment failure to formulate a housing policy has to a great extent contributed 
to the inflation of house rents. For example, civil servants put up 
buildings in which they live but claim high rents from Government. In COTU's 
view, senior Government servants have therefore been part and parcel of the 
hiking of rents to the detriment of workers. The Government should define 
a housing policy, extend the powers of the Rent Tribunal, and employ inspectors 
as in the case of price control so as to ensure that actual rents are in 
conformity with the laid down rules. 
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THE ROLE OF THE KENYA CONSUMERS' ORGANISATION 
By 
Christine N, Ndirango (Mrs) 
Chairperson 
The Kenya Consumers' Organisation 
In 1952, the price increases after the last remaining goods, 
chiefly foodstuffs, were taken off price control which had been operative 
during the war so outraged some of the staff wives of the Prince of Wales 
School (now Nairobi School) that they got together and organised an ad hoc 
committee to discuss what to do. Out of this the Housewives Consumers' 
Organisation was born. Recently, in an effort to widen its appeal, the 
organisation changed its name to the Kenya Consumers' Organisation.1 The 
organisation was then patronised by European women and operated mostly within 
Nairobi. Its aims, which have remained unchanged, were:-
to try to keep the ccst of living down; 
to protect consumer interests; 
to ensure that the views of the Organisation are known to 
the government, producer boards, manufacturers' associations, 
and to any other persons directly or indirectly engaged in 
the supply of consumer goods and services; 
to keep members informed on matters of interest to consumers; and 
to cooperate with other organisations with similar aims. 
The Kenya Consumers'Organisation (KCO) is a non-profit making and 
non-political voluntary body centred in Nairobi whose membership is open 
to all Kenyans regardless of age or sex. Its limited finances come mainly 
from membership fees whose total sum is not enough to allow the implementation 
of many programmes. It is affiliated to the International Organisation of 
Consumer Unions (IOCU) and locally is a member of the Kenya National Council 
of Social Services which is the umbrella body for all voluntary organisations 
in Kenya. 
The major aim of the KCO has been to protect the consumer. In 
doing so, the Organisation receives complaints of various types concerning 
the quality, quantity and price of all kinds of consumer items. It takes up 
these problems and tries to obtain the best solutions possible. 
1. The origin of this Organisation is reported in the July 1977 issue 
of Contact, the official journal of the Kenya Consumers' Organisation. 
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The KCO is represented in the Price Control Advisory Committee, a 
committee whose purpose is to advise the Minister for Finance on matters 
related to the prices of goods and services or to the control of the prices 
of goods and services. The KCO's views are normally sought with regard to 
the importance of a commodity, whether the commodity is of importance to 
consumers at large or a luxury which will only affect ti.: elite who can afford 
a higher price without adversely affecting their budgets. 
In trying to protect consumer interests, we take up consumer 
complaints and try to solve them with the person or firm concerned by way 
of open discussion. We feel that this is a more effective way of making 
ourselves heard, rather than being militant and noisy, and manufacturers 
tend to respond to our complaints better through discussion. Manufacturers 
and other producer interests usually respond to our complaints by either 
replacing the faulty good in question or by apologising for the poor service 
V 
rendered. Other activities of the KCO include visits to various factories, 
butcheries, supermarkets and other stores so as to discuss with them topics 
of special concern to us. We also used to publish prices of various essential 
goods in our monthly periodical Contact, with the unfortunate result that 
the shops charging lower prices raised them to the published levels. i ' f 1 r ( 
Unfortunately, members of the KCO do not have powers to arrest or 
prosecute defaulting traders and manufacturers, and we therefore work in 
close liasion with the relevant government ministries in solving problems 
involving legal offences, e.g. overcharging and hoarding is handed over to 
the Price Control Department of the Ministry of Finance; defaulters in 
weights and measures are reported to the Weights and.lleasures Departmentof 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; complaints regarding quality are 
sent to the Kenya Bureau of Standards; and those regarding adulteration of 
goods are referred to the Government Chemist of the Office of the President 
for analysis. 
Most of the complaints we receive come from consumers in urban 
areas, which represent only a small"fraction of the consumer population as 
a whole. Many of the rural consumers are not aware that they can and 
have a right to complain and do not usually know who to compalin to. The 
need to create consumer awareness through consumer education is therefore 
great. Unfortunately, the KCO, being a non-profit making organisation, 
has not been able to establish branches in the rural areas. However, we 
- 45 - IDS/OP 32 
attend seminars in the rural areas organised by other organisations and give 
lectures on consumer rights. 
I 
KCO's participation in international conferences keeps us in tough 
with other consumer groups in other parts of the world. Although we meet 
with groups from developed countries, we still feel that the problems facing 
i 
consumers are basically similar in both developed and developing countries. 
Based on our contact with consumer organisations in other countries, we have 
made the following recommendations to the government for possible implementation 
in Kenya:- + • 
±. Consumer Policy. A Consumer Protection Act should be enacted to cater for 
all consumer problems. This could either be included in the existing Price 
Control Act or be a separate Act. The Price Control Act as it stands tends 
to omit some very important consumer services e.g. social, health, and 
education services. That is why one does not, for example, know what to do 
with a rude bus conductor or driver when they violate his consumer.rights. 
That is why children as consumers of education services have no say over the'' ... 
conduct of their teachers and are sometimes punished or expMled from school when 
they complain about the behaviour of a teacher. 
( j 
( :i 
2. Consumer Time. This is a consumer right which does not receive any 
attention at all. An example of this is the time wasted at East African 
Power and Lighting Company and the Nairobi City Council when consumers go 
to pay their electricity and water bills respectively. A Consumer Protection 
Act should be able to control this by compelling the relevant institutions 
to devise better methods of collecting their levies. This would reduce the 
number of hours people spend queueing to pay their light and water bills. 
3. Unlawful Denial. At present in Kenya, we have a Rent Tribunal with a 
provision for unlawful eviction of tenants. A Consumer Protection Act 
should have a similar provision for unlawful disconnection of electricity, 
water or telephone. Any consumer unlawfully disconnected from the above 
services should be lawfully compensated for the inconvenience and embarrassment 
4. Price Increases. A Price Control Advisory Committee was started in 1972 
to deal with applications for price increases. We feel that any landlord who 
i 
wishes to raise his rent should be forced to submit an application to the 
same committee, giving reasons for the intended rent increase. The same 
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should apply to companies offering rental services e.g. after renting, say, 
a television set for three years or so, the monthly rental should go down 
for the simple reason that the set is no longer new and it is unfair to 
charge the same fee the dealer charges for new sets. 
5. Misleading Advertising. Consumers in this country are usually misled 
by false publicity on some consumer goods e.g. soaps, creams and tinned foods. 
Some of these goods have been proven dangerous to human health in other countries 
because they contain some ingredients like mercury but in Kenya sell like 
hot cakes. The KCO strongly condemns misleading and inadequate labelling 
of processed foods especially baby foods which we feel should bear enough 
information to avoid undernourishing babies. The government, together with 
a strong consumer representation and full use of the services of the 
Government Chemist, should make sure that all advertisements are genuine 
and action taken against all misleading publicity. 
6. Consumer Education. Poor people always pay more. Low income consumers 
have a double disadvantage: they have less to spend and also tend to get 
less value for the little they have. This is because they cannot buy in 
bulk and therefore often buy smaller packs with high unit prices, and rent 
and hire services because they cannot afford their own houses, washing 
machines, cars, etc. Advise on how to conduct consumer education courses 
should be sought from more developed countries, either by inviting their 
consumer educators to our country or by sending our educators to inter-
national conferences on consumer education. 
7. Advisory Committees. The present advisory committees only play a 
passive role and wait for problems to be brought to them. Some of these 
problems need never arise if the individual had a better understanding of 
his rights and obligations. The advisory committees should play a more 
active role like persuading people to seek advice before entering into 
contracts or taking insurance policies. This type of service would need 
a great number of specialist staff especially in the case of lectures and 
demonstrations, the results of which are not always easy to assess. The 
KCO will also need members with technical fchov;""fcow to"represenf~consurners. at 
some of the technical meetings held by, say, the Kenya Bureau of Standards. 
To conclude this short paper, it is important to put on record that 
there is a great need for raising consumer awareness in Kenya. Since our 
country is developing at a rapid pace, the KCO has even greater challenges 
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to fulfil. With the expanding local industries and the higher consumer 
demand for various commodities, the need for consumer education becomes 
vital. It is through demand that manufacturers increase their output, 
but the consumer must be well informed on issues concerning quality, 
safety, choice, and price. Consumer protection is needed to ensure that 
the poorest consumers do not spend the little they have on unsafe or shoddy 
goods. Since commercial organisations cannot be expected to provide the 
answers to consumer problems, the government and the KCO should play an 
active role. Of course there will always be people who will not be 
reached by information whatever mass media is used. Legislation on minimum 
standards and control of advertising and marketing practices can therefore 
be particularly important in Kenya. 
- 48 - IDS/OP 32 
THE IMPACT OF PRICE CONTROLS ON INFLATION AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF REAL INCOME IN KENYA 
By 
J. T. Mukui 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Until a few years ago, very little research effort was being devoted 
to the study of price control as a tool of economic management. However, recent 
experimentation with price controls in many countries has caused economists 
to take the issue more seriously. This paper is based on my M.A. thesis (Mukui, 
1978) which was a response to controls imposed - Kenya in late 1971 to control 
prices directly and curb profiteering. 
The paper starts by giving some background information to price 
controls e.g. why the controls were introduced and their coverage. The rest 
of the paper is an attempt at empirical analysis of the effectiveness of 
price controls. Aspects analysed include its effect on the cost of living, 
growth and distrivution of income, and observance and evasion of controls 
by traders. 
The conclusions are tentative because (a) the topic is one in 
which the theory does not provide unambiguous conclusions for all situations, 
(b) there are no handy measures by which to gauge the effectiveness of 
controls in practice, and (c) there are no other countries' studies to compare 
my results with. The paper explains the practical problems encountered in 
the implementation of a control policy and concludes that price control promises 
more than it gives and the faith the public has in it may even be detrimental 
because it might divert attention from more important considerations like 
property ownership . 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The present price control system was introduced in December 1971 
when the combination of a balance of payments deficit and increased inflation 
caused the Government to devalue the currency and to announce a price freeze. 
In his Press release of December 22, 1971, the Minister for Finance and Planning 
said: 
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The decision to maintain party with U.S. Dollar and the 
recently announced measures to control foreign exchange 
allocation for imports and the already existing tariffs 
and other protective measures, will mean that the protection 
enjoyed by local producers, especially of manufactured goods, 
has been increased tremedously. 
For the fear that this greater degree of protection would lead to 
'unnecessary and unscrupous ' increases in prices by manufacturers and traders, 
he announced a price freeze for all goods and some services and the establish-
ment of a Price Control Advisory Committee (PCAC), composed of representatives 
of manufacturers, trade unions, traders, farmers, consumer organisations and 
2 
Treasury. According to the Price Control Act (cap. 504), the legal instrument 
governing the control of prices, a PCAC is appointed by the Finance Minister I 
'to advise him on all matters affecting, tending to effect, arising out of 
or relating to the prices of goods and services or to control of the prices 
•of goods or services .... ' The Act empowers the Finance Minister to fix 
maximum prices for goods and services, to freeze all or some prices ordinarily 
charged on a specific date, and to prescribe percentage fixed goods. The 
Minister cannot delegate to any person any of these powers. 
The Government enforces two types of controls, specific and general. 
The Price Control (.General Prices) (Temporary) Order, 1971, L.N. No. 302/1971, 
prohibited increases in prices above those ordinarily charged on 22nd Dec. 1971. 
The categories affected by the freeze were: the sale of any goods by retail, the 
sale of any goods by wholesale, the importing or exporting of goods, catering, 
motor vehicle repairing, building construction and repair, electrical repairs, 
and electronic servicing. In 1973, the 1971 General Price Order was nullified 
in a law court on the grounds that it was not laid in Parliament as required 
3 4 by Section 8 of the Price Control Act. A replacement Order issued in December 
1974 served the additional purpose of bringing under control products and 
]r. Daily Nation, 23rd December, 1971. 
'2. See Kenya Gazette3 21st January, 1972, G.N. No. 135/1972, for names y 
of members of the first Price Control Advisory Committee. 
3. Makadara Court File No. 821/1973 (unreported). 
4. L.N. No. 314/1974. 
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services that had come into production after 22nd December, 1971. The 
latest General Price Order is L.N. No. 153/1976. 
The general control operates by prohibiting firms and traders from 
increasing the prices of goods sold or services rendered by them above the 
price levels prevailing on the date the latest General Price Order came into 
effect, except with the approval of the Finance Minister. A firm applying 
for a price increase is required to complete a questionnaire which should be 
accompanied by a copy of the Profit and Loss Accounts and Balance Sheets 
for the previous two financial years, and supporting documents like suppliers' 
invoices to show that his costs of production have gone up. The price 
increases allowed are communicated to the firm by letter, and the firm 
notifies the public and middlemen by marking prices on his products or by 
publishing the recommended selling prices. The prices are not published 
in the Kenya Gazette Supplement and it therefore becomes difficult for the 
public to know the legal maximum prices in the case of goods under general 
control. 
Even before December 1971 when general controls were introduced, 
specific controls were there for maize, maize meal, sugar, sifted maize meal, 
bread, rice, and beer and stouts. To make administration of controls more 
effective, many products were brought under specific control in late 197 3 
and early 1974. From June 1974, the specifically controlled commodities 
have been baby foods, barbed wire, charcoal, beer and stouts, tea, cement, 
GCI sheets, nails, soaps and detergents, fats and edible oils, toilet paper, 
sugar,rice, maize, and maize meal, sifted maize meal, bread, meat, wines 
and spirits, soft drinks, wheat flour, salt, tooth pastes and tooth brushes, 
5 
and matches. The prices of specifically controlled commodities are 
published in the Kenya Gazette Supplement which is posted to all Price 
Inspectors, District Revenue Officers, District Officers and District Commissioners 
and reported in the Press especially in the case of essential commodities. 
The proportion of consumers' expenditure under price control can be 
estimated from Consumer Price Indices Nairobi (Kenya, 1977). As can be 
5. Beans, peas, grams, and njahi (lablab beans) were controlled in 
August 1973 and decontrolled in May 1974 due to seasonality of production 
which caused erratic price variations. Wines and spirits were decontrolled 
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Table 1: Consumer expenditure under specific controls, by income classes 
(%) - Nairobi. 
COMMODITY LOWER INCOME MIDDLE INCOME UPPER INCOME 
1. Rice 0.48790 0.70132 0.64750 
2. Wheat flour 0.60270 0.80812 0.46250 
3. Maize flour 5.95730 3.52440 0.30250 
4. Maize grain 0.53710 0.27412 -
5. Bread 3.16930 2.26416 0.81500 
6. Meat 6.28940 5.72804 2.87250 
7. Oils and Fats 3.19800 3.04736 6.11250 
8. Sugar 2.9 5200 2.44216 0.77000 
9. Tea 0.77490 0.48416 0.18250 
10. Salt 0.31980 0.21360 0.05750 
11. Baby Foods 0.22140 0.36668 0.30000 
12. Beer 1.90740 2.24840 0.74520 
13. Soda 0.40832 0.34012 0.10051 
14. Wines and Spirits - 0.26708 0.53222 
15. Charcoal 1.96308 1.13016 0.18502 
16. Household soap 0.37759 0.56700 0.23885 
17. Detergents 0.39406 0.62775 0.16065 
18. Matches 0.12688 0.05994 0.07480 
19. Toilet soaps 0.88160 0.53880 0.16588 
20. Other toilet goods 
(include toilet rolls 
and tooth paste) 0.54120 0.29377 
21. Milk 4.35420 3.83412 2.48250 
TOTAL 34.92293 30.00869 17.50190 
Source: Consumer Price Indices Nairobi (1977) 
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seen from *hble 1, specific controls cover about 35% of total expenditure of 
6 lower income class, 30% for the middle income and 17.5% for the upper income. 
Assuming that price control is effective in keeping the cost of living down, 
one important and desirable feature of its coverage is that it is progressive 
over the entire income range. 
The coverage of general controls is more difficult to compute. The 
Price Control (General Prices) Order, 1976, L.N. 153/1976 covers: manufacture 
of goods, importing of finished goods, repairing of motor vehicles, catering, 
clearing or forwarding, and wholesale or retail sale of pharmaceuticals, 
met or vehicles, motor vehicle spare parts, agricultural machinery, and 
fertilisers and agricultural chemicals. With the help of a Price Control 
official, the author estimated that general controls cover about 8.5% of Lower 
Income class expenditure, 9.5% for Middle Income, and 18.4% of Upper Income 
7 . . class expenditure. This includes biscuits, coffee, cigarettes, footwear, 
refrigerators, bulbs, shoe polish, medicine, motor cars, motor car spare parts, 
radios, newspapers and ball pens. Table 2 shows that specific and general 
controls together protect all income classes in Nairobi almost equally. 
There are other areas of economic activity which do not come within 
the ambit of the Price Controller (and therefore not covered by -able 2) but 
where the Government exercises control on prices. These include:-
(a) Public utilities like telephone and postal services, water and 
electricity, where the Government controls prices by virtue of being the 
producer. 
(b) Petrol and petroleum products which are under the direct control 
of the Finance Minister. 
6. The effective coverage of specific controls may be even higher 
because the Consumer Price Index for Nairobi does not include cement, barbed 
wire, nails, and GCI sheets which are price controlled. 
7. These estimates do not include items such as fertilisers and agri-
cultural chemicals which are not included in the compilation of consumer 
price indices. 
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Table 2. Coverage of Controls by Income Classes (%) - Nairobi. 
Lower Income Middle Income Upper Income 
Specific controls 34.9 30.0 17.5 
General controls 8.5 9.5 18.4 
Total 43.4 39.5 35.9 
Source: Consumer Price Indices Nairobi (1977) 
(c) Bus fares, which are controlled by the Ministry of Power and 
Communications. The Road Service Identity Certificate issued annually to 
big passenger vehicles stipulate the route, timetable, and charge per kilometre 
There is no mechanism to enforce the regulations and the law is only there 
to provide a forum for settling of disputes that may arise. 
(d) Rent. The first rent control Act on residential premises was 
introduced in 1918 to check possible profiteering resulting from postwar 
housing shortage (Noormhamed, 1975, p. 21). The Rent Act ceased to apply on 
31st December, 1923. At the outbreak of the Second World War in 1940, rent 
control was introduced on both residential and business premises. The Rent 
Restrict ion Act (Cap. 296) applies to private dwelling with 'standard rent' 
not exceeding Ksh 800 for unfurnished dwellings and Ksh 1100 for furnished 
dwellings. There is a Rent Tribunal for the arbitration of disputes between 
landlords and tenants. 
The expenditure and establishement for the Price Control Department 
has expanded with the expansion of coverage of controls. As -able 3 shows, 
the staff has doubled between 1971 and 1978. When the present price control 
system was imposed in 1971, price control had regional offices only in 
g 
Nairobi, Nakuru, Mombasa, Kisumu and Nyeri but has since then opened new 
offices in Kakamega and Embu. 
When the General Price Order was introduced in 1971, only increases 
in costs of raw materials were considered in awarding price increases. However 
the Price Control (General Prices) Order, 1976, stipulates that application 
8. Daily Nation, 5th January, 1973. 
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Table 3: Establishment for the Price Control Department 
IDS/OP 32 
1971/72 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79" 
Price Controller 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Deputy Price Controller - - - - - 1 1 
Assistant Price Controller 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Assistant Secretaries - - 2 2 2 2 2 
Senior Price Control 
Inspectors 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Price Inspectors 8 12 20 20 20 20 27 
Clerical Officers - 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Shorthand typists - 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Copy typists 6 7 7 7 7 7 9 
Drivers 5 10 10 10 10 10 11 
Surbordinate staff - 2 2 2 2 2 9 
26 43 ' 53 53 55 55 72 
Expenditure (K£) 
(Approved estimates) n.a. 35,634 60,008 65,220 80,850 88,878 133,900 
Note: n.a. = not available 
" = estimates 
Source: Kenya, Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure, 1974/75 to 1978/79 issues. 
Establishment for 1971/72 from Price Control files. 
for price increases under the Order 'shall have regard only to increases in 
the direct costs of raw materials and fuels and the costs of importation of 
finished products', i.e. liberalising the Order by also allowing fuel costs 
but still excluding labour costs. The aim of this highly restrictive policy 
seem to have been to make companies absorb a part of increases in costs. It 
was also an implicit wage control because firms would be less generous in 
allowing wage increases which they cannot pass on to consumers. 
IDS/OP 32 
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3. INFLUENCE OF CONTROLS ON THE COST OF LIVING 
In estimating the extent to which price controls have influenced 
the cost of living, the measure of inflation used is the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). The CPI is -a measure of changes in the retail prices of goods 
and services typically consumed by households and is calculated separately 
for each of the three income classes in Nairobi. We will use the CPI because 
i:t allows us to analyse the effects of controls on each income class. We 
will analyse periods 1971-73 and 1973-77 separately. 
(a)' December 1971 - December 197 3 Period 
The rate of increase in the Lower Income CPI rose from 1.6% in 1970 
to 7.5% in 1971 but declined substancially to 3.1% in 1972.9 Was the 1972 
i 
decline due to price control? 
A reliable answer to this question requires a model that separates 
the influence of demand-pull and cost-push factors to the cost of living so 
that price control effect can be taken as a residual. However, in the absence 
of such a model, we will assume that other factors influenced the cost of 
10 
laving equally m 1970, 1971 and 1972. This implies that price control 
had a moderating influence, through two main routes. First, the price freeze 
must have instilled psychological fear in manufacturers and traders due to 
risk of falling foul of the law. Since the General Price Order had been 
s|ubtitled 'temporary', manufacturers and traders could have exercised restraint, 
i.e. forgo short term gains, expecting to make up for the loss when the 
freeze was removed. Secondly, when a firm applied for a price increase due 
to increased costs of production and the Price Controller, by looking at a 
firm's profit and loss accounts, was convinced that it was making more than 
average profits, such a firm was forced to absorb all or a part of the increased 
costs . 
In 1973, the Lower Income CPI rose by 16.5%. What was the effect of 
controls in 1973?"^ A Price Control official says that, about one year after 
the freeze was imposed, some firms started raising prices without consulting 
9. Kenya, Economic Survey, 1974-, p. 161. 
10. This is an assumption I cannot defend. See Section 7 of this paper 
for problems encountered in empirical analysis of effects of price control. 
11. For the effect of sales tax introduced in 1973 and import price 
index on the cost of living, see Killick, 1975. 
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12 
the Price Controller m the hope that they would not be found out. This 
implies that a part of the increase in 197 3 was a portion of the 1972 
inflationary pressure postponed by firms that exercised restraint in 197 2 
thinking that the General Price Order was temporary. 
For products that remained under control, the influence of controls 
on their prices must have declined over time because it is unlikely that the 
Price Controller forced them to absorb part or all increases in the cost of 
materials for a second year in succession. This is consistent with Killick's 
argument (1973, p. 407) that, even where there are initially large monopoly 
profits, the price effect of controls will be largely once-and-for-all 
because after the excess profits have been eliminated, the controllers will 
have to allow prices to rise with costs if they are not to discourage 
supply. Controls may only have a long term effect if there is a tendency 
for monopoly profits to widen over time. The only suppression of prices 
in 1973 could have come from increased labour costs because the Price 
Controller did not take them into consideration when awarding price increases, 
(b) December 1973 - December 1977 Period 
As mentioned earlier, many products were brought under specific 
control in 1973 and the various price amendments are therefore available 
in the Kenya Gazette Supplements. 
To estimate the effect of specific controls, we shall take the 
control prices of typical quantities of the specifically controlled commodities 
and compute ratios of December 1977 to December 1973 prices. The results 
are shown in Table 1. We will concentrate on the lower and middle income 
groups because the coverage of general controls in these two income groups 
is low and can therefore be ignored without seriously distorting the results. 
Table 5 shows that the weighed price increase of controlled 
products is slightly less than that of uncontrolled products and the overall-
price index in the case of the lower income group. Table 4 shows that prices 
of agricultural commodities rose faster than those of manufactured commodities. 
This is probably because the agricultural commodities have guaranteed producer 
prices which are set high enough to stimulate production. The high rise in 
12. This also means that those firms that still went through the Price 
Controller when raising prices were victimised while the unfaithful ones 
got away with it. Blessed are the unfaithful ....! 
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Table Price Comparisons (KShs) - Nairobi 
(1) (2) 
Commodity Dec. 1977 Dec. 1973 (l) - H 2 ) x 100 
1. Rice grade II -
1 kg. 
2. Wheat flour 
Atta - 2 kg. 
3. Maize flour 
sifted - 2 kg. 
Maize flour 
Unsifted - 1 kg. 
4. Maize grain -
1 kg. 
5. White bread -
. l kg. 
6. Beef with bone -
1 kg. 
bone - 1 kg. 
Meat Sirloin - 1 kg. 
7. Sugar - 1 kg. 
8. Tea Simba Chai -
100 g. 
9. Salt refined - 1 kg. 
10. Fat 250 g. packets 
11. Detergents - Omo - 200 g. 
12. Household soap 
blue - 5 kg. 
13. Toothpast Colgate 
- 240 g. 
14. Cement 50 kg. 
15. Spirits Haig 
Dimple - 7 5 ml. 
16. Toilet paper 
17., Barbed wire -
12\ g x 20 kg. roll 
18. Nails roofing -
6.5 cm x 9G x 50 kg. 
19. Galvanised iron 
8* x 3" 37G 
3.00 1.65 181.82 
4.85 3.00 161.67 
3.30 1.70 194.12 
1.25 0.65 192.31 
1.15. 0.60 191.67 
1.50 0.85 176.47 
8.30 6.40 129.69 
9.50 7.60 125.00 
18.00 12.60 142.86 
4.50 1.85 243.24 
1.20 1.20 100.00 
2.00 1.40 142.86 
3.10 2.40 129.17 
2.60 1.85 140.54 
2.25 1.85 121.62 
10.80 6.70 161.19 
27.10 15.00 180.67 
106.20 66.55 159.58 
3.45 1.80 191.67 
115.65 82.80 139.67 
308.90 259.70 118.94 
2.55 1.45 175.86 
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Table 4 (Cont'd): Price Comparisons- (KShs) - Nairobi 
(1) (2) 
Commodity Dec. 1977 Dec. 1973 (1) -4- (2) x 100 
Price Price 
20. Charcoal - 1 bag 18.00 11.00 163.64 
21. Matches - steamship 0.20 0.20 100.00 
22. Soft drinks Fanta 
- 290 ml. 1.00 0.80 12 5.00 
23. Baby foods -
Lactogen 4500 g. 13.30 9.45 140.74 
24. Bear Tusker 3.45 2.20 156.82 
25. Toilet soap 
Lifebuoy 1.30 1.05 123.81 
26. Milk 1.30 0.65 200.00 
Notes: 
1. The base period for wheat flour and baby foods is February 1974 when 
they were put under specific control. 
2. Sales tax was abolished on bread, margarine and Kimbo in the 
Budget speech 1975/76, Reported in Daily Nation^, 13th June 1975. 
3. Cement, barbed wire, nails and GCI sheets do not appear in the consumer 
price indices for Nairobi. 
4. The December 1977 prices of maize, unsifted maize meal (posho) and 
sifted maize meal, would have been higher had it not been for the price 
revision of November 1977 which lowered their prices by about 10%. See 
Kenya Gazette Supplement, No. 72, 2nd November, 1977. 
Source: Kenya Gazette Supplement, relevant issues. 
the prices of agricultural commodities cause the price index for controlled 
goods to rise fast. We will ignore "products with producer-prices guarantee 
and only concentrate on meat, tea, salt, fats and oils, detergents, household 
soap, toothpaste, wines and spirits, toilet paper, charcoal, matches, soft 
drinks, baby foods, beer and toilet soap. 
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Table 5: Price Increases - December 1977 as % of December 1975. 
All controlled All uncontrolled Total 
Products Products 
Lower Income 167.81 176.90 173.72 
Middle Income 165.63 163,34 164.03 
Upper Income 152.68 159.47 158.28 
Source: Kenya, Economic Survey 1978, and tables 1 and 4 of this paper. 
Let W^ be the proportion of expenditure spent on the above named 
items, W^ that of agricultural commodities with producer price guarantee 
and price control on middlemen, and W that of all uncontrolled products O 
and services. Le"t P 3 P 5 and be "their respective December 1977 prices J_ z o 
as percentage of December 1973 prices. 
Then V^ + W 2 + Wg = 1 
and W l P l + W2P2 + W3P3 = -
where - is the weighted price index 
Let us make the crucial assumption that P would equal. P in the _L o 
absence of controls. Let P* be the price index that would have prevailed 
in the absence of controls. 
Then P* = (W1 + W 3) Pg + W P 
The depression in the price index due to controls 
P* -P = (wx + w 3) P 3 +w 2P 2 - w l P l - w 2P 2 - w 3P 3 = W l(P 3 - P x) 
The results are shown in Table 6. The depression in the overall 
index is 1.76% per year, i.e. about a tenth of actual inflation. 
The above calculations refer to specific controls only. We are 
comparing control prices of goods at two points in time and the same 
cannot be done for goods under the General Price Order since their prices 
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are not published. For goods under general control, some qualitative 
assessment will suffice. For pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, motor vehicle 
spare parts, agricultural machinery, fertilisers and agricultural chemicals, 
there were 'factor formula' developed in 1972 for reaching retail prices. 
The formula required a dealer to add on the landed cost plus duty a profit 
margin defined as a certain percentage of landed cost. This means that if 
the landed cost of an item has increased five times since 1972, the absolute 
13 
profit also increased five times. This is why dealers in motor vehicles, 
motor vehicle spare parts and fertilisers sell below control levels; and 
price control is then officially said to be 'working' because there is no 
abuse of the factor formula. 
Table 6: Influence of specific controls on the cost of living (%) - Nairobi 
Lower Income Middle Income 
1' W1 16.86 16.16 
2. P 135.07 137.07 
3. W2 18.06 13.85 
4. P 2 198.40 198.94 
5. WQ 65.08 69.99 
6. P 3 176.89 163.34 
7. Pg - P 41.82 26.27 
8. W^Pg - P ) 7.05 4.24 
9. W.(P, - P.)/4 1.76 1.06 1 o 1 
(annual average) 
Source: Tables 1, 4 and 5 of this paper. 
4. INFLUENCE OF CONTROLS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BETWEEN PROFITS'AND 
WAGES 
The purpose of this section is to give a feel for the incidence 
of controls as they have operated in Kenya since December 1971. We will first 
consider how producers are affected because this determines what happens 
to other groups in society. 
13. See 'What the Price for Protection 'Daily Nation, 16th Feb., 1977 
and 'Spare Part Inflation', Daily Nation, 31st May, 1978. 
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In Kenya, information on profitability of companies is hard to trace. 
This is because the Companies Act (Cap. 486) Section 128 requires only a 
public company or a private company where at least one shareholder is a 
public company to deposit their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts 
with the Registrar of Companies. Unfortunately, only about a fifth of all 
public companies produce price controlled goods. The profitability of 
the 12 'controlled' companies in Table 7 might allow us reach some tentative 
conclusions about controls. 
To measure profitability, we use after-tax profits as percentage 
of shareholders' funds plus reserves. This measure can be defended on two 
grounds. First, it is generally accepted that one of the main objectives 
of a firm's management is to maximise the profits of the owners, the equity 
shareholders, and the cost of capital to the shareholders is the net of 
tax return they could obtain from investing their capital to the best 
advantage elsewhere. Secondly, in times of inflation, absolute level of 
profits can rise without necessary reflecting increases in real profitability. 
Since reserves are normally retained profits, they will be affected by 
inflation to the same extent as the absolute level of profits, thus 
moderating the effect of inflation on our measure of profitability. 
Table 7 shows that the profitability of B.A.T. Kenya Ltd., a 
manufacturer of cigarettes, has been on the increase despite the controls. 
The explanation for this phenomenon is that companies that produce goods 
that the Price Controller considers to be luxuries are allowed to make 
more profits because the Controller does not see why the Government should 
forgo corporation tax for the sake of wealthy consumers. For companies 
engaged in the production of necessities e.g. Kenya National Mills and 
Elliots Bakeries, the profitability has been on the decline because the 
Controller awards them low price increases in an effort to protect lower 
income consumers. This encourages investment in luxury goods and the 
artificially low prices of necessities boosts their demand while at the 
same time discouraging supply, leading to occasional shortages of these 
commodities. 
14. For a general discussion of the effect of selective controls on 
the pattern of production, see Killick (1973, p. 408) and Jervis (1949, p. 
209). 

- 63 - IDS/OP 32 
After scanning through the various companies' annual reports at the 
office of the Registrar of Companies, the author has the impression that 
manufacturers are more dissatisfied with the administration than they even 
are with the principle of price control. They complain of delays in obtaining 
price increases when costs of raw materials go up because the delays cause 
wide fluctuations in profitability and makes forward planning harzardous. 
How have companies coped with the situation? Edgren (1977, pp. 4-20-1) 
says that it is unlikely that wage cost increases averaging 10% per year have 
been sustained by private industry without passing on at least part of the 
increase to the consumers. Table 7 shows that, although 'controlled' 
firms were more profitable than noncontrolled ones before controls were 
introduced, the ratio of profitability of 'controlled' to noncontrolled 
firms has been declining. 
Table 8 shows the trend in labour costs and value added per employee 
for large scale establishments. We notice that controls cover high wage, 
high gross product per person industries. Also for the first three years, 
wages went up faster in controlled than in noncontrolled firms while 
productivity rose almost equally for both categories, which goes to explain 
why the ratios of profitability of cpntrolled to noncontrolled firms has 
been declining. 
We saw that price control on non-agricultural, specifically-controlled 
commodities reduce the cost of living by an estimated 1.7% per annum. 
However, there are a few Industrial Court disputes that support the assertion 
that the Court considers the effects of too strick price controls when , 
awarding wage increases, thereby eroding the effect of controls on the 
workers' real earnings."^ 
Rural people have possibly benefited from price control on processed 
items because they are not a part of the urban-based employer-employee equatior 
Killick (1973), in a study of the operation of price control in Ghana in 
the 1960s observed that non-observance was higher in rural areas than in 
cities. It is however possible that the overcharging occurs due to the failure 
of control authorities to fully cover transport and storage costs in reaching 
15. See, for example, Gazette Notice Nos. 2549/1972, 1469/1974, 330/1975, 
571/1976 and 922/1977. 
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Table 8: Indices of Trends in Unit Labour Costs in Large Scale Firms a 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
1. Controlled firms^ 
Value added per employee 100 112 119 137 139 
Earnings per employee 100 112 111 14.1 134 
Labour costs as % of value--added 100 101 93 103 96 
2. Non-controlled firms 
Value added per employee 100 106 123 142 169 
Earnings per employee 100 99 101 114 140 
Labour costs as % of value--added 100 93 82 80 82 
3. All large scale firms 
Value-added per employee 100 106 119 135 156 
Earnings per employee 100 102 103 120 138 
Labour costs as % of value--added 100 96 87 89 88 
4. Value added per employee in 
controlled as ratio of non-
controlled 2.12 2.22 2.05 2.04 1.74 
5. Average wage In controlled as 
ratio of non-controlled. 1.48 1.69 1.63 1.84 1.42 
Notes: a) Data base is in current prices. 
b) 'Controlled' firms include meat and dairy products; grain 
mill products; bakery products, sugar and sugar confectionery; 
spirits, beer, malt and tobacco; soft drinks; basic industrial 
chemicals and petroleum; paints, soap and vegetables oils; 
cement; and motor vehicle repairs. 
Source: Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1377, p. 154. 
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the maximum retail prices, in which case the overcharging is a legitimate 
(but illegal) attempt to cover costs. If the above assumption holds i.e. 
traders cover the costs incurred in the course of handling goods whether 
there is price control or not, then the rural consumers benefit from the 
suppression of ex-factory price by the Price Control authority. 
A rigid price control system can cause a decline in the growth of 
employment. Unfortunately, the extent to which controls restrict employment 
creation is difficult to ascertain. Two pieces of evidence, one indirect 
and one direct, might suffice. The indirect evidence is that since increases 
in a company's wage bill, arising from increases in wages of workers and new 
recruitment, will not be accepted by price control authorities as a justifi-
cation for a price increase, a company is expected to be very cautious In 
employing new recruits. In the long run at least, refusal to allow wage 
increases as justification for price increases will act against labour 
intensity. The direct evidence is that at least one company has reported 
that it fired workers. In late 1977, East Africa Bag and Cordage Co. Ltd. 
reported that it had dismissed 300 trainee workers and it was working out a 
formula on how to phase out some of the 19 50 workers who were on permanent 
16 terms due to what It described as 'unprofitable prices'. 
Price control can also cause shortages of price controlled goods 
although it would be wrong to argue that all shortages in Kenya are caused 
by price control. The Finance Minister outlined three ways in which shortages 
17 
occur.- First, the foreign exchange position which in late 1971 forced 
the Government to adopt rather restrictive import policies and to impose a 
price freeze. Secondly, large quantities of goods both locally manufactured 
and imported being re-exported to neighbouring countries and especially Uganda 
through smuggling. Thirdly, there are 'artificial' or 'generated' shortages 
which refers to goods in stock but not available to the general public for 
purchase because traders anticipate price rises. There are usually widespread 
shortages of price controlled goods in the period immediately before Budget 
time in June as traders hoard goods to release them at higher retail prices. 
After the Budget, the commodities are Released for sale whether their prices 
are raised or not, thus confirming tfyey are held for speculative purposes. 
16. 
17. 
Sunday Nation, October 9, 1977. 
Daily Nation, 25th August 197 3. 
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Some firms have occasionally been forced to 'strike ' or stop 
production of price controlled goods if their costs rise and their applications 
for price increases are delayed by the Price Controller. This raises an 
important point. If the Price Controller delays a monopoly's application for 
a price increase or does not increase the price of Its product to the extent 
demanded by the monopoly, it can hold the Government to ranson by stopping 
production. If the monopoly producer an essential commodity, the public 
would have the choice of paying more or not having the good at all. 
5. OBSERVANCE AND EVASION OF CONTROLS 
In this section, we will try to estimate the extent to which controls 
are observed. To measure the degree of evasion (or observance) of controls, 
we will compare actual retail prices as recorded by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) enumerators with the official control levels established by 
the Price Controller. 
Table 9 shows the actual prices as percentage of controls prices of 
specifically controlled commodities for Nairobi at three points in time. 
Cement", GCI sheets, barbed wire and nails are not included in the list 
because they are not used in the construction of consumer price indices for 
Nairobi and their prices are therefore not collected by CBS enumerators. 
We note that evasion is more serious with basic food items e.g. rice grade II, 
standard wheat flour, unsifted maize flour, and maize grain. Charcoal shows 
a low or no disparity between actual and control prices . The ratios given 
underestimates the degree of evasion on charcoal for three reasons: 
(1) The Price Control (Charcoal) Order, 1977 specifies the price 
for 41 lg„ bag of charcoal while the CBS records indicate that the weight 
of one bag of charcoal could be as low as 32 kg. This gives a charcoal 
dealer an automatic overcharging of up to 28%. 
(2) Unlike products like maize flour, maize grain, standard wheat 
flour, rice grade II, beef, sugar, salt, and blue soap where the actual 
prices are the averages of test purchases, the charcoal prices are the results 
of price quotations. It is therefore possible that charcoal dealers only give 
the control prices so as not to raise alarm in Treasury . 
(3) Some charcoal dealers refuse to sell in bags but instead sell 
in small lots using small tins. In this way, they are able to sell at even 
over double the control price. 
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For manufactured, packed and branded commodities like wines and 
spirits, tooth pastes, beer and fats, there was no evasion. There are various 
plausible explanations for this phenomenon. First, in some products like tea, 
matches, and salt, the manufacturer stamps prices on the lebels. It there-
fore becomes difficult for a trader to convince a buyer to buy above the 
control price. Secondly, the law requires traders to mark the prices at 
which goods are offered for sale. The trader marks the control price or less 
because to mark a price in excess would be prima facie evidence that he is 
overcharging; and a buyer resists paying a price above the one marked on 
the label. Thirdly, these high income class goods are usually purchased 
from supermarkets. Supermarkets can sell even below control levels because 
their operations are based on high turnover-low profit margin, and because 
they buy their stocks straignt from manufacturers, thus pocketing both the 
18 wholesale and retail profit margin allowed for by the Price Controller. 
At the bottom of Table 9 are the weighted means of actual as 
percentage of control prices. In all cases, evasion is highest for the lower 
income and decreases as you rise up the income scale, though evasion is 
slight in all cases when compared with Killick's results of price controls 
in Ghana in 1960s. 
Table 10 shows the actual maize prices and the figures in brackets 
are actual prices as percentage of control prices. Table 11 shows maize 
prices in municipal market stalls. From Table 10, we note that 'undercharging' 
in the open air markets is more of the rule than the exception. Out of the 
68 cells in Table 10, 52 show actual prices below control levels, equal in 
four, and greater than control prices in 12. In Limuru and Timboroa, for 
example, the actual prices have, over the period, been below control levels. 
There are many instances where price control regulations are 
flouted but the extent to which they are flouted can not be properly 
quantified. For example, Table 9 shows that the actual price of sugar 
corresponds with the control price. However, traders sell a kg. of sugar at 
the control price but require the customer to bring his own container or buy 
from him the paper bag used in packing the sugar. This is an evasion of the 
Price Control (Sugar) Order, 1976, which specifies that the gazetted retail 
price includes the cost of packing. 
18. Mentioned in Contact, Journal of the Kenya Consumers' Organisation, 
July 1972, p. 1. 
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Table 10. Maize Prices in Shs/Kg. - June 1977 to March, 1978. (Cont'). 
Note: The figures in brackets are actual prices as percentage of 
control prices. 
Source: Actual prices from Market Information Bulletins, June 1977 
to March 1978 issues. Control prices from L.N. Nos. 88/1977 
and 275/1977. 
Table 11. Maize prices in Shs/Kg. in Municipal Markets 
JULY 1975 SEPT. 1976 JULY 1977 
Nairobi 1.02 1.00 1.33 
(102) (100) (102) 
Kisii 1.19 1.23 1.10 
(119) (123) (88) 
Kakamega 1.19 1.23 0.80 
(119) (123) (64) 
Kitale 1.25 1.25 2.00 
(125) (125) (160) 
Mombasa 1.20 1.10 1.35 
(120) (110) (100) 
Nyeri 1.50 1.00 1.69 
(150) (100) (130) 
Embu 1.00 1.00 2.00 
(100) (100) (154) 
Nakuru 1.10 1.13 1.45 
(110) (113) (116) 
Kisumu .97 0.75 1.29 
(97) (75) (103) 
Malindi 1.10 _ 1.39 
(110) - (103) 
Meru .85 _ 1.00 
(85) (77) 
Note: The figures in brackets are actual prices as percentage of controlled 
prices. 
Source: Actual prices from CBS and control prices from L.N. Nos. 33/1975 
and 88/1977. 
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Price control also affects the prices of uncontrolled commodities 
through conditional sales. Conditional sales refer to 'a restriction of 
sales of the price controlled commodity to buyers who undertake to purchase 
another commodity or range of commodities, which otherwise they would not 
buy, or at least not at the price they are required to pay1 (Bauer, 1965, 
p. 25). There has been numerous instances of this in Kenya. Some butchers 
19 refused to sell beef unless a customer purchased offals at the same time. 
When there was shortage of rice in August 197 5, retailers required a customer 
20 
to make purchases of a certain value before he is sold a kilo of rice. 
Although the extent to which conditional sales raise the general price level 
is difficult to estimate, it is important to note that such practices 
occur when there is a shortage of the price controlled commodity, and there-
fore demonstrates the ineffectiveness of price control in times of shortage 
when price control is needed most. 
When the price freeze was put in force in December 1971, traders 
and manufacturers started looking for ways of going round it. In May 1972, 
six months after the freeze was announced, the Government noted that traders 
were disguising price increases by reducing discounts to which customers 
21 were entitled. A Nairobi journalist wrote an article titled 'How to 
Beat the Government's Price Control Measures' in which he outlined the 
22 
various ways in which traders were beating the price freeze. These 
included: 
(a) Reducing discount. He cited a case where the listed price of 
a car was KSh 25,000 but the going discount in that firm was normally 15%. 
By reducing the discount to 5%, the firm was selling KSh 2,500 above 
the control price. 
(b) Offering products claiming that they were of higher quality 
or design, thus deceiving the customer into paying more for a price 
controlled item. 
19. The Standard, 9th February 1975. 
20. Daily Nation, 26th August 1975. 
21. Daily Nation, 31st May 1972. 
22. Peter Mwaura 'How to Beat the Government's Price Control Measures,' 
Sunday Post, 18th June 1972. 
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(c) Offering products disguised as new products and therefore not 
subject to price control. 
(d) For.service charges, traders overcharged by making false 
claims. If they charge, say, KSh 20 per hour for servicing your car, they 
still charge you at the same rate but make more money by claiming your job • 
took two or more hours extra. 
The General Price Order had many problems of enforcement. First, 
the Order required one not to raise the price 'ordinarily charged' on the 
freeze date. Thus, if a trader was selling an item at a price higher than 
in other shops, the trader would not be contravening the Order if he 
continued selling at the same high price. It became difficult for price 
control officials to know the price 'ordinarily charged' on the freeze date 
since traders would produce fake books of accounts. • 
Secondly, the Order did not apply if a commodity was not sold on 
the freeze date. If by mistake the Order was signed on a Sunday or public 
holiday when all shops had closed, it would have been void when it was signed. 
Thirdly, the Order did not apply if the commodity was not in stock 
or was not in production. The Minister for Finance has been trying to 
bring new products under the Order by updating it. Some manufacturers change 
design and sell at their own prices. This is not confined to Kenya. When 
the French government tried to freeze the price of the humble croissant, 
the shopkeepers changed its shape, nicknamed it le Barre (the name of 
23 France's prime minsiter who had frozen the price) — and raised its price. 
Fourthly-,. ~.t times it become difficult for a.trader or manufacturer 
to know whether he is contravening the Order or not due to the problem of 
interpretation. For example, in August 1977, the Price Control Department 
received a complaint that a well-known international hotel in Nairobi put up 
the charge for the use of toilet facilities by 900%, from ten cents to one 
24 
shilling, making loos more lucrative than parking meters. The hotel owners 
could not imagine that for toilet facilities came within the ambit 
23. 'Europe's Incomes Policies', The Economist (London), February 11, 
1978, p. 100. 
24. The incident qualified for the 'Funny World' column of the East 
African Report on Trade and Industry, September 1977, p. 40. 
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of price control regulations. They were forced to return to the previous 
charges on the grounds that 'catering' comes under the General Price Order 
and toilet facilities are ordinarily offered in the normal course of 
catering! 
6. CONCLUSION 
On the price front, the price freeze contributed much to moderating 
price increases, at least in its first year of operation. After the first 
year, the success of price control in controlling the cost of living must 
have declined, for two main reasons. First, some small firms which had 
exercised restraint in 1972 started increasing prices without consulting 
the Price Controller, thus reducing the coverage of the General Price Order. 
Secondly, if a firm had lowered its profitability in the first year, the 
Price Controller most likely passed on further cost increases to the consumer. 
Although controlled firms were more profitable than noncontrolled 
ones before the controls were introduced-, the ratio of profitability of 
controlled to noncontrolled firms has been declining. The more efficient 
firms absorbed labour cost increases and in some cases profitability even 
went up. However, price control has adversely affected the profitability 
of the marginally profitable firms, although it is debatable whether such 
firms should be protected. Companies engaged in the production of neces-
sities get low price increases for their products. This discourages supply 
and leads to occasional shortages of necessities. 
Price control has other failures to record. It is not speedy 
enough in processing applications for price increases and at times, producers 
are forced to temporarily stop production or suspend some production lines 
awaiting action from the Price Controller. There are also instances where 
the control is redundant. In the case of motor car spare parts for example, 
there is 'factor formula' developed in 1972 for reaching retail prices, 
which makes absolute profits increase at the same rate as landed cost. Some 
dealers even sell below control levels and price control is then officially 
said to be 'working' because there is no abuse of the factor formula. 
The enforcement of price control regulations is easy for branded 
commodities like fats, soft drinks, etc. However, in the case of charcoal 
and other non-standardised commodities, dealers can evade the controls by 
lowering quality or changing the measure. Despite occasional raids on 
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charcoal dealers by price control inspectors posing as buyers, official 
prices have been regularly and openly ignored and the legal maximum price 
has been the operating minimum. The control price is too low and there 
is not effective surveillance at the wholesale stage. A worrisome side 
effect of price control on charcoal is that it may have caused a downward 
bias in the consumer price index. The lower income spend an estimated 1.96% 
of their disposable income on charcoal. If we assume that the price of 
charcoal went up by 50% in 1977 over and above the increase revealed by 
CBS data, then the lower income consumer price index was depressed by 
about 1%, which could have important repercussions in as much as the consumer 
price index is used by the Industrial Court as a basis for wage awards. 
7. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES: AN EPILOGUE 
There have only been few empirical studies of price control. This 
paper did not, therefore, take advantage of the mistakes of others and there 
are no other countries' studies to compare my results with. In addition, 
there is a 'missing figure', what the 'real' price or profit would have been 
in the absence of controls. A few examples will Illustrate. 
(1) The 'missing figure' problem makes the comparison of actual 
with control prices a hopelessly inadequate measure of effectiveness of ' 
controls. If commodites retail at below control levels, legally the policy 
is working because control prices are supposed to be legal maxima but in 
economic terms, It means the policy is redundant. If items retail at 
control levels, we can conclude that possibly the controllers correctly 
guessed the market clearing price, in which case there is no incentive to 
evade the controls. And if items retail above control levels, we can 
conclude that the law is Ineffective. 
(2) A reliable analysis of the influence of price controls on the 
cost of living requires an estimation of the influence of demand and supply 
so that the price control effect can be taken as a residual. In that light, 
we concluded that the price freeze led to a moderation of price Increases 
in 1972 at the risk of committing the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
(a latin phrase whose literal translation is 'after this, therefore necessarily 
because of this'). 
(3) Since value added is expressed in money terms, it is affected 
by prices. 
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(4) Quality changes are ignored in the analysis. 
(5) It is not clear what the aims of controls are. If we take 
the cost of living to be the criteria, then zero price increase, whatever 
effect controls may have no production, would be the target. 
(6) We assumed that the prices of controlled products would rise 
at the same rate as noncontrolled products if controls were abolished. 
However, the purchasing power that would have been absorbed by controlled 
products in the absence of controls spills over into demand for noncontrolled 
items and causes their prices to rise. This implies that the prices of 
noncontrolled products with controls are higher than they would otherwise 
have been in the absence of controls. 
There are two basic conclusions to be derived from this paper. First, 
due to methodological problems listed above, empirical analysis, though 
necessary is not a substitute for good theory. Secondly, inspite of the 
25 
faith people have on price control, it does not make much economic sense 
to think that the solution to inflation is to legislate against it and 
expect it to be law-abidir:r-. There is even a danger that price control 
might make income distribution worse by diverting attention from more important 26 I considerations like property ownership and industrial protection. 
25. See, for example, Daily Nation editorial, 'Time to Act on Vegetable 
Prices', 2nd August, 1978, where it is stated that 'the public is being let 
down in an area where It can be helped'. 
26. In discussing the limitations of price control as an anti-monopoly 
measure, I stated: '... In practice, the very idea of price control to 
regulate monopolies may encourage concentration. First, a rigid price 
control in an industry may discourage other firms from investing in the 
industry, thus retaining the number of firms which was there when the 
price control system was introduced. Secondly, there is a danger that 
a government may encourage the growth of monopolies through industrial 
protection just because it feels that it can control them through price 
control. Whether the government can effectively control such monopolies 
is not the issue. Giving protection and then controlling prices is like 
giving something with one hand and taking it away with the other (Mukui, 
1978, p. 13). 
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Weighting System 
Details on expenditures collected in the 1974 survey were classified 
in accordance with the recommendations contained in the U.N. System of National 
Accounts, and proportions of expenditure incurred on various items calculated 
by income groups described above. These proportions then formed the basis of 
the weighting system for the indices. 
Selection of Commodities 
Although a consumer price index is designed to reflect price changes 
for a wide range of goods and services, it is obviously impractical to collect 
prices for every item and brand sold in Nairobi, _,"and: also unnecessary. 
Instead of taking all goods and services, only representative goods and services 
are selected. The method of selection is first to divide all the commodities 
on which expenditures are incurred into groups of close substitutes, or at least 
groups having similar raw materials. The idea is that prices of close substitutes 
tend to move together and a few items within a group can therefore be taken to 
represent the group. 
In making selection of items two general principles were considered:-
(i) all types of items for which there are characteristic 
price trends were represented in the index; and 
(ii) items selected should remain unchanged if possible over 
a period of time. 
The general principle in the selection of representative items is 
that the more important the group, and the less homogeneous the component 
items, the larger must be the items taken to represent it. 
Selection of Outlets 
The prices of any commodity vary according to the location of the 
outlet and the type of outlet from which the commodity is purchased - market 
stall, retail shop, supermarket, etc. Theoretically, the number of the 
different types of outlets should be in proportion to the expenditures 
incurred in them. Further, within the strata defined by type of shop and 
area, outlets should be randomly selected. Since the information on relative 
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expenditures incurred in different types of outlets in different areas of 
Nairobi was not obtained in the expenditure survey, it is not possible to 
follow these principles rigidly. Instead the outlets have been selected 
on the basis of local knowledge of types of outlets within the various 
localities in Nairobi. 
Specification of Items 
For a price index to reflect price change and nothing else, a 
homogeneous type of good or service must be priced each time to ensure 
similarity and constant quality. Specifications for most items and 
services included in the indices are maintained in the commodity registers 
compiled by the Bureau, which give detailed descriptions of the form and 
physical characteristics of the items. The list of commodities and 
services included in the indices appear in the appendix. Only limited 
specifications are given in the appendix for brevity. 
PRICE DATA COLLECTION IN NAIROBI 
Prices for items in the index for the Lower Income Group are 
collected at the beginning of every month and price collection lasts about 
four days. For the Middle and Upper Income Groups, prices are collected 
from 15th of every month and collection lasts approximately one week. 
Prices are collected by personal visits to the various retail outlets by 
members of staff who go through the normal system of bargaining. For 
certain items sample purchases are made and the items so purchased are 
disposed of at the Kenyatta National Hospital. These items are identified 
in the appendix. 
Theoretically when prices are collected from different sources, 
weights should be assigned to each source according to volume of sales to 
estimate a weighted average price. In practice, however, this is extremely 
difficult particularly when one is dealing with small retailers with hardly 
any sales records. Hence, in Kenya we take the simple unweighted average 
of prices obtained from various outlets. 
Since the accuracy of the consumer price index depends to a large 
extent on the accuracy of the prices themselves, the following general 
principles are followed when collecting prices:-
- 82 - IDS/OP 32 
(i) The prices represent the group of persons to whom the 
index relates. In other words, price collectors make 
purchases or obtain quotations as actual purchasers in 
different income groups would; and 
(ii) Prices correspond to the same quantity and quality of 
each item, to the same or equivalent sellers, to the 
same condition of sale and even to the same part of the 
week. 
Practical problems of price collection 
In areas and for items for which actual purchases are not made, 
prices are collected by quotation. Mere price quotations whether reported 
by retailers or obtained by price collectors are usually inaccurate and false 
entries are by no means uncommon. This is particularly common with stores 
dealing with motor-vehicle spare parts, household durables, furniture and 
clothing, where we normally hand over questionnaires to the sales attendants 
in such stores and collect the questionnaires after a day or two. 
Quotation of controlled prices is another area which need mention. 
Ideally we are concerned with prices being paid by consumers and that is what 
the index should measure. However quotation of prices for meat and charcoal 
has in the past been posing some problems. In the Middle and Upper Income 
groups where we have graded meat, the problem was getting prices actually 
paid by consumers as opposed to controlled prices. When a butcher is given 
a questionnaire, he would fill in controlled prices but test purchases when 
made showed higher prices. In the case of charcoal, charcoal dealers refuse 
to give quotations or disappear from the scene, unit of sale is changed, and 
charcoal is sold at night to avoid harassment from price control inspectors. 
These practical problems have been sorted out as follows:-
(i) Callbacks are made when we find prices quoted are not con-
sistent with the specifications given. 
(ii) Budget for purchases of meat and meat products increased to 
allow actual purchases to be made. 
(iii) Charcoal prices are collected by interviewing households within 
the area where price collection is taking place. 
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Other Problems 
(a) Fruits and Vegetables 
Problems arise because the prices of fruits and vegetables 
are subject to seasonal variation, and at certain times of the 
year some fruits and vegetables go off the market altogether. 
The method used for any fruit and vegetable is to calculate 
the ratio of a twelve month moving average ending with the 
current month to a similar moving average ending with the 
corresponding month in the base period. When, however, a 
particular vegetable or fruit becomes unobtainable at certain 
times of the year, the price is either left unaltered until it 
is again obtainable in the market, or left out of the calculation, 
its weight being spread over those of the other fruits and 
vegetables. 
(b) Changes in Fashion or Quality 
In some cases, changes in fashion or quality make it almost 
impossible to price the identical article over a long period of 
time. Secondly, new products are introduced which frequently 
bear little resemblance to products selected during the base 
period, and as such, direct price comparisons cannot be made. 
When there is a change in fashion, prices for the two items are 
collected for a period of time. During this period, a ratio is 
calculated of the price of the latter item to that of the former. 
The base period price is then adjusted by multiplying it by this 
ratio to obtain what would have been the base price of the new 
item. 
PRICE COLLECTION IN OTHER MAIN TOWNS AND URBAN AREAS 
The Central Bureau of Statistics is extending the coverate of price 
collection exercise to other towns and urban areas. Quarterly price collection 
in the three big towns i.e. Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru started in 1976 and the 
Bureau is currently compiling cost of living indices for these towns. Commodity 
and group weights are derived from the information collected in the Urban 
Food Purchasing Survey conducted in these towns in 1977. A composite index for 
only middle and lower income groups is calculated because the survey covered, 
households earning less than KShs.2,500/-. These indices will be published after 
they have been formally cleared. 
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In other urban areas, prices are collected annually and are used 
for comparative purposes only. Consideration is being given to computing 
tentative indices based on weights derived from data collected in the 
Integrated Rural Surveys discussed below. 
PRICE COLLECTION IN THE RURAL AREAS 
Background. Price collection in the rural areas is a comparatively 
recent development in Kenya and has grown out of the Bureau's National 
Integrated Sample Survey Programme (NISSP). The most important survey 
administered under this programme is the Integrated Rural Survey, a multi-
purpose household survey which collects data on smallholder agricultural 
2 
production as well as household income, expenditure and consumption. One 
of the most important objectives of the programme was to establish a 
permanent and efficient statistical infrastructure to collect data throughout 
the rural areas of Kenya. This infrastructure consisted of a well-trained 
cadre of field enumerators and supervisors permanently stationed in the 
field and qualified to undertake a variety of different statistical enquiries. 
The range of subjects covered by the NISSP surveys in the following year 
included for instance demographic studies, agricultural production, nutrition, 
literacy, fertility, marketing, etc.. 
Market Information Service. Although initially the work programme 
of the enumerators described above was almost exclusively centred on household 
interviews, their duties were expanded in 1977 to include weekly visits to 
specified markets for the purpose of collecting regular up-to-date market 
information. This market information service was initiated as a result of 
a joint FAO/Kenya Government Marketing Development Project; in which the 
Central Bureau of Statistics was to play a significant role as one of the 
main sources of data on marketing operations in rural areas. 
3 
Initially eighty markets were selected. Within each province a 
list was made of the most important and strategic markets. A subset of these 
markets was then chosen for inclusion in the Market Information Service according 
to how accessable they were to the Bureau's enumerators. One enumerator was 
then assigned to cover each of the selected markets. 
2. The consumption data from this survey will later provide the baseline 
weights for the rural 'basket of goods and service' needed to establish the 
rural cost of living index. 
3. Minor changes have been made to the original list of markets, in the light 
of experience gained, but the total number by 1979 was still 80. 
- 85 - IDS/OP 32 
The main function of the enumerators is to collect weekly data 
on prices, volumes, and number of traders dealing in the most important 
crops in the market. These crops include maize, beans, cabbages, tomatoes 
sorghum, millet and potatoes. In collecting price data the enumerator is 
instructed to record information on a number of observed sales. His 
observations are deliberately spaced throughout the entire period of the 
day as well as across a variety of different sellers. An average price 
for the day is then later computed on the basis of these observed sales. 
Initially each enumerator was supplied with a weighing scale with which to 
check the weight of the produce sold. Later the enumerator was in addition 
supplied with a specially calibrated 'Standard Debe' a 'Standard Tin' since 
grains and pulses are traditionally sold by volume. 
These data must be processed and published with minimum delay. 
Therefore considerable attention is devoted to getting the completed forms 
to Nairobi within a few days. Different types of transport are used 
including supervisors' motorbikes, and public taxis, depending on the 
location of the market. Initially a restricted computer print-out of 
the prices is produced on a weekly basis with a time-lag of ten days. This 
is subsequently re-published as a part of a regular Bureau publication, the 
Market Information Bulletin, on a monthly basis. 
Recent Development. The Market Information Service was initially 
established for the dissemination of market news. It is however being 
considerably expanded into a much more extensive price collection exercise 
with a view to establishing a rural cost of living index. The first step in 
this expansion was taken in December 1978 when, for a smaller number of 
selected markets, prices were collected for a much more extensive list of 
items. This exercise included visits to local shops (dukas), butchers and 
non-market retail outlets. The initial pilot round proved successful. The 
exercise will be permanently established on a quarterly basis and will be 
merged together with the already existing Market Information Service. On the 
basis of this expanded price collection exercise, it is envisaged that by the 
end of 1979, it will be possible to compute a rural cost of living index and 
rural/urban domestic terms of trade indices. 
Conclusion. Kenya is fortunate in that it has been able to build 
its rural price collection operations on an already established rural 
statistical infrastructure. The system is still young and in its 
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developmental, stage. It should be stressed however that there are certain 
specialized price information needs for which the Bureau's system is not a 
appropriate. A case in point is the daily reporting of fruit and vegetable 
prices in the main assembly markets. This is a somewhat specialized price 
reporting exercise which lies outside the scope of the Bureau's activities 
and would be more appropriately undertaken by another agency or department. 
Also outside the scope of the Bureau's system is price reporting on live 
livestock sales. The Bureau at this time sees itself firmly committed to 
an integrated system of data collection. Consequently its efforts over the 
next five year period will be directed towards reinforcing and expanding 
its price collection system within the National Integrated Sample Survey 
Programme rather than branching out to more specialized areas. 
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APPENDIX 
COMMODITY ITEMS IN THE LOWER INCOME GROUP 
CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
1. FOOD FOOD CONTID. 
1.1 Cereals and Cereal Products 1.6.2 Vegetables 
1.1.1 Cereals 
•{Rice - Grade II 








1.1.2 Wheat Products 
Bread - White Ordinary 




1.2 Meat 1.7 Roots and Nuts 
"Beef - Without Bone 1.7.1 Roots 
- With Bone "English Potatoes 
Offal 1.8 Sugar 
Poultry "Sugar - Refined 
1.3 Fish 
*Fresh Fish - Tilapia 
1.9. Beverages 
Tea 
1.4 Dairy Products & Eggs Coffee 
Milk - Green Tetrapack 1.10 Miscellaneous Food 
"Eggs - Fresh *Salt 
1.5 Oils and Fats 
Kimbo 
Curry Powder 
Lactogen •- Baby Milk 
Tangauzi - Ground Ginger 
Salad Oil 
Ghee - Cowboy 1.11 Purchased Food 
Margarine - Blue Band Ugali na Nyama 
Irio 
1.6 Fruits, Vegetables and Pulses Githeri - Maize and Beans 
1.6.1 Fruits 
*Bananas - Green Bananas 
- Ripe Bananas 
TOTAL FOOD 
'"'Denotes items where purchases are effected. 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
2. DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
2.1 Drinks 
Beer - Tusker 
Murat ina 
Buzaa 
Fanta - Soda 
2.2 Tobacco 
3.2 
Cigarettes - Sportsman 
- Ten Cents 
TOTAL DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
3. CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
• 3.1 Clothing 





Other Men's Clothing -
3.1.2 Women's Clothing 
"Women's Dresses 
'"'Women's Dress Materials 
''-'Women' s Underwears 




3.1.3 Children's Clothing 












"Mean's Shoes - Leather 
- Rubber 
-'Women' s Shoes - Leather 
-'Children's Shoes - Leather 
TOTAL CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
HOUSING FUEL AND POWER 
4-. 1 Housing 





FURNITURE', FURNISHING, HOUSEHOLD 
EQUIPMENT AND HOUSEHOLD OPERATIONS 
5.1 Furniture, Furnishings and 
Household Equipment 








5.1.2 Household Equipment 
StoVes 
Brooms - Cleaning Equipment 
China - Cup and Saucer 
'"'China - Glassware - Tumbler 







Pots and Pans 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
5.2 Household Operations and 8. RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, 
Domestic Services EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES 
5.2.1 Household Operation 
"Household Soap - Blue Soap 
- Panga Soap 
Detergent - Omo 
Shoe Polish - Kiwi 
Matches - Steamship 
TOTAL FURNITURE, FURNISHING, 
HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT AND HOUSE-
HOLD OPERATIONS 
8.1 Education 
School Fees - Private 
- Sharda H. School 
- City H. School 
School Fees - Government 
Pumwani S. School 
Nairobi Girls 
Starehe Boys 
8.2 All Others 
8.2.1 Equipment 
6. HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE 
6.1 Medical Care & Health 
Medicine - Aspro 
- Cafenol 
- Algon 




6.2 Personal Care 
Toilet Soap - Sunlight 
- Lifeboy 
TOTAL HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE 
Records - E.A. Records 
Record Players - Phillips -
G.A. 214 
Radio Phillips - RL 238 
- Sanyo - 7s 
107 WF 
8.2.2 Entertainment 
Cinema Entrance - Back 
Entrance 
Stadium Entrance 
8.2.3 Books And Newspapers 
Newspaper - Taif Leo/Baraza 
TOTAL RECREATION, ENTER-
TAINMENT EDUCATION AND 
CULTURAL SERVICES 7. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
7.1 Personal Transport 




7.2 Purchased Transport 






City Bus Fares - Short Route 
Long Route 
9. MISCELLANEOUS GOODS AND SERVICES 





TOTAL MESCELLANEOUS GOODS AND 
SERVICES 
TOTAL TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
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COMMODITY ITEMS IN THE MIDDLE INCOME 
CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
1. FOOD 
1.1 Cereal and Cereal Products 
Cereals 
Rice - grade 1 Pishori 
Wheat Flour - White Packed 
Wheat Flour - Brown 
Maize Flour - White Packed 
'''Maize Grain 
Corn Flakes - Post Toasties 
1.1.2 Wheat Products 
Bread - White Ordinary 
- Brown 




*Beef - Beef with Bones 
- Steak 
Chicken - Alive 
- Capon 
Offal - Tripe 
1.3 Fish 
!'!Fish - Fresh Tilapia 
'•Fish - Dried Tilapia 
1.4 . Dairy Product and Eggs 
Fresh Milk - Green Tetrapack 
Eggs 
1.5 Oil and Fats 
Butter - Salted 
Tinned Fat - Kimbo 
"Salad Oil - Bottled -Elianto 
- Tinned 
Ghee Coloured - Cowboy 
Margarine - Tinned 
CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
1.6 Fruits, Vegetables and Pulses 
1.6.1 Fruits 
Banana - Unripe Uganda Type 














1.7 Roots and Nuts 
1.7.1 Roots 
"Potatoes - English 
1.8 Sugar 
Sugar - Refined 
Jam - Strawberry 
- Plum 
Honey and Glucose - Smith 
- Capilano 
Sweets - Tropical 
1.9 Beverages 
Coffee - Instant Kenna 
- Brooke Bond 
- Instant Nescafe 





1.10 Miscellaneous Food 
Table Salt - Fine Packed Packet 




CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
Baby Milk - Nan 
- Lactogen 
Baby Food - Cerelac 
- Farlene 
1.11 Purchased Food 




3.1.2 Women's Clothing 
"Women's - Dresses - Crimplene 
'''Dress Mateirals-
- Polyster/Cotton 
- '''Underwear - Pants 
- Brassiers 
- Petticoats 





- Coats - Crimplene 
- Trousers 
- Blouse 
3.1.3 Children's Clothing 





Boys' Long Trousers -
Crimplene 
Children's Sweater-Acrylic 
Children's Vests - Cotton 
'•'Children's Underpants - Midco 
3.2 Footwear 
Men's Leather Shoes 
Women's Leather Shoes 
Children's Leather Shoes 
'"'Sandals - Hawaai 
2. DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
2.1 Drinks 
Soda - Fanta 
- Pepsicola 
Orange Squash - Pep 
Beer - White Cap 
- City 






Cigarettes - Sportsman 
- Embassy 
- Sweetnut 
TOTAL DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
3. CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
3.1 Clothing 
3.1.1 Men's - Suits - Trevira/Wool 
- Long Trousers -
Trevira/Wool 
-"Shirts - Polyster/Cotton 
-"Underpants - Nylon 
- Vests - Sunflag 
- Pullovers - Acrylic 
- Socks - Nylon 
- Ties 
4. HOUSING, FUEL AND POWER 
4.1 Housiing 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
Water 
Electricity 5 .2 1 Household Operations 
TOTAL HOUSING, FUEL AND POWER Servants Wages 
Detergent - Omo 
- Surf 
5. FURNITURE, FURNISHINGS, HOUSEHOLD Shoe polich - Kiwi Shoe Cream - Kiwi 
Suede Sho:e Cleaner EQUIPMENT AND HOUSEHOLD OPERATIONS 
5.1 Furniture, Furnishings and 
Household Equipment 
Laundry Soap - Panga 
- Blue 
Matches 
5.1.1 Furniture And Furnishings Laundry Dry Cleaning 
Sofa Set - Ngambo 
Dinning Set - 5 pieces 
Table With formica top 
TOTAL FURNITURE, FURNISHING, 
HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT AND 
HOLD OPERATIONS Chair with padded cushion and 
seat 
Coil spring bed with all metal 
frame legs 6 HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE 
Dressing Table 
Wardrobe 6 1 Medical Care and Health 
Blankets Eye examination and prescription 
Bedsheets - 60" x 90" plain of eye glasses - Doctor's fee 
local Child delivery - Hospital fee 
Mattress - Foam Medicine 
Curtains - Synthetic fibre Ambulance charges 
Bath Towel - stripped/solid Dental filling 
colours Tooth Extraction 









6 2 Personal Care 
Toilet Soap - Perfumed 
Skin lotion 
Skin cream 
Powder - Perfumed 
Tooth paste 
Toilet Rolls 
TOTAL MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH 
Dinner plates - Eartherware 
Cup and saucer 
Soup plate 7. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Table fork 
Table Knife 7. 1 Personal Transport 
Kitchen Knife New Car 
Broom - Finlay New Motor Cycle 
5.2 Household Operations and 
Domestic Services 
7. 2 Operation of Personal 
Transport 
Lubrication 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
Engine tune up 
Head lamp assembly 
Brake lining or brake pad 




Petrol - Regular/Premium 
Engine Motor Oil 
Gear box oil 
Road license 
7.3 Purchased Transport 
Car hir§ - self drive 
Bus fare = within Nairobi 
- Nairobi to Provincial 
Headquarters 
7.4 Communications 
Postage - land, air or sea 
Telephone call in Nairobi -
Minimum period 
Trunk call - Nairobi to 
Provincial Headquarters 
TOTAL TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS 
8.2.2 Entertainment 
Theatre/Cinema Entrance 
Fee - Back Stalls 
Stadium Entrance - Non 
Sheltered Terrace 
Radio Licence 
T.V. Rental - Monthly 
8.2.3 Books And Newspapers 
Newspaper - English Daily 
Magazine - Weekly Review 
Books - Bible 
- Dictionary 
TOTAL RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, 
EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES 
9. MISCELLANEOUS GOODS AND SERVICES 
9.1 Personal Goods 
Stationery - Envelopes 
- Ball point 
- Writing pad 
- Wrist watch -
Men' s 
Men's Umbrella 
Shaver Manual - Clippers 
9.2 Financial Services 
Motor Insurance - Comprehen-
sive 
- Third party 
TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS GOODS 
AND SERVICES 
8. RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, 
EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES 
8.1 Education 
School fees - Private School 
- Government School 
8.2 All Others 
8.2.1 Equipment 
Radio - 3 band-Electric/ 
battery 
Record Player - Automatic 
Records 45 - r.p.m. E.A. 
language 
- outside E.A. 
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Cereals and Cereal Products 
Cereals 
Rice - Grade 1 Pishori 
Wheat Flour - White Packed 
Maize Flour - White Packed 
1.1.2 Wheat Products 







Bread - Premium 
- Brown 













Pork - Loin, Leg, Shoulder 
"Chicken - Capon 
Beef - Sausage 
Pork - Sausage 
Bacon - Packed 
Tinned Meat - 3 Bulls 
Corned Beef - Fray Bentos 
1.3 Fish 
'"'Fish - Fresh Tilapia 
Tinned Fish - Witco Tuna Fish 
- Cherry Star 
- Oyster 
1.4 Dairy Products and Eggs 
Fresh Milk - Green Tetrapack 
Tinned Milk - Ideal 
Cheese - Cheddar 
Eggs 
1.5 Oil and Fats 
Butter - Salted 
- Unsalted 
Kimbo - Tinned Fat 
Salad Oil - Mazola Corn Oil 
Ghee Coloured - Cowboy 
Margarine - Tinned 
1.6 Fruits, Vegetables and Pulses 
1.6.1 Fruits 








Other Fresh fruits - Pears 
Tinned Fruits - Pineapples 
1.6.2 Vegetables 
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1.7 Roots and Nuts 
1.7.1 Roots 
'"'Potatoes - English 
1.8 Sugar - refined 
Jam - Rasp berry-
Marmalade - Orange Sevile 
Honey and Glucose - Smith 
Capilano 
Creamed Honey 
Sweet - T o f f ee 
1.9 Beverages 
Coffee - Instant Kenna 
- Non-Instant B.B. 
- Instant Nescafe 
Tea Leaves - Brooke Bond 
Green Label 




1.10 Miscellaneous Food 
Table Salt - Kapa 
Curry Powder - Simba Mbili -
Virani 
Baking Powder - Royal 
Yeast 
Garlic 
Baby Milk - Nan 
- Lactogen 
- Glucose 
Baby Food - Cerelac 
- Heinz 
- Farex 




DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
2.1 Drinks 
Soda - Coco Cola 
- Ginger Ale 
Orange Squash - Pep 
- Treetop 
Whisky - Teachers 
- Haig 
Brandy - Beehive 
Wines 
Beer - Pilsnerr 
- Tusker Export 
2.2 Tobacco 
Cigarettes - 555 State 
Express 
- Embassy 
Tobacco - Sweet Nut 
TOTAL DRINKS AND TOBACCO 
CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
3.1 Clothing 
3.1.1 Men's Clothing 











3.1.2 Women's Clothing 
Women's - Dresses 









Women's Half-Slip Petticoats 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS. 
3.1.3 Children's Clothing 
Childrens Uniforms 
Girl's Dresses - Polyster/ 
Cotton 
Boys' Shirts - Polyster/ 
Cotton 
Boys' Trousers - Tetron/ 
Cotton 
Children's Pullover - Nylon 
Children's Underwear - Cotton 
3.2 Footwear 
Men's Leather Shoes 
Women's Leather Shoes 
Children's Leather Shoes 
Sandals - Tropical 
Sports Shoes 
TOTAL CLOTHING AND FOOTWEAR 
4. HOUSING, FUEL AND POWER 
1 Housing 
Rent 







TOTAL HOUSING, FUEL AND POWER 
5. FURNITURE, FURNISHING, HOUSEHOLD 
EQUIPMENT AND HOUSEHOLD OPERATIONS 
5.1 Furniture, Furnishings and 
Household Equipment 
5.1.1 Furniture and Furnishing 
Executive Sofa Set 
Dinner Set - 4 Chairs and 
table 




Door Mat - Coarse fibre 
Curtain - Sanforized synthe-
tics fibre 
Bath towel 30" X 60" - cotton 
- plain 
Blanket - Cotton/Wool 
Mattress 54" X 84" 4-Foam 
with cover 
Bed Sheets 90" x 100" -
Printed cotton 





Electric Iron - control dial 
Electric Light Bulb 
Sewing Machine 
Dinner plate - Earthenware 
Soup Plate - Near bowl 
Broom - Finlay 
5.2 Household Operations and 
Domestic Services 
5.2.1 Household Operations 
Detergent - Omo 
Shoe Polish - Cream 
- Liquid suede 
Cleaner 
Floor and Furniture 
Polish Manson 
Laundry Soap - Jembe 
Matches - Steamship 
Dry Cleaning 
5.2.2 Domestic Services 
TOTAL FURNITURE, FURNISHINGS, 
HOUSEHOLD EQUIPMENT AND HOUSEHOLD 
OPERATIONS 
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CATEGORY AND ITEMS CATEGORY AND ITEMS 
6. HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE 
6.1 Medical Care and Health 
Medicine 
Examination and Prescription 
of eye glasses - Doctor's 
Fee 
Ambulance charges - One way 
(to Hospital) 
Child delivery - Hospital fee 
Dental Filling 
Tooth Extraction 
6.2 Personal Care 
7.4 Communications 
Postage - Land, Air, Sea 
Telephone - Standing 
Charges -
Monthly 
Telephone calls in Town -
Minimum period 
Trunk-Calls to Provincial 
Headquarters 




Other Toilet Goods 
Other Personal Effects 
TOTAL HEALTH AND PERSONAL CARE 
8. RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, 
EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES 
8.1 Education 
School fees - Private 
- Government 
8.2 All Others 
8.2.1 Equipment 
Radio 3 Band - Electric 
and Battery 
Tape recorder 5 keys -
Electric and Battery 
Record Player Automatic 
Electric and Battery 
Record - 45 RPM - E.A. 
Language 








T.V. Rental - Monthly 
8.2.3 Books and Newspapers 
Newspaper - Daily 
Magazine - Weekly local 
Books - Bible 
- Dictionary 
TOTAL RECREATION, ENTERTAINMENT, 
EDUCATION AND CULTURAL SERVICES 
7. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION 
7.1 Personal Transport 
New Car 
Motor Cycle 




Brake-lining or Pad 




Petrol - Regular/Premium 
Engine Motor Oil 
Gearbox Oil 
Road Licence 
7.3 Purchased Transport 
Car Hire - self drive 
Bus Fare - Nairobi/Provincial 
Headquarters 
Taxi Fares per kilometer 
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THE DOMESTIC PRICE EFFECTS OF KENYA'S 




Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last years the Kenya Government has intervened massively 
in the economy to protect local industry from foreign competition and to control 
foreign exchange. The effects of these interventions on domestic price levels 
and prie@ r@latien§hig§ has fe§§R little @©n§id§r@i asi little uRdergteed by 
these whs are responsible for policy formation and implementation in this area. 
In view of the crucial role of prices In determining the behaviour of both producers 
and consumers, this apparent lack of understanding and concern in the formation 
of industrial policy is ironic. The relative growth of different industries 
and sectors, the technology and factor intensity of production, the rate of 
labour absorption and employment growth, the equity with which income is 
distributed in the economy, the balance of payments, and the sustainability of 
the industrialization process are all dependent on prices and relative prices 
in the economy. There is a general pattern in Kenya that explicit Government 
policy and rhetoric in these areas is directly countermanded by the economic 
consequences of the price divergencies engindered by Government interventions. 
Economic activity predictably responds to the prices and regulatory structures 
observed rather than to the rhetoric. 
The exhilarating growth in the manufacture of import-intensive, import-
substitutes in Kenya and the abysmal performance of manufactured exports are 
the direct result of major distortions in domestic prices. In particular, the 
substantially higher prices of manufactured goods on the domestic market has 
also led to a situation where potential exports are priced out of foreign 
markets by the inflated costs of locally manufactured intermediates. The 
result is that while Government policy statements emphasize local-resource-
intensive and labour-intensive manufacturing and exports, and also emphasize 
more equitable income distribution, the behaviour of the industrial sector, 
responding to the price consequences of Government interventions, exhibits the 
exact opposite characteristics. 
• • i • • 
As a result of these interventions, substantially enhanced profits 
and incomes are being made by import-intensive, import-substituting firms. The 
- 99 -
IDS/OP 32 
inevitable corollary of such a subsidy to selected firms \ in the form of 
higher product prices and subsidized inputs) is a tax on other firms and 
individuals."'" These Government-instigated transfers of income do not flow 
to the poor from the rich in Kenya's overpriced product market but to the 
rich from the poor, to the protected industries and firms, and from the anti-
protected industries, firms and individuals. 
The prime consequence of much of the Government's industrialization 
and trade policy intervention in Kenya is that a number of firms and individuals 
are reaping handsome financial rewards with little benefit to the economy. These 
high incomes are being made at the expense of the relatively powerless sectors, 
firms and individuals, and ultimately at the expense of exports and potential-
exports. Since manufactured exports tend to be local-resource-intensive and 
labour-intensive, and also offer the prospect for sustained growth in employment, 
this anti-export (pro-import-substitution) bias of the price and incentive 
system in Kenya is a serious aberration in development policy. Since Kenya's 
import-substituting industrialization involves the inefficient and wasteful use 
of foreign exchange and does not even earn the foreign exchange necessary for 
its own continued growth, the import substitution bias is a prescription for 
stagnation. 
2. IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 
The most basic source of price distortions in Kenya is the attempt on 
the part of Government to balance external payments and protect certain industries 
from foreign competition by the use of import restrictions. 
The inevitable and overriding consequence of these restrictions is the 
overvaluation of the Kenya Shilling. The reason for this is simply that in the 
absence of the import restrictions, imports would rise to such as extent that 
Kenya could not possibly balance its international payments without devaluation. 
Currency overvaluation and its necessary accompaniment, exchange control 
legislation, Implies that a subsidy is received by anyone who changes local for 
foreign currency at the official rate (e.g. importers), and a tax is being paid 
by anyone who sells foreign currency at the rate (e.g., exporters). 
1, Recall that it Is not possible to subsidise without taxing or to protect 
without anti-protecting. 
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The effect of the existing overvaluation of the shilling is that 
instead of imports costing, for example, Ksh 10 per dollar, they cost Ksh 7.50 
per dollar. Imports are thus the recipients of Ksh 2.50 per dollar spent and 
exports are taxed at the rate of Ksh 2.50 per dollar in that exporters should 
be earning Ksh 10 (using these exchange rates) but are in fact earning Ksh 7.50 
per dollar. There is a 10% export subsidy, erratically and inconsistently 
available for certain commodities which, in those cases that it is available, 
raises exporters' earnings from Ksh 7.50 to Ksh 8.25 per dollar. Quite apart 
from the difficulties in successfully claiming this subsidy, the problem is 
that it only represents Ksh 0.75 in the dollar. This in no way compensates for 
the implicit tax on exports. Movement of funds out of Kenya at the official 
rate also 
receives a subsidy and the right to remit earnings overseas at the 
effieial rats thus rsprtfignt @©n§id©.rabl@ sublimits to individual firms i 
The most striking feature of Kenya's import restriction, trade and 
foreign exchange control regime is, however, its highly variable and inconsistent 
character. The range includes outright bans, quotas expressed as foreign exchange 
allocations, quotas expressed as specified quantities, restrictive licences 
allocating import rights to specified individuals or firms, tariffs ranging from 
zero to 100% od valorem, and specific tariffs on a per article basis. The bans 
on imports may apply to certain specified articles within a range (e.g. certain 
sizes of pipe fittings but not other sizes). They may apply to all articles 
within a certain price range. For example, shoes, blankets, or clothing articles 
below a certain price per pair or per unit may be banned whereas articles above 
that price may be permitted on payment of the duty. 
From the point of view of the individual firm producing import-substitutes, 
the most advantageous ban is the one that operates at the discretion of that firm 
so that a licence to import is only given if that firm provides a 'No Objection 
Certificate' (N0C) to the import licensing authorities. The N0C status gives a 
firm, or sometimes an association of firms, the right to prevent all imports 
that it regards as a threat to its own market. N0C status can also be used by 
the firm to considerable advantage in those lines where it has no existing 
2. Tariffs and subsidies do not necessarily lead to distortions in local 
prices. If tariffs are uniform between commodities and are matched by an 
equivalent subsidy to exporters, producers are not given incentives to produce 
in ways that are inefficient from the point of view of the econmy. A uniform 
tariff, making importscost Ksh 10 per dollar, accompanied by a uniform export 
subsidy so that exports earned Ksh 10 per dollar, would obviously be the economic 
equivalent of moving to a no..al exchange rate of Ksh 10 per dollar for all trade. 
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production facilities. It is recognised as a misuse of the NOC status to stamp 
and sign an import licence application for another firm for a pecuniary (or other; 
consideration. It is also considered a misuse of the status for a firm to deny 
the application, import the item itself, and sell it to the applicant at a premium. 
It is not regarded a misuse to deny the NOC and undertake to fill the applicant's 
order as a new line of production, even at a price to the applicant which is many 
times the price at which he could land it (duty paid) from an overseas supplier. 
In cases where an importer appeals to Government against a local manufacturer's 
refusal to grant an NOC, the appeal may be considered on grounds of technical 
specifications or on grounds of the local manufacturer's inability to meet a 
time deadline; it is not considered on the grounds of the price differential 
3 between the local and foreign supplier. 
It is far from clear how the list of firms with NOC privileges grew; 
in fact the list itself is neither in the possession of the Director of Industries 
nor of the Chairman or Secretary of the Industrial Protection Committee (IPC). 
According to IPC officials, there should not officially be more than ten companies 
with NOC status. In fact there are well over six times that many. While the only 
body authorized to confer the NOC status is the IPC, it appears that instructions 
to do so have been coming from a variety of different administrative and political 
sources, both inside and. outside the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In some 
cases they have come from individuals within Government who technically have 
nothing to do with the processes of the Ministry. 
3. In response to a question on the price differential, the Government official 
charged with responsibility for enforcing the regulations stated: If it is given 
protection the price depends on the manufacturer. We may find that the local 
price is five times the import price but there is nothing we can do about it. This 
was followed by a statement bemoaning the total ineffectiveness of price control 
legislation for the vast majority of products. 
4. The problem of Government servants and policy makers being among the 
principal commercial beneficiaries of the policies and interventions of Government 
through their private business interests and holdings is one of extreme severity 
in Kenya. This issue is well understood by commercial firms, some of whom make a 
point of never entering business without the personal financial participation of 
a person capable of affecting Government policy toward the firm, or one of his 
family or associates. This element explains, as much as any other, the seemingly 
inconsistent and irrational stance of Government on the issues discussed in this 
paper. It also suggests that the task of effecting a major policy change is 
going to be more difficult than it otherwise might be, simply because those who 
would need to make the decisions might be financially hurt by them. 
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The deposit measures have effectively curtailed foreign exchange 
expenditures, and are therefore viewed with approval in official circles. 
They have done so, however, at the expense of raising the protection and 
the premiums of import-competing finished goods producers, and of even 
further removing the economic value of foreign exchange from its official 
rate. In doing so, they are completely consistent with the various other 
measures to protect foreign exchange in Kenya in that they subsidize import-
intensive, import-substituting manufacturing, further raise the local prices 
of protected goods, further distort the exchange rate in the direction of 
protected overvaluation of the Kenya Shilling, and further bias local economic 
incentives against exports. They are also consistent with the other measures 
in that they were introduced as temporary and emergency expedients but are 
rapidly developing powerful lobbies with a vested interest in their preservation. 
For each of the import restrictions and taxes that are in force, there 
is considerable discretion and variation in the way in which it operates. This 
discretion and variation may operate through the formal system with, for 
instance, the Industrial Protection Committee recommending that a specified 
firm receive the right to import a dutiable product free of duty, a decision 
which must be gazetted by the Minister for Finance. Alternatively, it may 
operate through a semiformal system whereby, for instance, a letter from a 
Cabinet Minister gives a particular firm the authority to import equipment 
without going through General Superintendence. The fact that the Cabinet 
Minister does not have the statutory power to confer such authority may 
complicate the proceedings but it may be politically impossible to reverse. 
Thirdly it may operate through the informal system where, for instance, a 
Ministry or Central Bank employee delivers the necessary forms with the 
necessary stamps and authorizations to a particular firm for a pecuniary or 
other consideration. An element of entrepreneurship frequently occurs in 
the area of licences, wi th a middleman who is not an importer acquiring the 
licence, and marketing it to prospective importers. The price at which such 
a transaction takes place varies with the premium at which the commodity in 
question can be sold, which depends, in turn, on the difficulty of acquiring 
the licence. This provides an obvious incentive to bureaucrats to make the 
formal system as restrictive as possible, while prserving its discretionary 
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character.^ 
3. THE PRICE EFFECTS OF PROTECTION, SOME CASES 
A number of problems make the effort to quantify the price effects of 
Kenya's trade regime very difficult. The first is that where a particular 
line of imports has been banned for some years, it is not easy to get current 
price comparisons between the border and local prices. This task is not made 
easier where there have been restricted or illegal imports as these are 
generally sold at a substantial premium. What follows is therefore not intended 
as a formal statement or quantification of the price effects of import 
restrictions. An attempt has been made where possible to check the figures 
presented but there is no guarantee against inaccuracies. However, in the 
opinion of the writer, there are no obvious biases in the'presentation. It 
reflects rather the general pattern of Government conferring monopoly power 
on particular firms by quantitative restrictions on imports, and the price' 
effects of that monopoly power. 
Lead pencils can be imported for a.c.i.f. price of Ksh 20 per gross, 
rubber-tipped, and Ksh 15 per gross, plain. By the time the 30% duty, 10% sales 
tax on the duty-paid-price, wharfage, clearing and forwarding are paid, 
these costs in Nairobi are Ksh 31 and Ksh 24 respectively. In the interests 
of protecting the National Pencil Co. Ltd., the firm was given a ban on all 
competing imports through the NOC and tariff protection. This firm now charges 
Ksh 61.50 and Ksh 45 ex-factory or 67.65 and 49.50 including sales tax for the 
two types of pencils. This represents a rise of 118% and 106% respectively 
above the duty and sales tax paid, delivered price, or an implicit nominal tariff 
of 208% and 200% respectively. 
6. In a perfectly functioning bribery market with many bribers but only 
one bribable official, the size of the bribe could be expected to go up to the 
value of the premium on the goods. Since there are more than one way to skin 
a cat and since the licence market is full of imperfections, risk and 
misinformation, a great deal of the rental value of the licences probably, stays 
with the firm for further contingencies. In the case of large new investments, 
where capital can be overinvoiced and various other concessions can be granted 
on the firms' imports, where a firm can get most if not all of its risk capital 
from the overinvoicing and from Government and parastatal sources (or Government 
secured bank loans), and finally where the firm can be given types of protection 
that permit substantially higher prices for its products, there may be many 
millions of surplus shillings that can be used to grease the bureaucratic 
wheels. 
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Haco Industries also appears on the list of firms with NOC rights and 
produces ball point pens. Haco sells at a retail price Ksh 1.75 per pen. 
Importers state that a good quality Italian equivalent could readily be imported 
and sold for 50 cents. This implies a premium of 250%. 
In the case of carbon paper, Crescent Investments makes it at Ksh 80 per 
box. The Imported equivalent, now not available, would cost Ksh 10 a box, implying 
a 700% premium. 
To complete the list of items that might be of interest to an academic 
(pencils, pens and paper), Table 1 presents paper prices from Panafrican Paper 
Mills and quotations from three different overseas suppliers in late 1977. It 
can be seen that the local company was selling at a premium that varied 
between 72% and 113% above imports at that time. While the company is 
overwhelmingly oriented towards the domestic market, it has done some exporting, 
principally to utilize plant capacity that exceeds local market demand. It will 
be seen that the company's export price list has to be more competitive with 
the rest of the world, and that its local prices go as high as 9.1% above the 
export price for the same item. 
The inflated paper price in Kenya has had a pervasive effect on the costs 
of other firms and industries. The majority of these firms market locally, and 
merely pass on the additional costs to their buyers. Exporters, however, have 
been unable to do this and have been severely hurt. 
Following considerable pressure on the company by local exporters, and 
in part to reduce the output that must be disposed of at the substantially 
lower world market prices, the company has developed a complex scheme of price 
discriminations, not only for their own exported products to different markets 
but also to paper converters who then export. Such exporters pay the local 
price of the paper initially but are later given a credit note on production of 
evidence that the company's paper was re-exported. The size of the credit note 
depends on the destination of the exports to Uganda, for instance. In this way, 
the company attempts to capture as much of the profit from the export as possible 
without making that export impossible to the re-exporter. The problem with the 
re-export rebate, quite apart from the complex bureaucratic procedure involved, 
is that it only applies to the products of those firms which make the initial 
purchase and only to exports that are .100% paper. Other firms that export, 
using paper packaging materials for instance, can get no rebate on their paper 
costs however large these costs loom in the price of the product. Horticultural 
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exporters, for instance, find that the inflated costs of the boxes cut into 
the profitability of their exporting activities, but they can do nothing 
about it. Even for those who successfully claim the rebate, it is frequently 
not enough, so that paper costs are still too expensive to allow them to 
compete successfully on major contracts. 
On such items as screws from Nalin Nail Works, dealers also cite 
quality complaints from users. This is despite the fact that 4 gauge g-inch 
screws, for instance, wholesale for KSh 5.35 per packet whereas they could be 
imported for less than Ksh 2 for an equivalent, and allegedly higher quality, 
packet. 
In the case of Emco Steel Works, there is evidence of typical monopolistic 
behaviour, not only in terms of very large price markups, but also in the company's 
disinterest in meeting elemental specifications and standards in the knowledge 
that buyers have nowhere else to go. The company is also a typical case of a 
supplier beginning with reasonably competitive prices, presumably to convince the 
authorities that an import ban was appropriate. After the ban was well established, 
artificial shortages were created and prices rose to the point where they are now 
markedly above the imported equivalents. The company appears to be a case where 
the import bans, far from creating an efficient integrated industry, merely raises 
costs and impairs performance all the way down the line of what might otherwise 
be a competitive metal-working industry. 
An interesting case illustrating the typical proliferation of products 
stimulated by trade restrictions is Finlay Industries, a British brush manufacturer 
with worldwide connections. At the time of setting up, there were one or two 
lines of brushes which, for various reasons relating mostly to local material 
supplies, the firm could have exported successfully, competing with any of the 
world's producers. For the majority of lines, the Kenya firm could not possibly 
compete with these lower-cost producers, mostly because the crucial raw materials 
would have to be imported. The firm faced the choice of concentrating on the 
cost-efficient lines and on exports, or producing a complete range of lines at 
above world prices and seeking a ban on competing imports. 
The firm's own preference for a protected domestic market orientation 
was, in effect, strongly encouraged by Government in its enthusiasm to establish 
the industry in Kenya. There was no help or stimulus in the 
exporting area; all the Government rewards and incentives were toward import 
substitution. A complete ban was imposed, eventually through the NOC mechanism, 
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on the importation of any brushes the firm regarded as competitive. 
The firm, not without considerable effort on its part, thus achieved a position 
of complete monopoly in the Kenya market. Local brush prices have risen as a 
result to about double the prices at which they could be landed from overseas. 
The focus of the firm's entrepreneurial and bureaucratic effort, consuming 
considerable cost and attention for the first part of its life, was not the 
push into foreign markets, or even cost-cutting and marketing to make more 
effective in roads into the Kenya market. Instead, the firm used every 
possible means at its disposal to persuade and cajole Government to enforce 
an import ban on all brushes, whether or not they were better, more suitable 
or cheaper. 
Again, somewhat typically, a second producer then entered the market, 
attracted in by the inflated prices. With the limitations of the Kenya brush 
and broom market, however, this has merely meant that neither producer has the 
unit cost advantages of large turnover. Local brush prices have not moderated. 
There is a strong policy pressure for government participation in 
foreign-owned manufacturing firms in Kenya. The conventional logic for 
government (or parastatal) participation in commercial firms is that for 
reasons of market power, or because of some benefit or cost not appearing as 
such to the individual firm (i.e. externality), a gap develops between the 
benefit cost calculus of the individual firm and that of society. Government 
can, under these circumstances, use its power or influence to make the firm 
behave in the social interest. This logic is completely inverted in the 
Kenya context. Far from Government making its client firms have in the 
social interest, those firms with the necessary power or influence to attract 
Government participation then use it to make Government behave in the firm's 
interest. The complete range of special concessions, licences, guarantees, 
and the whole edifice of protective measures, are far more accessible to the 
firm that has Government financial participation than to one that does not. 
In 1978, for example, Kenya's Firestone tire factory make a return of 
approximately 100% on its investment. This profit level cannot be separated 
from the fact that a set of local Firestone tires is priced at a very large 
premium above the imported equivalent, and that all imported tires are banned 
except those for which the import licence bears the Firestone stamp, stating 
that Firestone has no objection to the importation. All Firestone's equipment and 
materials, furthermore, enter the country free of duty so that rate of effective 
protection is very high. Even in these circumstances there was no pressure from 
Government, a major investor in Firestone, to bring prices more into line with the 
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imported equivalent and avoid the adverse economic effects of inflated tire 
prices. Technically, there is price control legislation in force providing 
a price ceiling for Firestone products. A 50% price increase was however, 
granted to the firm in 1975 by the Price Controller. The fact that the firm 
is 30% owned by Government (through two of its prastatals) undoubtedly 
influenced the earlier decision in favour of the firm, as well as the various 
other decisions affecting its financial welfare. The firm also enjoys the 
right to remit very substantial earnings overseas. 
The problem with Government financial participation in individual 
firms is now clear. When Government stands to lose money because of financial 
problems within its client firms, the pressure is strong to shore up its 
investments by concessions to those firms on which its portfolio depends. The 
fact that these concessions merely involve transfers from the rest of the 
economy, frequently including substantial transfers from the public fisc itself 
in foregone taxes and duties and higher prices for goods (medicines, school 
books, etc.), is less visible and less of an embarrasment than the spectre of a 
government-funded company in financial difficulties. Private firms have 
developed considerable expertise in the use of this spectre in negotiating 
a wide range of concessions involving very substantial subsidies from the rest 
of the economy. 
Of particular concern in Kenya's predominantly rural economy is the 
intersectoral terms of trade. While precise measurement in this area can be 
complicated and is not undertaken here, there can be little doubt that it has 
moved strongly against the rural and agricultural sector in the last years. 
The reason is that while agricultural commodities have tended to trade (albeit 
inconsistently) at world prices, manufactured goods have systematically risen 
above world prices. Under these circumstances, prescriptions in the area of 
raising farmers' selling prices clearly do not address the problem. The 
more so since agricultural commodities are the prime source of foreign exchange 
for the whole economy, and the country has little or no power to affect export 
prices. 
Kenya's development plans have stated that the terms of trade should not 
go against agriculture and that the prices paid by farmers should not tax them 
unduly. In fact, virtually everything that farmers buy that is locally 
manufactured (except the products of the informal sector which are unprotected, 
and frequently discriminated against, by Government), implies a large transfer 
element, taxing the mass of farmers and subsidizing a few protected manufacturers. 
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The importation of sacks, for instance, required by farmers for 
a large number of their products, is banned in order to protect Acif Ltd. 
and East African Bag and Cordage Co. Ltd. These companies have the right 
to import jute free of duty; they also use polypropylene and sisal for 
different grades of sack. Besides serving farmers these companies supply 
large amounts to Government and parastatal agencies. Jute sacks can readily 
be landed in the country from Bangladesh at Ksh 3 per sack on an effectively 
unlimited basis. This price has, furthermore, prevailed for a number of years. 
It is not possible to buy the local equivalent for less than Ksh 10, or 
3_1 times the imported price. Quite apart from the price of the jute sacks, 
tfje companies have also raised the prices of soil sacks (sisal is locally 
produced) behind the import prohibition. 
In the case of basic hand implements used by farmers, especially low 
income farmers, across the country, Ideal Casements Ltd. make jembes (hoes), 
that sell, following a recent authorized price increase, for double the imported 
equivalent. Pangas (the indispensable Kenyan machetes), can be imported for 
Ksh 7/80 to and retailed for Ksh 10 to 11. The country now enjoys a local 
product made by East African Engineering Works Ltd. (a foreign firm using 
almost entirely foreign materials and foreign equipment, and expatriating 
substantial profits). This panga wholesales for Ksh 17 and retails for 
Ksh 24 or 25, about 2.5 times the price of the equivalent import. The same 
order of price increase applies to local spades. Furthermore, instead of the 
higher priced local implements being of better quality, farmers complain that 
they break far more easily and are generally lower in quality than the import. 
Fortunately, Kenyan farmers have, thus far, been protected from 
Government protected fertilizer producers, despite several high-powered and 
highly corrupt attempts at establishing local plants. Since the country only 
uses about 150,000 tons a year, and even that figure is divided among some 15 
separate compounds, local plants could only survive if they raised local 
prices quite considerably. The latest fertilizer plant is currently 
deteriorating on site at Mombasa after the bankruptcy of Ken-Ren Chemicals 
and Fertilizer Company, a subsidiary of the American firm^ N-Ren. In the 
associated scandal, costing the Government many millions of shillings, the 
General Manager was deported (African Business, October/November 1978). 
The case of vehicle assembly in Kenya is not going to be given detailed 
analysis in this paper for reasons of time and length. Suffice it to say that 
CKD (completely knocked down) vehicles cost at least as much, and often more, 
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and often more, to import as CBU (completely built up) vehicles. With no 
exceptions known to the assemblers, local components also cost more, sometimes 
three, four, five or six times more, than the imported components. There is, 
therefore, an understandable reluctance among assemblers to use them. 
A number of local component manufacturers such as African Radiators 
Ltd. have been serving the replacement market very successfully and without 
protection for many years. This company explains its success by the labour-
intensity of radiator core production. But even this company has been unable 
to sell to the assemblers, who raise endless technical specification problems 
and clearly have a strong preference for their own DE (original equipment) 
suppliers. 
There are four vehicle assembly plants now operating in Kenya: Associated 
Vehicle Assemblers (Lonrho, Inchcape, and associated companies), Leyland, 
General Motors, and Fiat. Each one of them turns out a wide range of different 
commercial vehicles. (Passenger vehicles may be imported as CBUs, though 
importation is restricted by quotas, which result in their being sold at high 
premiums.) In most lines of component manufacture, the variety of lines means 
that runs are generally short and costs are high. 
Much of the component manufacturing is itself highly import intensive, in 
many cases little more than breaking up lots, cutting or packaging. Where 
restrictions are imposed on the equivalent import, moreover, prices tend to rise 
dramatically and profits tend to be high. Flat glass importations, for instance, 
are banned, and assemblers must purchase from a local manufacturer, despite the 
fact that the item is not manufactured locally. 
The overall result is that assemblers cannot possibly compete with the 
imported equivalent, even from their own parent companies. Not only are the 
CKDs as or more expensive to import as the CBUs (implying that local value added 
does not exist or is negative in economic terms), but the more local components 
they must use the higher their costs. Local components have, in almost all cases, 
gone up in cost and the more stringent the import restrictions, the greater the 
cost escalations. The irony is that the initial Government logic for vehicle 
assembly was that its presence would stimulate and increase the efficiency of 
local component manufacture. 
Higher vehicle and transportation costs have a pervasive effect on the 
economy, certainly not least on the far flung agricultural sector. These costs 
are major inhibitions to the whole process of rural commercialization. A number 
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of factors external to the Kenya economy have served to raise these costs in 
recent years. Far from being mitigated by Government-stimulated developments 
in the domestic economy, this inflation has been enormously compounded by them. 
All this has happened, furthermore, with a serious curtailing rather than 
increasing, of Government revenue from equivalent tariffs. 
The Government is deeply committed in the financing of these firms. 
IDB owns 51% of Associated Vehicle Assemblers (with part of this money coming 
indirectly from the Treasury). ICDC owns 51% of General Motors and the 
Treasury owns 35% of Leyland. Government is also deeply into the financing 
of components producers, virtually all of which rely on Government bans and 
restrictions rather than their own competitive or economic advantage. It is 
hard to see, therefore, how Government's influence on the sector can be 
anything but discriminatory against vehicle users (principally against 
commercial and 4-wheel-drive vehicle users). 
In general, it can be said that intersectoral transfers and 
taxation of the agricultural sector may have some logic if an efficient, 
expanding, exporting and labour-absorbing industrialization is the result. 
It is hard to apply this logic, however, to the transfer of income and 
resources from a sector where judicious investments have substantial 
employment implications and where extremes of poverty exist, to a sector 
with a manifestly limited ability to absorb labour and where the transfers 




Quantitative and licencing interventions and restrictions have 
provided large rents to arbitrarily chosen firms, which have led to 
high levels of profit but have neither improved growth nor income distribu-
tion. The initial policy measure proposed is to replace these with price 
related interventions (tariffs, taxes, subsidies). The next priority is to 
remove (or at least, reduce) the enormous variance that exists between 
the impact of these measures on the taxing or subsidization of different 
sectors, industries and firms. The third, and related, priority is the 
removal of the very large anti-export, pro-import-substitution bias that 
has developed in the pricing and incentive structure facing firms as a 
result of the existing Government regulations, and the consequent over-
valuation of the Kenya shilling. 
Manufactured exports, especially those to high income, capital 
rich countries, land to be intensive in the use of local resources and 
of labour. They also face elastic markets with considerable expansion 
possibilities, with payments made in foreign exchange. They therefore 
offer employment growth and self-sustaining industrialization not 
dependent on the country's traditional foreign exchange earnings and 
exports with their attendant inelasticities. The existing anti-export 
bias (which is a price phenomenon that can not be seriously counteracted 
by 'export promotion' rhetoric or activities, however correct and useful 
they are) is therefore a serious aberration in development policy. 
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WAGE AND INCOMES POLICY IN KENYAt A BRIEF SURVEY 
OF EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 
By 
B.E. Oduor-Otieno 
Employment Promotion Division 
Ministry of Labour 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Kenya, the imbalance between people's aspirations and the structure 
of incomes and opportunities available for the attainment of higher living 
standards is one of the basic and critical economic and political issues today. 
The inequalities in the income structure include the disparity between the 
average urban wage level and the average rural income level; between the wage 
level, job security and working conditions in the modern sector and in the 
unorganised sector; and the inadequacy of the minimum wage level in relation to 
basic needs. 
In an attempt to reduce the severity of these problems, Kenya has 
developed a national wage and incomes policy with the aim of inducing wage 
moderation in the modern sector as a significant element of its anti-inflationary, 
employment and equity policies. This paper reviews the necessity and effective-
ness of a national wage and incomes policy from the colonial period to the pre-
sent. The paper concludes that, in the final analys is, the structure and degree 
of inequality is influenced not only by the wage policies but also by fiscal and 
monetary policies, the system of land tenure, health and educational policies, 
housing, as well as by the general institutional setting. 
2. THE HISTORICAL SETTING 
A wage and incomes policy for Kenya can be traced back to 193 2 when the 
need for wage fixing was first given legal recognition by the Minimum Wage Ordi-
nance of 1932, which empowered the Governor in Council to make orders fixing 
'the minimum wage for any occupation in any municipality, township, district or 
other area in which he was satisfied that the wages for such occupations were 
unreasonably low'. However, no wage fixing orders were made under this Ordinance 
and it was eventually repealed by the Minimum Wage Ordinance of 1946. During the 
Second World War, the British government passed the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act of 1940 whose official purpose was 'to promote the prosperity and 
happiness of the people in the colonial empire'. The Defence (Fixing of Wages) 
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Regulations, 1940, were enacted and a wage board set up for the purpose of 
fixing minimum and maximum wages to be paid in some specified trades and 
occupations. Such orders applied to Asian artisans only and automatically 
lapsed when, at the end of the hostilities, the Regulations were revoked. 
Following the lapse of the Colonial Development Welfare Act in 194-6, 
a dispatch was circulated from London charging the colonial government with 
the imperative duty of raising the living standards of Africans for humanitarian, 
political and economical reasons. As a first step in raising wage levels, 
Kenya passed the Minimum Wage Ordinance of 1946, which initially applied to 
Nairobi but later covered eight other industrial towns including Mombasa and 
Kisumu. The wage policy explicity sought to widen the urban-rural income gap in 
order to create a permanently committed labour force. The Nairobi Labour 
Department stated in 1946 that the long term policy was directed towards the 
maintenance of stability between agricultural and industrial areas. This 
meant the development of an Independent wage worker without subsidy from the 
native unit, The first step towards stability was the general adoption of a 
'living wage' standard for an African divorced from his native land unit. 
However, in 19 52, the Labour Department found out that only about 
10% of the African wage earners in Nairobi received the barest minimum. This 
necessitated the introduction of wages councils and in June 19 52, the first 
wages council was established for tailoring and garment making. 
When Kenya gained political independence in 1963, there was still no 
comprehensive wage and Incomes policy. The existing wage policy was essentially 
aimed at the creation and stabilisation of an effective African labour force 
to produce maximum output at minimum labour costs, as shown by the fact that 
the statutory minimum wage remained unchanged in real terms from the time 
it was introduced in 1947. 
The government has, since independence, set up policies to cure such 
colonial ills. For example, in 1964, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between 
the government, employer and trade unions in which the unions agreed to a one 
year wage freeze while private employers agreed to expand employment by 10% and 
the government by 15%. In 1970, another Tripartite Agreement was concluded in 
which the government and private employers agreed to expand employment by 10% 
of their regular establishment and employees agreed to a 12 month wage stands-
till, and there would be no strikes or lockouts during the agreement. The 
actual number of jobs created was about 34,000 and 45,000 in 1964 and 1970 
respectively. The 1979 Tripartite Agreement has the objective of increasing 
wage employments allows wage increases of up to a half the increase in the 
increase in the cost of living. 
- .7 - IDS/OP 32 
The post-independence wage and incomes policy has the objective of 
redressing income distribution, stimulating productivity, promoting 
employment, and stabilising prices and the balance of payments (Edgren, 
1976). Wage policies are formulated with due regard to other forms of 
income such as profits, dividends, rent, interest and agricultural incomes. 
Here is a clear class structure even more complicated than the traditional 
marxist analysis: low income employees are economically better off than 
peasant farmers and the urban unemployed and underemployed but are still far 
behind the upper class of foreign and local entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. 
The wage policy aims at raising wage levels. However, in pursuing this 
objective, the government takes into account the fact that beyond a certain point, 
wage increases can only be justified by increased productivity and that the 
higher the wage increases, the greater the unemployment and the higher the 
prices of goods and services, unless the economy is expanding fast enough to 
contain the wage increases. For this reason, trade unions are under pressure 
from politicians and the upper class to restrain their wage demands in the 
interest of the unemployed, although there is no indication that this restraint 
has played or will play part in employment creation. As the ILO report (1972, 
Technical Paper No. 17) points 
out, in the absence of strict profit controls, 
wage restraint may even lead to an outflow of money overseas. The sceptism of 
trade union movements towards wage restraint is therefore understandable. In 
a resolution taken at Limuru in 1971, the Kenya trade union leaders accepted 
the government's call for a wage restraint in the 1970-74- Development Plan on 
condition that there would be inter alia price controls on all products which 
are not subject to free competition, improved rent controls on low income 
housing and expanded housing facilities for low income groups, and improved 
machinery for assessing and taxing profits, with restrictions on. the expatriation 
of profits by foreign owned firms. 
The present national wage and incomes policy was outlined in general 
terms in the Sessional Paper on Employment (Kenya 1973), which was an official 
response to the recommendations of the 1972 ILO report on Kenya. The government 
accepted the central theme of the ILO report, i.e. that Kenya's employment'and 
. 'He-
unemployment problems are deeply embedded m the country's social and economic 
fabric and that these problems can be significantly alleviated only b]jz fundamental 
changes in the pattern of development and in the structure of key institutions. 
However, the government did not accept some components of the package. For 
example, the government did not accept;-
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a. The specific minimum Incomes suggested in the report on the 
grounds that there was neither sufficient information nor 
sufficient means of implementing it 
b. The proposal to introduce a tax on the employment of expatriates 
to act as a disincentive on the employment of expatriates, perhaps 
due to the economic and political implications involved. 
c. The suggestion that school leavers be hired at less than standard 
rates because this proposal was inconsistent with the rest of the 
report and the fact that the government policy is to create an 
economy which is more labour absorbing, avoiding the discontinuties 
of ad hoc programmes of this nature. 
d. The proposal that as a general rule there should be direct control 
over luxury imports and direct curtailment of consumption of 
exportables. The government preferred to use fiscal instruments 
such as tariffs, domestic consumption taxes and export subsidies 
to accomplish the objective of improving the balance of payments 
since these instruments alter the distribution of income and at 
same time curtail Imports and increase exports. 
3. THE INTRODUCTION OF 'THE WAGE GUIDELINES 
The original Wage Guidelines were issued by the Minister for Finance 
to the Industrial Court on 29th August 1973 as a directive under Section 
5 of the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971. All collective agreements 
were henceforth to be registered with the Industrial Court to ensure their 
conformity with the Guidelines. The bulk of collective agreements are 
signed after voluntary negotiations between employers and trade unions. 
The deliberations of the Court, when giving judgement in a particular 
trade dispute or when considering the registration of a particular collective 
agreement, was to be guided by the following Guidelines:-
I) So long as the economy continues to expand, all sections of 
the population have a right to expect some regular improvement 
In their standard of living. Over the years some employees have, 
however, tended to receive wage increases at a faster rate than 
the growth of the economy. This situation if allowed to continue 
unplanned would have the undesirable effect of employees as a 
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group having a relative advantage over other sections of the 
population, particularly small farmers. 
ii) It is important that the decisions of the Court should not cause 
any check to the regular growth of wage employment opportunities 
in line with the Development Plan targets or cause redundancy in 
cases where labour becomes less profitable to use than machinery. 
This is important because the welfare of all sections of the 
population will only be improved if there is a significant and 
regular increase in the number of people in wage employment. 
In order to avoid widening inequities and frustrating employment 
creation, the Court should make sure that on the whole, increases 
in wages and salaries do not exceed the rate of income growth in 
the economy as a whole. 
iv) The workers' wages should not normally be eroded by price increases. 
Compensation for price increases other than those caused by 
increased taxation may be granted, based on the rise of the Nairobi 
Wage Earners' Price Index from the time of the most recent 
revision of wages and salaries. Since tax increases must be borne 
by all members of society, if is not justified to ask that price 
increases caused by taxation be compensated in the same way as other price 
increases. 
v) Workers are entitled to a basic minimum standard of living. 
It will be for the Court to decide what that minimum should be from 
time to time in each occupation. But in deciding that minimum, it 
is suggested that the Court should always have regard to the 
standard of living of people who are not in wage employment, 
particularly the standards of the average small farmer in the rural 
are as, 
vi) As far as possible, priority in the allocation of awards should be 
given to lower paid workers provided this does not cause either a 
contraction in the opportunities for the employment of general 
unskilled labour or a decline in the incentives for workers to 
improve the levels of their work skills by training. Reasonable 
differentials should be established to reward skills and training, 
particularly as regards manual and technical skills. 
iii) 
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vii) The Court should endeavour to prevent increases in wages in one 
industry leading to increases in wages in another industry less 
able to afford such an increase. The continual leapfrogging of 
wage increases from one industry to another will be harmful to the 
economy. Efforts to bring about equal pay standards for equal work 
should aim at lifting up those who are below the average rather than 
lifting the whole group to the position of the highest wage obtainable 
for that type of job. 
viii) Ability to pay higher wages should not necessarily be regarded as 
adequate and conclusive reason for an increase, if it means that 
one group of workers will receive awards significantly out of 
step with those being given to other workers of similar skills, 
ix) As far as possible, the Court'should endeavour ro ensure that 
higher wages do not lead to higher prices, whether in export 
industries or industries producing primarily for local consumers. 
The Court should always bear in mind that rising consumer prices 
erode the real value of any wage aaard. 
x) It is suggested that the level of remuneration of any one section 
of workers should not be reviewed more often than once every 
twenty-four months. This rule should apply to all awards granted 
or agreements entered into after these guidelines have been 
issued. It will not preclude reviews of wages and salaries for 
groups which are presently covered by collective agreements of 
a duration shorter than twenty-four months. 
It was made clear that the contents of the Wage Guidelines would be 
subject to occasional modifications according to the experience gained in their 
implementation and to follow the requirements of changing economic conditions. 
The main objective of the Guidelines was to ensure that employees can acquire a 
fair share of the national product, while at the same time ensuring that better 
organised workers do not overcompensate themselves at the expense of the weaker 
aid less organised sections of the community. Since some wages e.g. of managers, 
contract labour and in unorganised firms are not regulated by collective agreements, 
the employers in such firms were urged to respect the substance of these 
Guidelines. 
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In March 1974, the Minister for Finance issued another letter to the 
Industrial Court aimed at clarifying the relevance of the Guidelines to the 
then prevailing economic situation which was characterised by rapid and 
persistent price increases. This letter did not interfere with agreements 
already negotiated and/or registered. The letter also increased the 
flexibility of the original Guidelines in the sense that the Court was asked 
not to object to arrangements whereby workers and employers voluntarily agree 
to review their agreements after one year, provided that the revision conformed 
with Guideline (iv). 
In mid-1974, the economic situation started deteriorating, This 
made the Minister for Finance issue an amendment to the original Guidelines 
in January 197 5 which was quite restrictive: Productivity would no longer be 
used as a justification for wage increases and compensation for cost of living 
increases would be allowed in full only for the lowest paid groups those 
earning KShs. 250 or less per month), with a uniformly declining rate of 
compensation up to KShs. 2,000 above which no compensation would be allowed. 
The entire policy measures to deal with the critical economic situation were 
described in the Sessional Paper on Economic Prospects and Policies 
(Kenya, 1975). These measures included the control of public expenditure, 
higher income tax for the well-to-do, increased indirect taxes on luxury items, 
introduction of capital gains tax, increased property taxes, import restrictions, 
and increased farm production. 
During the first quarter of 1975, mounting trade union opposition to tb 
strict Wage Guidelines and the low statutory minimum wages led to a threat of a 
general strike which ended in an agreement between the Central Organisation of 
Trade Unions (COTU) and the Minister for Labour to ease the restrictions and 
give more leeway for collective bargaining. In a statement issued on 18th April 
1975, the Minister for Labour declared that while the Wage Guidelines would 
remain, increases over and above the ceilings laid down in January 197 5 would be 
permitted. On 1st May 197 5, against a background of political crisis, the 
President announced increases in the statutory minimum wages above the levels 
recommended by the General Wages Advisory Board. 
Real per capita income rose only slightly in 1974, fell in 1975, and 
was expected to improve only slightly in 1976. Export incentives continued to 
be eroded by rising domestic costs of production, and higher import prices 
continued to aggravate the balance of payments deficit. In these circumstances, 
the government issued amendments on 3rd February 1976 for the interpretation of 
- 122 - IDS/OP 32 
the original Guidelines of August 1973, The new emphasis was that price 
increase which were due to increased costs of imports or local commodity 
shortages could not be used as bases for compensating better paid groups, 
since that would only lead to increased inflation. Due to improved economic 
performance from 1976 onwards, the Guidelines were relaxed in August 1977 to 
allow compensation based on realised productivity increases, The claim for 
productivity increase would be limited by the lower of the percentage 
increases of either the per capita income in the economy as a whole during 
1977 and beyond or production per worker in the industry or firm covered by 
the particular claim duping 1977 and beyond. Compensation for cost of living 
increases was to remain as before. 
4. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WAGE GUIDELINES 
The average rates of increase in wages provided by collective agreements 
registered with the Industrial Court during the period September 1973 to Decembar 
1978 are shown in Table l. These are not all the collective agreements in 
existence. Some of the agreements registered before and during 1974 were still 
valid in 1978 when this paper was written on had not been succeeded by new ones, 
and in some cases e.g. coffee, sugar and sisal plantations, there had been 
supplementary agreements. An analysis done within the Ministry of Labour shows 
that, the percentage changes in earnings for most sectors more or less reflect 
those provided for under the registered collective agreements during the periods 
indicated, although the total number of unionisable employees covered by the 
registered agreements is only about 400,000. This represents less than half tbe 
total wage earning labour force but include a majority of the paid-up union member-
ship estimated at 350,000 in 1978. 
Most of the agreements are of two year duration although many are revised 
annually, therefore making it difficult to calculate the annual increases in 
wages under the agreements. It appears that about a quarter of all agreements 
registered during 1973-7 5 remained in force for an average of 28 months while 
those registered in 1976 remained in force for an average of 24 months and 
25 months for those registered in 1977. This shows an improvement in the 
frequency with which collective agreements are revised as compared to the 
days before the introduction of the Guidelines when agreements were revised 
after longer periods and with less favourable terms and conditions of 
employment. The averages are unweighted and therefore give undue weight to 
the large number of small firms covered by separate agreements. If the new 
agreements were to be regarded as compensation for price increases which take 









Table 2. Labour Costs As % Of Gross Domestic Product, 1973 - 77 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Agriculture 36.4 25.4 25.8 18.2 11.7 
Forestry 64.5 69.9 82.6 88.8 87.6 
Fishing 25.9 27.6 24.8 27.5 28.0 
Mining and Quarrying 41.8 52.6 55.4 43.1 43.1 
Manufacturing and Repairing 46.00 46.8 45.5 42.3 43.5 
Building and Construction 81.1 79.8 79.6 81.9 82.6 
Electricity and Water 24.1 25.1 36.6 36.8 26.0 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication 64.9 61.2 60.6 59.6 56.2 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 43.0 45. 2 45.6 45.3 44.6 
Banking, Insurance, Real 
Estate 46. 7 44.2 47.9 47.1 47.5 
Other Services 67. 7 67. 8 71.1 69.0 71. 5 
TOTAL 43.6 43.4 43.5 39.1 34. 1 
Source: Kenya, Economic Survey and Statistical Abstract, relevant issues. 
increased noticeably from 1974 to 1975 except in transport and communication 
and increased manufacturing sectors like textile and garments, leather, 
electronics, building and construction, and glass, ceramic and other 
building materials, which showed some decline. 
Table 2 gives the percentage shares of labour costs to GDP. The 
table shows that the share of labour to GDP was stable over the period 1973-75. 
The share decline in the sectors where production declined e.g. large scale 
agriculture and building and construction. However, the overall labour 
share sharply declined from 43.5% in 1975 to 39.1% in 1976 and 34.1% in 1977. 
This can be explained partly by the effects of the Wage Guidelines in 
manufacturing and repair, mining and quarrying, commerce and other services, 
and partly by the boom in the value of gross marketed agricultural produce 
especially of coffee and tea. 
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The translation of the Guidelines into shillings and cents meets the 
following difficulties: 
a- Whereas the upper limit for wage increases is described clearly 
in Guideline (III), the lower limit is defined in rather general 
terms, 
b. The upper limit is a maximum, not a target. If there is a great 
risk of redundancy or layoffs in the industry or firm concerned 
or if wages are already relatively high or have been increased 
rapidly in recent years, the Guidelines advise the Industrial 
Court to be less generous in its wage awards. The difference 
between the maximum and the target level can be widened or 
narrowe narrowed depending on the views of the parties, one of the factors 
being redundancy or layoffs. 
c. There is very little empirical evidence to follow the suggestion 
in Guideline (v) that the Industrial Court 'should always have regard 
to the standard of living of people who are not in wage employment, 
particularly the standards of the average small in the rural 
areas'r 
d. The lack of a framework to deal with what the labour and management 
expects to be the economic performance of the firm and the economy 
as a whole, 
e. The Guidelines recommend a change in the structure of wages in 
favour of the lowest paid groups. The lack of a definition of 
the lowest and high paid categories presents implementation 
problems. The high degree of sophistication of the Guidelines 
requires a considerable improvement in the collection, analysis 
and presentation of labour market data. 
The present wage and incomes policy takes into account almost all forms 
of development policies affecting incomes, including such government programmes 
as direct provision of goods and services. The wage policies are therefore 
combined with measures affecting incomes other than wages. In the 1970-74_ 
Development Plan, the government estimated that 'the achievement of the basic 
goal of an economy 60 per cent larger in 1974 than in 1967 will be obtained 
mainly through a greatly expanded spending programme covering the whole 
country which implied that the increased expenditure would largely be met 
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from revenues- The government planned to use taxation to achieve equitable 
distribution of income and beginning with the 1974/75 budget, the incomes 
policy has more or less been in line with the Sessional Paper on Employment 
(Kenya, 1973). The tax structure has been made more equitable by the 
abolition of the Graduated Personal Tax and the introduction of 10 - 25% 
sales tax on most items other than food, While the income tax system has 
been made more equitable by reducing the jfeax threshold from K£990 to K£720 
for a family of four or more, taxation of company profits has increased 
from 40 to 45% and the rate of tax on dividends paid to non-residents 
increased from 125% to 15%. 
A 15% tax on insurance commissions has been introduced. Furthermore, 
all foreign insurance companies will now be incorporated locally to ensure 
stricter supervision of insurance business in order to protect local policy 
holders, and avoid unnecessary foreign exchange cost of insurance written 
overseas. All goods purchased by Kenya importers must be insured with 
companies licensed to transact insurance business in Kenya. It is envisaged 
that the surplus generated by insurance business in Kenya will in future be 
used in financing economic development. The tariff system has been reformed 
by introducing an import duty of 10% on a wide range of items that have 
higherto been duty free and further changes will be made. At the same time, 
a 10% local manufacturers' export compensation scheme has been introduced to 
offset the disadvantage to which exports are put because of import duty. 
This policy is expected to have the desirable effects of shifting Kenya's 
industrial and trade policies from inward-looking import substitution to 
outward-looking export promotion based on, and efficiently using, local 
resources rather than imported raw materials. Since this is a vital part 
of our development strategy, emphasis is being put to restrain the growth of 
imports. In addition, customs duties have been increased on various imported 
textiles, wines and spirits, and motor cars. In an effort to achieve greater 
income redistribution, capital gains tax was introduced covering not more than 
35% of the difference between what was paid for a property and what has been 
received for selling the property. 
In the 197 8^79 Budget however, the Minister for Finance declared that 
the Capital Gains Tax would now be levied only on half the gain that an 
individual makes on the sale of the property. This is likely to inflate 
property prices. It has been argued that the Capital Gains Tax has the effect 
of inhibiting economic growth and that in its place, the existing stamp djlty 
could be raised, and perhaps collect as much revenue with less collection costs 
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than the Capital Gains Tax, However, there is a general feeling that the 
Capital Gains Tax is necessary for the purpose of wealth and income 
redistribution and that what is needed is to close the loopholes. In 
addition, there is a progressive taxation of wealth in Kenya which is levied 
at varying rates between one per cent on estates between K£2,500 to K£5,000 
and 50% on estates over K£1 million. 
Agricultural incomes on the other hand have been increased through 
subsidies and increases in producer prices for selected commodities, removal 
of cesses on cash crops, and reduction in housing charge for agricultural 
employees from 15 to 10% to enhance the value of their emoluments. In general, 
however, Kenya has different goals to be achieved through the use of one 
instrument: taxation. For various reasons, possibly including corruption and 
inefficiency in the tax collection systems, it has been difficult to achieve 
the goals of equity in the distribution of income and wealth through the one 
instrument. 
5. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
It is obvious that the issue of wage and incomes policy is complex. 
The essential factors considered in the process of wage determination are the 
overall economic situation in the country, the principle of social justice, 
the bargaining power of the parties, and the necessity to promote, productivity 
and skill upgrading. The main problem with the Wage Guidelines is that they 
try to reconcile contradictory principles: to put a ceiling on wage increases 
and at the same time ensure a basic minimum standard of living. 
There is a body of economic literature which holds that in Kenya and 
may other developing countries, prices outside agriculture are largely 
influenced by foreign organisations and multinational firms, and therefore 
undertaken outside the effective control of government, It is also possible 
that the wage policy is not very effective in promoting employment due to the 
fact that there are many factors besides labour costs that determine factor 
mix, and wage restraint alone will not therefore significantly affect 
employment unless it is combined with other more powerful measures of job 
creation. 
Wage 'distortion' is usually included as a factor explaining this 
low growth of employment in less developed countries. That wage levels are 
'too high' in this sense is indicated by the existence of substantial 
unemployment without a general tendency for wage rates in the modern sector 
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to decrease, while much lower pay rates for similar skills exist in the 
unorganised sector. The failure of wage rates in- the modern sector to 
reflect market forces is partly explained by the presence of organised 
social forces in the industrial sector, notably trade unions. But 
government wage and social policies are probably of far greater significance. 
The government has played a major role in wage determination, both as an 
employer and in its wage regulations. 
The general picture then, is of the modern sector paying high wages, 
with their levels even rising despite substantial unemployment and government 
wage policies. These high wage levels provide a part of the explanation for 
the relatively slow employment growth in the past 15 years. As Reynalds (1965) 
observes, there is no question about the plausibility of this kind of analysis. 
As a general proposition, a more rapidly rising wage level will lead to less 
growth in employment for reasons that are well known; furthermore empirical 
studies in a number of countries suggest wage elasticities of demand for labour 
which are negative and significant though generally lower than one. 
Another significant dfactor in the explanation of slow employment growth 
is the distortion in the price of capital, which derives from certain economic 
policies and institutional arrangements in less developed countries which 
encourage capital intensity e.g. overvalued currencies, subsidised credit 
arrangements, and general fiscal policies. 
It must be recognised however, that there are costs involved in a low 
wage policy. It is likely that the effectiveness and intensity of work effort 
is adversely affected, particularly among highly trained and educated workers. 
Low wages may cause deterioration in health and nutrition and result in slower 
rates of performance. There are, moreover, some unfavourable income 
distribution effects of low wage policies. Income distribution favours dividend 
receive®s abroad, domestic capitalists, managers, and private sector employees, 
whose incomes are less amenable to effective control than salaries of public 
sector employees. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of wage policy in narrowing the urban-rural 
income differential is difficult to assess in the absence of national data on 
income levels in small farms. However, there has been some success attributable 
to the pricing policy on major food items and to some free public services. In 
addition, the real wages in the modern sector significantly declined in the period 
1973-75 at the same time as agricultural producer prices were rising. But as 
Edgren observed; 
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It is hardly likely that the urban-rural income gap narrowed in that 
period except in some geographical areas which had good rains and 
produced cash crops at favourable prices. Drought, distribution 
problems and rising prices of agricultural inputs as well as of 
non-food items seem to have eroded the real income of most small-
holder families during the years of the new incomes policy.... 
Given the lack of control of productivity in the small-scale farming 
sector, attempts to narrow the gap tend to rely heavily on restraining 
wages in the modern sector. Since there is reason to believe that 
wages are more directly influenced by profitability and intra-firm 
relationships than by trade unions' bargaining activity, wage trends 
will not be effectively controlled by measures directed only at 
negotiated wages. And profits cannot be effectively controlled 
except by a government take-over of ownership (1976). 
The costs of wage restraint are therefore real and for wage restraint 
to have a significant impact, a whole range of complementary policies are required 
e.g. control on the level and the use of profits. No wage policy, for example, 
will dampen the flow of migrants unless something is done to develop 
agriculture and improve rural amenities and land tenure arrangements. 
Similarly, no industrial sector expansion will bring about higher rates of 
labour absorption without basic changes in, say, fiscal policies and the 
structure of incentives so as to reduce or eliminate those features which 
encourage capital intensity. Without appropriate changes in general economic 
and social policies, even the most rational wage policy will hardly make a dent 
on the employment problem. 
It Is envisaged therefore, that future development policies will put 
more emphasis on formulating and implementing a more integrated rural 
development programme which together with improved government control on 
commodity prices and wages and measures to control productivity, would create 
more employment opportunities while at the same time improving the incomes of 
the rural workers, thus narrowing the urban-rural income differentials. 
However, care must be taken to avoid increased rural-urban migration in view 
of the on-going countrywide consolidation and registration of individual 
land ownership and the emergence of a permanent agricultural wage labourer class 
which will accelerate the process of rural differentiation and landlessness. 
As Godfrey suggests, 
Our framework would point to the need to influence the whole structure 
of urban rewards and the way in which it is changing.... Most rural 
development schemes have the effect of increasing differentiation, 
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whatever their intention and would thus be expected to accelerate 
rural-urban migration. Large-scale political and institutional 
change, including redistribution of land would be needed to 
counteract this process. Educational planning might also have a 
part to play although the rate at which people equip themselves 
for high-level jobs and thus their propensity to migrate, can 
hardly be controlled in the absence of measures to reduce the 
rewards for such jobs and rationalise their educational content 
(1975, pp. 11-2). 
A desirable development would be the implementation of a coordinated 
« 
and fully integrated wage and incomes policy operated by a single body (a 
National Board for Prices, Wages and Incomes), which would oversee in Mma4ters 
affecting wages, prices and other incomes and monitor changes in -productivity. 
The existing institutions e.g. the Price Control Advisory Committee, the Wages 
Advisory Board, the General Wages Advisory Board, the Agricultural Wages Advisory 
Board, Industrial Wages Councils, etc., could be amalgamated to provide the 
basis for setting up such a national organisation. Otherwise the existing 
framework lacks coordination and operates on ministerial basis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Kenya, the issue of rent controls is important, if the readers' 
letters and editorials in the local newspapers are anything to go by. This 
is because shelter is a basic need and rent (which is the price of that 
shelter) is a substancial proportion of expenditure of urban dwellers, 22.9% 
for the lower income, 16.1% for the middle income, and 27.2% for the upper 
income group in Nairobi (Kenya, 1977). Again, there is the suspicion, some-
times justified and sometimes not, that the market mechanism through the 
free interaction of supply and demand works against the interests of tenants. 
Hence the need to set 'fair' rents to reduce or prevent exploitation of 
tenants. 
A number of academic papers (see, for instance, Mutunga, 1978) argue 
that rent controls are necessary because the market mechanism does not 
produce equitable results. However, one of the concerns in this paper is the 
likely effects of rent controls on the supply of housing. The conclusion is 
that the solution to the rent problem lies in getting more houses built. The 
paper also analyses the present system of rent control through the Rent 
Restriction Act (Cap. 296) and concludes that the legal institution embodied 
in the Rent Tribunal is inadequate both on paper and, even more so, in 
practice. 
The paper is divided into three sections. The first is a review 
of the literature; the second deals with the structure of rent controls in 
Kenya; and the last summarises the emerging issues. The underlying major 
assumption throughout the paper is that the currently dominant capitalist 
economy, with heavy doses of state intervention, will prevail for quite some 
time, although this in no way reflects the authors' ideological stance. 
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Myrdal (1969) says that social scientists should, if they can, 
simply announce their biases and assumptions so that the reader can take 
them into account when he examines the data presented and the arguments 
based upon them. In this paper, as stated above, we are assuming a mixed 
economy, with investment and the pattern of development solely determined 
by the profit motive, an assumption that holds true for Kenya. 
The coverage of rent controls is important in as much as it affects 
the pattern of supply of housing. Mishan (1969) argues that, if the 
government, in a genuine attempt to protect the urban poor, controls rents 
in low cost housing, private investors will divert their investments to the 
uncontrolled middle and upper income housing, causing a severe shortage of 
low cost housing. This would leave the government to shoulder the whole 
burden of providing low cost housing. If rent controls cover all housing, 
a situation which is difficult to achieve in practice, private investors 
will direct their investments from housing to other sectors of the economy -
assuming that the controls make the returns to housing construction less 
profitable compared to other investment opportunities. Thus, France had 
practically no residential construction from 1914 to 1948 because of rent 
controls (Samuelson, 1976, p. 396). Samuelson continues: 'If new construction 
had been subjected to such controls after World War II, the vigorous boom in 
French residential building since 1950 would never have taken place'. 
However, this does not mean that there would be no housing shortage in a 
decontrolled system, but the implication is that the scarcity of housing 
would have been greater, and the rents would have risen more had the stock 
of housing not expanded In response to the high prospective profits (Harris, 
1969, p. 3). 
Mishan (1969) argues that it is a fallacy to argue that 'rent 
controls are necessary during a time of shortage'. He argues that, during 
a housing shortage, rent controls will induce a less intensive use of housing 
stock, thus exacerbating the shortage. He advances two further arguments 
against rent control as a redistributive policy instrument. First, there 
are poor landlords and rich tenants and rent controls may therefore 
constitute a transfer of real income from the poor to the rich. Second, 
even if we supposed all landlords are better off than their tenants, rent 
controls discriminate against the owners of a particular class of property 
in an arbitrary manner. He recommends that the difference between the 
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estimated market rent and the government controlled rent be paid by the 
government on behalf of the poor tenant to the landlord, the funds necessary 
to finance this subsidy coming out of general revenues. 
There are various objections to Mishan's approach to the issue. 
First, given the small size of the public vote in a country like Kenya, a 
subsidy to tenants would be too heavy a burden on the government. Second, 
the subsidy would be subject to misuse and would favour the urban dwellers 
who are likely to stay in rented premises. Mishan's argument that it is 
possible to have poor landlords and rich tenants does not seem to hold 
true for Kenya, at least at an aggregate level. 
3. RENT CONTROL SYSTEM IN RESIDENTIAL PREMISES IN NAIROBI 
Rent control on residential premises was introduced in 1918 at the 
end of World War I to prevent profiteering arising out of the post-war 
housing shortage but was removed on 31 December 1923. Rent controls on 
both residential and business premises were introduced in 1940 at the 
beginning of World War II and are still in force. We are concerned here 
with rent controls on residential premises although some arguments are 
relevant to business premises as well. 
Rent control on residential premises cover those premises whose 
'standard rent' does" not exceed Ksh. 800 for unfurnished dwellings and 
KShs. 1,100 for furnished dwellings. If because of reconstruction and 
improvements of a hitherto controlled house the rent exceeds, by the agree-
ment of the parties, the financial ceiling, the control ceases immediately; 
or if the Rent Tribunal assesses rent for a dwelling house over and above 
the financial ceiling, such a house is thereby decontrolled. Since rents, 
like prices of most consumer goods and services, have been increasing since 
1966 when the rent ceilings were fixed,"'" the statutory coverage of rent 
controls has been declining over time, not to mention that the low ceilings 
puts the upper income and most of the middle income housing outside the 
ambit of the rent control machinery. The fact that the statutory coverage 
of rent control is low and is declining as rents increase means that the 
legal machinery has an built-in distortion which retards the supply of low 
income housing. 
1. Act No. 37 of 1966, section 3. 
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The legislation does not apply to tenant-purchase houses which are 
becoming the dominant category of houses in Nairobi. The rationale for 
this is that tenant-purchase houses are occupied by the purchasers. This 
is a naive assumption as a good proportion of these houses are rented out 
and even the finance institutions which mortgage them out often recognise 
this fact but do nothing about it. 
Also kept out of rent control, although here the tenant-employees 
are not charged high rents, are houses provided by the central and local 
2 
government institutions and some parastatals. It must be noted, however, 
that in such cases, the ultimate landlord may be reaping high rents from 
the government or parastatal which are normally too high for individual 
potential tenants. Under section 3 or the Act, service tenancies - defined 
as dwelling premises given by the employer to the employee in connexion with 
his employment - are excluded from controls. As with the category of 
dwellings given to government employees, the employer may not be the ultimate 
landlord or owner of the premises. Oftentimes, the employer merely leases 
the house and gives it to the employee at a subsidised rate. Individual 
potential tenants can hardly compete with corporate employers and other 
multinational institutions in securing such premises. 
The gap between the legal and actual coverage of rent controlled 
premises is further magnified by the fact that not all assessable plots 
are assessed by the Rent Tribunal. Noormohamed's study of the economic 
consequencies of rent controls in Eastleigh, Nairobi, shows that only 7% 
of assessable plots were assessed by the Rent Tribunal and that rents are 
effectively controlled in only 50% of the assessable plots, thus making 
only 3.5% of plots with rents kept at the level of 'standard rent'. 
Noormohamed concludes that, even though the Rent Tribunal is significantly 
effective in assessed plots, its overall impact is negligible (1975, p. 45). 
Again, as Mutunga observes, '...in the urban areas, the figures of the 
personal enquiries show that the greater population of the towns who are 
tenants have not availed themselves of these institutions, or were not 
aware of them' (1978, p. 226). It must be pointed out that the Rent Tribunal 
2. Sections 3 and 4 (1) of the Act and Gazette Notice No. 4662 of 
1966. 
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has very wide powers including the appointment and employment of valuers, 
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inspectors, and clerks. Without identifying the reasons why the Tribunal 
has so far not chosen to exercise some of its wide statutory powers, it is 
hard to determine the influence its powers would have had on rents and stock 
of housing. 
Another class of houses worth considering are the Nairobi City 
Council houses. The Council charges low rents to occupiers, giving an 
implicit subsidy to the occupiers equal to the difference between the 
market rent and the Council's rent. This subsidy can be up to 60% (Temple, 
197 3, p. 220) and the rentees sometimes convert the subsidy into cash by 
subletting at the prevailing market rates. 
The issue of rents in Council houses has been recognised by 
various scholars, notably Temple (1973) and Harris (1969). Temple and 
Harris show that some of the Council houses are not low income houses 
and the occupiers do not therefore warrant a public subsidy. Second, the 
subsidy lowers the funds available to the Council for house construction 
and is therefore one of the factors contributing to the magnitude of 
Nairobi's housing problem. The current system protects a group of rich 
tenants and reduces the supply of houses. The resultant shortage of 
public houses makes it possible for private landlords to charge high rents. 
Thus, the beneficiaries are private landlords and tenants in the Council 
houses while the burden is borne by the Council, tenants in non-controlled 
private housing and, of course, the houseless and shanty dwellers. Further-
more, the availability of low rents in public housing and rent controlled 
private sector housing reduces labour mobility because occupiers know 
they will pay higher rents if they leave rent controlled premises. 
The politics of the subsidy of City Council houses is well docu-
mented. Temple (1973, p. 221) shows that it is too tough a political 
act to remove the subsidy because of the relative political power of the 
beneficiaries and that the poor have no machinery to pressure the Council 
to allocate the houses in their favour. As Temple argues: 
Since housing allocation provide very tangible means of 
rewarding supporters, relatives, and friends, it is not 
surprising that the councillors endeavour to preserve as 
much personal control over allocation procedures as possible. 
3. Section 5 (1) (A) of the Act. 
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Council officers are also tied into Nairobi's networks of 
personal influence and obligation, and many of them also try 
to use their positions to influence allocations. Furthermore, 
many Council employees desire Council houses themselves, and 
given Nairobi's long tradition of employer-provided housing, 
they often feel that the Council has an obligation to provide 
it for them. When medium cost estates come up for allocation, 
Council employees often constitute a powerful internal lobby 
(1973, p. 231). 
Political considerations aside, we would recommend a removal of 
the subsidy on high income Council houses because it inhibits supply of 
housing and is not in the interest of the poor in Nairobi. It is hoped 
that the market rents collected would be chanelled to new housing construction 
so as to spread the benefits to a wider population. 
To summarise the argument so far, we started by inviting the 
reader to accept that in a market economy like Kenya, profit (greed?) is the 
prime mover and concluded that rent controls inhibit housing construction, 
create more shortages, which might be used as a justifidication for more 
rigorous controls. However, before we advocate a repeal of such laws, one 
must -examine whether new houses would be built'if such laws are repealed. 
Again, although rent controls are more of a myth than reality, the government 
should, under a decontrolled system, maintain a tribunal to deal with cases 
of breach of contract between landlords and tenants. According to Jorgensen, 
such a tribunal 'just as many countries have labour tribunals, would deal 
with and enforce its decisions on such matters as untimely evictions, change 
of rent during the period of lease, lack of maintenance and other kinds l 
of negligence on the part of both tenant and landlord, devious contracts 
and interpretation of unclear or unusual contract terms' (1972, p. 20). 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that rent controls imposed in -a largely market 
economy interferes with supply of housing. If controls cover low income 
housing only, they discourage supply of housing to the low income earners 
unless substantial public housing for the low income is realised, and if 
imposed on all classes of residential housing discourages investment in 
residential housing sector as a whole. As Kenya's 1979-83 Development Plan 
states, 'it is not the policy of the government to allow the exploitation of 
tenants through unjustified evictions and extortionate charges by unscrupulous 
landlords It is, however, appreciated that in the final analysis the 
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answer to high rents lies in getting more houses built' (p. 173). While 
this paper accepts the general thesis of the Plan that it is futile to 
expect rent controls to achieve the desideratum of both low prices and 
abundant supply, the various institutional constraints on supply of housing 
e.g. the housing finance and the land tenure systems should be improved 
so as to allow expansion in housing stock as a result of the high rents; 
or encourage individual construction of own houses within reasonable 
distance of the towns. 
The statutory and actual coverage of rent controls is low. Given 
that rent control is more of a myth than reality, they should be relaxed and 
the Rent Tribunal operate like an industrial court so see that contracts 
between tenants and landlords are adhered to and that market excesses are 
minimised. Indeed the existence of the Rent Restriction Act and the Rent 
Tribunal only helps to maintain and promote the myth of existence of rent 
controls. The City Council houses should also charge market rents because 
they are occupied by the well-to-do who do I n<Jt deserve a piiiblia''subsidynand 
prevents new housing construction, which could be used as a way of spreading 
the benefits to a wider population. 
The comment by Jorgensen (.1972, p. 20) might as well close this paper: 
'The benefits of rent control, if it is not fully implemented, is doubtful 
because of the sense of injustice it leaves. The cost of rent control, if it 
is to be effective, will be enormous.' 
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THE MONITORING OF PERFORMANCE IN AGRICULTURE 




Ministry of Agriculture 
Government intervention in agricultural markets is found world-wide 
and Kenya is certainly no exception in this respect. Such intervention 
takes a variety of forms: direct through price control or price setting 
at various levels in the marketing chain, involving possibly consumer and/or 
producer subsidies; and less direct through the marketing operations of 
parastatals established by government which may involve the use of buffer 
stocks, price stabilization funds or other measures designed to affect prices. 
Governments may also confer market power onto non-parastatal organisations 
such as public companies through, for example, exclusive bujanw or.js&llarig 
rights or they may simply adopt a laissez faire attitude so that such organi-
sations can acquire market power and hence exercise control over agricultural 
markets and their prices. This implies that agricultural marketing firms, 
whether parastatal or not, tend to conduct themselves and perform very much 
according to the monopoly or monopsony powers - or both - they wield. This 
is very much in line with the Bain/Caves thesis that one can predict how firms 
or business organisations will conduct themselves in a market and how they 
will perform in that market in response to that market's concentration. Several 
very enlightening examples can be taken from Kenya's agricultural markets which 
well demonstrate this point. This is all very interesting but what is more 
important in a practical sense is how to measure the performance of agricultural 
marketing parastals or quasi-parastatals, most of which perform marketing 
services and functions specific to a particular crop or product and undertake 
various processing activities. And having decided what to measure, against 
what set of criteria should these measurements be set to begin to attempt 
some sort of appraisal? And again, if the performance is found to be lacking, 
what is to be done about it'. How can a government countervail against the 
marketing organisation it has either established or permitted to become 
established in order to preserve the interests of producers and/or consumers? 
It may surprise some that this last question is posed at all in the context 
of parastatals but certainly the problem of controlling marketing institutions 
established by Acts of Parliament and with functions defined in such legal 
documents (functions which can become modified in practice and over time) 
can be a major one. 
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Recapitulating so far, marketing parastatals or their quasi-parastatal 
relations, are often granted a good deal of market power when they are 
established, at least in the domestic market, and a good deal of autonomy 
with which to wield it. Over a period of time, these powers may change and 
increase. It can be noted also that developments over time can work in an 
opposite direction. Marketing institutions may lose market power and become 
enfeebled to such a degree that they can no longer perform the roles they 
were set up to undertake. 
After this preamble, the first point to make Is that if governments 
are to intervene effectively and continuously in agricultural markets (the 
supposition, not discussed here,being that such intervention is desirable), 
there is a need for them to monitor performance and possibly the conduct of the 
marketing agencies established in agricultural markets, to compare the results 
of this monitoring against some set of criteria, and do something about It if 
either performance or conduct appear to be lacking. That this need has been 
realised in Kenya is only slowly manifesting itself. So if we are to offer 
anything here, we have to address ourselves to the problem of the conduct and 
performance measures to be used, their criteria and consequent action. The 
second point to be made is that governments can and do, whether willingly or 
not, change policies either more or less explicitly, which can severely modify 
the market environment in which a marketing organisation is operating and 
hence affect its conduct and, more important, its performance. If these two 
points are not recognized, then the situation so often demonstrated in Kenya's 
agricultural markets can arise: of marketing institutions, parastatals and 
others, not conducting themselves in the market or not performing in the 
national interest. Deficits accumulate, producers' incomes are depressed or 
producers face other market difficulties, consumer prices are inflated and 
consumers have access to a more limited range of products than need be. These 
are some examples. This sort of situation cannot be blamed entirely on the 
marketing institutions themselves although in Kenya, a fair share of the blame 
i • *. 
can certainly be aimed at them. Government policy may be involved also and 
without doubt can be implicated in some cases. 
Without pretending to offer many firm prescriptions, what can be 
said on the three main aspects of this problem: the measurement of conduct 
and performance of an agricultural marketing institution, the criteria against 
which such measurements can be appraised, and consequent action? It would 
seem more appropriate to consider the measurements along with their criteria; 
remedial action can be considered separately. 
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The following are some of the conduct/performance measurements and 
their criteria:-
(a) Performance of functions at minimum cost. That is, technical efficiency. 
Such measures e.g. storage costs per unit and transport costs per unit, are 
not difficult to calculate. The overhead costs of administration per unit 
of throughput can also show some interesting trends. Other things being 
equal, such overhead costs should decline with increasing throughput. However, 
comparing these costs between institutions can be misleading because It is 
rare for any two institutions to be performing similar functions, or be in 
the same sort of market environment. One institution may be undertaking 
more of a processing function, another a trading one. One may be dealing 
in a perishable product, another may not. Again, drawing from examples 
from similar institutions in other countries can be fraught with difficulties 
- exchange rates, quality differences, factor costs, government policies, 
to name a few - although major differences in costs can be shown. 
(b) Undistorting market price signals to both producers and consumers. 
Clearly there is a link between (a) and (b) because the more technically 
efficient a marketing organisation is, the more capable it is of undistorting 
market price signals so as to maximize the resource allocative efficiency 
of that market, although its management may choose not to do so. The best 
measures here are the producers' share of a market price or the mark-up from 
the producer or farm-gate price to the consumer price. Again, and for the 
same reasons as for (a) above, it can be misleading to base too much on 
inter-institutional comparisons. More Important are trends over time: if 
a producers' share Is declining over time, what are the reasons? Or trends 
In relation to some other measurement, such as trading profits or the 
accumulation or size of reserves. Thus, an upward shift of the producers' 
share of the market proceeds in any year accompanied by a decline in trading 
profits or a run-down in reserves, clearly can only be a temporary situation. 
A declining share accompanied by an increase in trading profit and/increase 
in reserves may be the result of over-conservative pricing policies either 
by the institution itself or imposed on it by government and may be corrected 
in the following year. Then again it may not, and here some action would be 
justifies. 
(c) Allocating sufficient capital to develop and/or1 Improve marketing or 
processing services or functions. The accumulation of capital reserves normally 
appropriated from trading profits could be regarded as a healthy sign. They 
should also be seen in the context of trends in other measurements listed 
above. The question can be made: what is it supposed to do with such reserves? 
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If they constitute a windfall gain from advantageous trading conditions, then 
producer prices should subsequently be adjusted to absorb them over a period 
of time. If they are being accumulated to invest in new capital, can it be 
shown that this will.confer benefits to producers? If not, can this be an 
example of conspicuous1" investment or is the institution concerned simply with 
accumulating a comfortable reserve on which it can enjoy a quiet life, a 
privilege many, parastatals conferred with monopoly/monopsony powers seem 
• \ to regard as behaviour deserving approval? 
(d) Achieving trading profits or at least avoiding deficits. This would 
seem to be a very basic measurement of performance although in practice, given 
the quixotic policies adopted by governments in agricultural markets, it is 
less useful. A trading deficit may simply be an unfunded subsidy. In the 
industrial market context, excess profits - that is, excess over a 'normal' 
return to the risk capital invested - can be a sign of monopoly/monopsony 
power in a market such as to justify the exercise of countervailling power 
to overcome it. In agricultural markets dominated by parastatal marketing 
institutions, such a broad conclusion has less validity. 
(e) Performing specific functions such as stabilising producer returns. 
It is rare, in fact, to have such functions carefully defined although they 
pertain to the establishment of price stabilisation funds administered by 
the marketing institution. It is equally rare to find criteria against 
which the operations of the fund can be measured although ex-post measurements 
can be useful, especially if they can be combined with other measurements such 
as the trend in the producers' share of the market price of a commodity. 
The marketing institution may be successful in stabilising the producer price, 
but at a level low relative to the actual trend in the market price. The 
surplus may be siphoned off to other ends, a complaint made by investigators 
of the performance of marketing boards in Ghana (cocoa) and Uganda (cotton), 
for example. Therefore, such quantifiable measurements - costs, shares of 
market proceeds, reserves, trading profits, price stabilisation - are useful in 
appraising the performance of a particular marketing institution but need 
to be qualified. What sorts of functions is the institution supposed to be 
performing and actually doing? Are these entirely of a marketing/processing/ 
trading type or do they include those of a quasi-political nature such as 
creating employment which may not be conducive to good performance? What 
is happening to throughput or quantities handled for do not expect a 
marketing institution to perform well if government policies have reduced its 
share of the market. What are the trends in costs over time and in relation 
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to overall inflation? Is the institution performing better or worse than one 
might expect in these circumstances? These qualifications do underline the 
need to be fully acquainted with the particular institution, 'the market it is 
operating in and government policies which impinge on it, before definite 
conclusions may be drawn from these measurements, even if they are quantifiable 
and hence less subjective. 
More subjective but worthy of note are the less quantifiable measure-
ments such as market conduct and the physical performance of marketing/ 
processing services or functions. An appraisal of market conduct involves 
investigating an instiution's pricing policies in terms of location and 
grades and the range of products it offers consumers. Typically, a firm 
with greater monopoly power will restrict the range of products (e.g. the 
Kenya Cooperative Creameries which has a virtual monopoly in milk in the 
major urban markets, only offers fresh whole milk as standardised, pasteurised 
milk packed in \ litre tetrapacks) either to lower their costs or to only 
produce that product with the greatest mark-up (e.g. in the bread market, not 
a monopoly but one with a high concentration ratio, a greater margin is earned 
on a 'premium* loaf than on a 'standard' loaf and it is therefore the former 
which is more commonly marketed). Here again, it is only possible to examine 
the market from the view point of ascertaining its conduct and attempt to 
draw conclusions on how closely it confirms with twhat may be termed as the 
national interest. The same goes in trying to appraise the physical performance 
of institutions in carrying out their functions or services, especially 
marketing functions such as storage, acceptance of produce, grading procedures, 
etc. If performance is poor in these areas, this can show up on the costs 
side although not invariably so. It is worthwhile to examine the whole 
marketing chafe; from the producer to the consumer, or that part of it under 
the control of the marketing institution in question, to ascertain what is 
supposed to be done by whom at the various links in this chain and how 
well it is done in practice. This can be a useful exercise although demanding 
in manpower and Is therefore unlikely to be incorporated in regular monitoring 
procedures. 
If one has to bet tentative in offering ideas on the measures to be 
used in appraising the performance of institutions operating in agricultural 
markets and on the criteria against which they can be compared, hedging them 
with qualifications and caveats, this is even more true when making 
recommendations on what actions are appropriate in the event of a particular 
institution failing its performance tests. It is pertinent to note that the 
I 
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legislation on which such institutions normally, but not invariably, rest 
as a rule do comment at length on the institution's duties and functions, its 
constitution, financing and so on. Therefore the legislation normally 
gives some idea of what the institution is supposed to do but it is rare to 
note any ideas on what is to be done in the event of the institution not doing 
what it is supposed to do. It is normally regarded as sufficient if it 
produces audited accounts at least annually and on time, some do not. But 
guidelines on what performance can be expected and what remedial action can 
be taken is lacking. It can be remarked that parastatal annual reports and 
accounts in Kenya, when they are produced, are normally much more informative 
and give a better idea on the details of the accounts than annual reports 
from public companies, and certainly provide more details than would be 
required under the Companies' Act. There is a danger that such reports oeuld 
become less informative as time goes by, which would mark an even further 
weakening of government control over them. Here again, the legislation could 
specify in more detail the minimum requirements with respect to the content 
as well as the timeliness of regular reports and presentation of accounts. 
The' normal procedure adopted if a parastatal is not performing well 
is to sack the management, which may or mayv not solve the problem. If the 
problem stems from a basic incompatability in government policies and these 
policies remain unchanged, then such an action cannot achieve Its desired 
objective. Short of this and in those cases where government does not have 
legal control over the institution in question, some leverage can be used 
against erring institutions through pricing. Reducing trading margins through 
raising producer prices while maintaining consumer price levels, for example, 
can be a salutory lesson for a trading institution, whether it is a parastatal 
or not. However, in some cases, government does not have sufficient control 
over prices or may not wish to use what pricing powers it may have. On the 
other hand, simple 'jaw boning' - that is, simply discussing with the 
institution's management the conclusions of a performance appraisal and what 
may happen if appropriate action is not taken - can achieve the desired result. 
Overall, it would be beneficial if firmer guidelines on expected 
performance on the part of a marketing (including processing) Institutions 
can be set down as a quid pro quo for the conferring of certain powers on 
it. Such guidelines could be quite general such as the expected producers' 
share of market proceeds or the ex-store or factory mark-up over the farm-
gate price; or the maximum size of reserves as a proportion of the producer 
payout. Guidelines such as these could give a frame of reference within which 

Table 3: Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) 
Costs - Kshs/'kg CDWa 
Year Beef 
Processed 
'000 kg CDW 
Transport Total Operations 
, Adminis-b : tration 
1971 27,427 0.10 1.33 0.15 
1972 33,522 0.09 1.03 0.19 
1973 23,043 0.13 1.36 0.27 
1974 20,637 0.19 1.65 0.29 
1975 17,063 0.32 2.72 0.36 
1976 26,033 0.46 2.84 0.25 
Note: a - Cold Dressed Weight 
b - Includes transport costs, processing, etc. 
Source: KMC Annual Reports. 
Finance Grand Average Producer Producer Surplus 
Total Receipts, shs/Kg. price as (deficit) as 
% sales % turnover 
value 
0.04 1.67 3.09 67.3 3.7 
0.03 1.36 3.08 61.6 3.7 
0.04 1.82 4.10 66.5 3.6 
0.07 2.19 4.67 70.7 (3.7) 
0.26 3.53 5.03 65.0 (8.3) 
0.22 3.49 5.35 63.4 8.9 
Table Kenya Cooperative Creameries Ltd. (KCC) 
„ . . - . , , Costs cts/litre intake Year Intake milk 







7.56 2.52 21.80 
8.56 2.65 20.81 
10.16 2.66 21.59 
11.42 3.27 26.84 
13.44 4.67 38.06 
16.29 4.71 39.64 
Source: KCC Annual Reports. 
Producer Payout Payout as Trade Surplus 
Total cts/litre ave- % sales (deficit) as % 
rage turnover 
31.81 55.89 60.5 0.4 
32.18 70.87 73.2 (16.9) 
34.61 72.73 31.2 (17.0) 
41.53 72.73 62.1 4.2 
56.18 79.05 57.9 4.1 
60.65 86.36 59.2 Breakeven 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF MAIZE MARKETING CONTROLS IN KENYA 
By 
Guenter Schmidt 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Maize is the major staple food in Kenya and most of it is produced 
by smallholders of whom 90 per cent grow maize. The functioning of the 
maize marketing system is therefore of major concern as reflected in the 
various commissions of inquiry and research undertaken over the years (see 
the bibliography). Since colonical times, the maize marketing system in 
Kenya has been subject to strict controls, giving the parastatal marketing 
organization, the Maize and Produce Board (MPB), a monopoly with regard to 
production exceeding subsistence requirements.1 The controls were introduced 
in order to benefit both producers and consumers as stated in the Maize 
Marketing Act, Cap. 338. However, it is questionable whether the aim has 
been achieved, especially because Kenya has reached self sufficiency in 
maize production and has even produced considerable surpluses for some 
time. The discussion will therefore focus on whether Kenya should decontrol 
maize marketing or not (see (Gsaenger and Schmidt, 1977; Hesselmar'k and 
Lorenzl, 1976; Kenya, 1978). The Select Committee on the Maize Industry 
(Kenya, 1973) and the 1970-74 and 1974-78 Development Plans recommended 
2 
decontrol of the maize marketing system. Except for a short period m 
1977/78, no definite action has been taken, probably due to the uncertainty 
with regard to the costs and benefits of relaxing the controls. The research 
project on which this paper is based (Schmidt, 1979) was undertaken in 
collaboration with the Marketing Development Project of the Kenya government 
to evaluate whether or not the controls were fulfilling their stated 
objectives. 
1. For a brief history of the maize marketing controls, see Hesselmarkm 
1977. 
2. The 1974-78 Plan for example states: 'The 1970-74 Plan anticipated 
that major changes would be made to the system of maize marketing in Kenya, 
in particular that the internal maize market would be freed of all 
restrictions. These changes have not yet been made but will be introduced 
early in the new plan period. Under the proposed marketing system, maize 
millers will be free to purchase their requirements direct from farmers 
without going through the Maize and Produce Board. The Board will purchase 
any maize offered to it at a guaranteed floor price and will sell maize to 
anyone requiring it at a fixed price. It will also be responsible for main-
taining the strategic maize reserve and for all imports and exports' (p. 2 34) 
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An effective marketing system which benefits both producers and 
consumers should achieve operational efficiency; pricing efficiency; security 
of outlets and sources in order to guarantee a market to producers and 
sufficient supplies to consumers; prevent exploitation of both producers and 
consumers; and operate at lowest possible costs. This paper summarises the 
findings of the research project which examined the extent to which maize 
marketing controls in Kenya perform these functions. 
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The legal provisions for the maize marketing controls are laid down 
in the Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, including the Agricultural Produce 
Marketing (Maize and Produce Board) Order, and the Maize Marketing Act. The 
Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, which commenced in 1936, specifies, among 
other things, the powers and regulations of Marketing Boards and the power of 
the Minister for Agriculture to fix minimum,maximum or specified producer 
prices for regulated produce. The Maize Marketing Act lays down more specifi-
cally the marketing regulations, their execution, and the degree of control to 
be exercised. 
The main functions of the MPB, as described in the Maize Marketing 
Act, are to regulate, control and improve all maize marketing activities, 
to import or export as required, and to advise the Minister for Agriculture. 
The Board is empowered to appoint agents to act on behalf of the Board, within 
limits set by the Board, which include the definition of the area in which the 
agent is allowed to operate. Agents may, with the consent of the Board, 
appoint sub-agents. 
To protect the MPB from competition, movement controls are required 
as specified in the Maize Marketing (Movement of Maize and Maize Products) Order. 
According to this Order, all movements of maize, with some exceptions, require 
a movement permit which is valid for only 24- hours. The movement permit must 
be obtained from the MPB or any other authorized person prior to the movement. 
Movements at night are generally prohibited. Exempted from these regulations 
are: the movement of maize or maize products within the boundaries of the 
farm, the movement of not more than 2 bags (180 kg) across districts if 
accompanied by the owner, and the movement of not more than 10 bags within 
a district if accompanied by the owner and for consumption by such owner or his 
family. With regard to the latter, the Board may declare two or more adjacent 
districts be treated as one. If adjacent districts are not declared as one, 
a farmer wishing to take 3 bags to the market or agent located in the adjacent 
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district must first get a permit often from a place more distant than the 
market he wants to go to. 
The Agricultural Produce Marketing Act and the maize Marketing Act 
regulate the fixing of producer prices by the Minister of Agriculture. In 
addition, the Price Controller of the Ministry of Finance fixes the MPB ex-
depot, wholesale and retail prices for maize and maize flour. Thus, prices 
for maize are fixed at all levels of the marketing system except in the 
informal subsystem. A District Commissioner, in his capacity as a Deputy 
Price Controller, has the power to adjust prices if local conditions require 
it. He even has the power to ban all maize and other marketing activities 
in the open markets in his district as occurred in Kitui. This adds further 
controls to those imposed by the above legislation. 
3. SUPPLY AND DEMAND PATTERNS 
Smallholders play an important role in maize production. As mentioned 
above, 90 per cent of them grow maize and contribute about 70 per cent of 
total maize production. The remaining 30 per cent comes from large and medium 
scale producers with holdings above 20 ha. However, because the major 
portion of smallholder output is used for subsistence consumption, the large 
and medium scale producers' share in marketed production is much higher, an 
estimated 50 - 55 per cent in 197 5-78. Thus, supply is more concentrated than 
production. This is even more if one looks at marketed production in value 
terms. In 1974/75, about 95 per cent of smallholder maize producers accounted 
for only 29 per cent of total sales (Kenya, 1978, p. 24). 
Maize is grown in almost all agricultural zones and almost throughout 
the year. The major production areas are the western parts of the country, 
3 
including Rift Valley, and the Coffee and High Altitude Grassland Zones. 
All other zones contribute only marginally to national production and are 
not self sufficient except for short periods of the year. They therefore 
get supplies from other zones, and this makes the intertemporal pattern of 
production and supply important in the operation of the marketing system. 
Harvest times differ considerably between provinces and within provinces or 
districts so that inter- and intra-regional flows can contribute significantly 
to balancing supply and demand over time. 
3. The classification of zones is based on the Integrated Rural Survey 
(IRS), (Kenya, 1977). 
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The demand patterns are more or less in line with the supply patterns. 
Since the majority of the Kenyan population work and live in rural area, the 
rural demand accounts for approximately 90 per cent of total demand including 
subsistence, or 80 per cent of total marketed production. The high share in 
total market demand is explained by the fact that non-marketed production 
covers only about 60-65 per cent of smallholder families' consumption (Kenya, 
1977; Shah and Frohberg, forthcoming). The regional distribution of rural 
demand follows the distribution of production except for Eastern Province which 
includes major rural deficit areas. The Rift Valley and other western areas 
produce enough to meet their own requirements and usually have surpluses 
particularly if the temporal distribution of production is taken into considera-
tion . 
4. BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MAIZE MARKETING SYSTEM 
The controls separate the marketing system into two different though 
interrelated subsystems, the formal system which is subject to controls and 
14-
th e informal system which consists of relatively small traders, mainly women, 
operating on a local level in the open air markets where prices fluctuate in 
response to the forces of supply and demand. 
The small traders can be classified according to their degree of 
mobility. Most market traders are mobile and move between two or more 
markets. Only about a third of the traders do not move and are termed 
'resident traders'. The rest are termed 'itinerant traders'. About 80 
per cent of itinerant traders called 'intra-regional traders', move within ; 
a radius of 50 km and about 20 per cent, called 'inter-regional traders', ! 
usually operating on a larger scale, may travel distances of even more than 
100 km, about 80 km on average. Both intra-and inter-regional traders play: 
an important role by responding to the regional and seasonal patterns of 
supply and demand. This is even more so because private marketing 
functionaries are not allowed to participate in inter-reglonal marketing 
flows, except through the MPB. 
4. About 7 5% of small traders have a working capital of less than 
KSh. 500 and handle less than 340 bags of maize annually. 
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Figure 1: M a r k e t i n g C h a n n e l s f o r S m a l l h o l d e r M a r k e t e d M a i z e 1976/77 
* M a r g i n a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n ( b e l o w 1 % ) 
a S m a l l h o l d e r m a r k e t e d m a i z e o u t p u t a c c o u n t e d f o r a b o u t 30% o f t o t a l s m a l l h o l d e r o u t -
p u t a n d r o u g h l y 4 5 - 5 0 % o f t o t a l m a r k e t e d p r o d u c t i o n i n c l u d i n g l a r g e s c a l e m a r k e t e d 
p r o d u c t i o n . 
b D u r i n g o f f - s e a s o n a g e n t s s o l d a b o u t 6% o f t h e i r t u r n o v e r t o o t h e r r e t a i l s h o p s , 
l o r r y t r a d e r w i t h g e n e r a l w h o l e s a l e b u s i n e s s s o l d m o r e t h a n 7 5 % t o r e t a i l s h o p s . 
c S t o c k f e e d , s t a r c h e t c . 
d E x p o r t s , F a m i n e R e l i e f , C o o p e r a t i v e s , I n s t i t u t i o n s ( s c h o o l s , h o s p i t a l s , p r i s o n s e t c . ) 
e I n c l u d i n g I n s t i t u t i o n s , w h i c h a c c o u n t e d f o r a b o u t 1 - 2 p e r c e n t . 
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The MPB, with its network of 35 depots, is the dominant marketing 
functionary of the formal system which includes the appointed MPB agents 
at the assembly side and wholesalers and retail shops at the distribution 
side. MPB agents are usually individuals operating a produce store (with 
an average turnover of about 3,000 bags annually). Apart from these 
individual MPB agents, cooperatives and, in the Rift Valley, the Kenya Farmers 
Association (KFAj act as MPB agents. In typical smallholder areas, however, 
the individual agent is the predominant feature. 
According to the regulations, there should be a division of ' 
activities between the two subsystems, with the informal system handling 
the marketing flows within a district and the MPB handling surpluses beyond 
district requirements, in practice,both subsystems interact and overlap- to 
a considerable extent. MPB agents, for example, go to the markets of their home 
areas or of other districts and buy at prevailing market prices, Market. 
traders frequently ship maize in small quantities across district .and 
provincial boundaries, On a large scale, produce wholesalers, handling 100-
400 bags a week, ship maize from surplus to deficit areas using their own or 
hired lorries. Wholesalers engaged in these transactions are often referred 
to as 'lorry traders' and all their activities are usually in violation of the 
Maize Marketing Act. 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the informal system handles more than 
70 per cent of smallholder marketed output. Only 20 per cent goes through MPB 
agents and 8 per cent is sold through cooperative mostly to the MPB. Large 
and medium scale farmers do not depend on the informal system but usually have 
direct access to the MPB depots. The formal, controlled system therefore mainly 
serves large rather than small farmers. Similarly, the formal system's links 
on the distribution side with the informal system are quite weak. Maize 
is mainly sold through informal outlets and the MPS mostly serves the milling 
industry. 
Even in areas where the MPB is expected to play a major role, this is 
not usually the case. During the survey period, Kitui District was for example 
almost exclusively supplied by lorry traders, coming mainly from Meru (where 
about 70 per cent of the surplus supposed to go to the MPB was sold to Kitui ) 
and from other places like Nyahururu and Uasin Gishu. The lorry traders' market 
share, particularly with regard to smallholder maize, is quite substantial, 
about 10 per cent on average. The lorry traders buy from farmers, market traders 
and MPB agents, and sell through many outlets, Including the MPB, particularly 
undertake 
in Western Kenya. If controls were effective, the appointed agents would be, 
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the sales now undertaken by lorry traders. However, in about 30 per cent of the 
sample markets, no active MPB agents were found and 52.8 per cent of small-
holders interviewed in markets did not know of any MPB agent in the vicinity 
of the market. This suggests that in various smallholder areas, no real 
alternative to the informal system exists and in such cases therefore, the in-
formal and formal subsystems are isolated from each other. 
The impact of controls is also influenced by other features of 
the market structure: degree of competition between typi§ of outlet (inter-
type competition), restricted market entry, and lack of market transparency. 
Although intertype competition is not guaranteed for all rural centres, 
there is usually a sufficient number of competitors none of whom is big 
enough to influence the market price. However, there are other factors 
which affect the market price e.g. point of sale or purchase, region, and 
time. 
According to IRS data, about one third of smallholder1 maize 
production is not sold at a market or trading centre but at the holding or 
roadside (Casley and Marchant, 1978, p. 30). Farmers selling at the holding 
or roadside are usually faced with monopsony or quasi-monopsony power of 
the buyer at the time of transaction though the buyers at these places might be 
numerous. Unless the farmer has a good knowledge of the market conditions 
and outlets in a market or trading centre within his reach, alternatives 
are limited or non-existent, which reduces his bargaining position considerably. 
This is the case especially during the peak supply season when rural markeLs 
or assembly centres act as buyers markets, though the number of outlets and 
traders are usually numerous. 
In general, markets handling maize in surplus areas during the peak 
season have an atomistic structure with virtually no barriers to entry and 
transactions are usually on a wholesale basis. When local supplies from 
farmers decline, markets turn mainly into sellers' markets with a considerably 
lower number of maize retailers and traders. The markets provide a competitive 
structure with regard to number and size of traders although in a number 
of markets no maize transactions take place and consumers have to rely on MPB 
agents, cooperatives, lorry traders and shops. This was the case in Kitui 
where maize trade in markets was banned, and is also prevalent in Western 
Kenya. In the centres with MPB agents, two or more of them were operating. 
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The market imperfections were not much observed with regard to market 
concentration (number and size of traders) and market entry, but more with 
regard to market transparency. Market transparency is severely restricted 
by the absence of uniform measurements of weights and standards in markets. 
Even the MPB standards are difficult to rely on because grades are broadly 
defined, grading is done subjectively by agents and depot managers and 
according to traders, maize is often sold without regarding and/or weighing. 
Market and lorry traders use differents sizes of tins, calabashes, baskets 
and bags so that price comparisons are very difficult. The lack of standard-
isation mainly affects farmers and consumers since traders use their own 
measurements which they can easily relate to other standard measures. There-
fore farmers and consumers have problems in comparing prices within the 
markets and with government controlled prices. 
Traders are particularly affected by lack of standardization if the 
exchange of market information in markets and areas not personally frequented 
is considered. This is particularly so with regard to quality, because this 
requires personal inspection. There are some measures which serve as common 
denominators, e.g. the 'standard debe'. However, information on market 
prices and market conditions of other areas is rather poor, and traders 
usually know only about their home areas. Consequently, the network of markets 
constituting the informal system is not very well integrated as far as 
market information is concerned, thus reducing marketing efficiency. The 
controls are largely responsible for this situation because they restrict 
private market transactions at the local level. 
5. PERFORMANCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CONTROLS 
(i) Operational Efficiency 
Operational efficiency is concerned with marketing costs. If a 
marketing system performs its functions at higher costs than necessary there 
is a scope for increasing the operational efficiency. Due to the maize 
marketing legislation, virtually all maize production beyond subsistence 
requirements must be marketed through the MPB. Mills, were in the past 
established mostly in the vicinity of MPB depots. Maize is therefore 
supplied to the neighbouring depot and then shipped from there to the mill, 
adding a marketing channel which is economically questionable. Maize 
wholesalers face a similar situation. Marketing costs could therefore be 
reduced significantly if direct sales to mills or distributors we allowed. 
Some people argue that the MPB's per unit costs might increase but this 
is not necessarily so because the existing capacity would be sufficient 
- 166 - IDS/OP 32 
and the MPB would extend its facilities to other crops which have so far 
been neglected because of maize. 
Total savings which would result from bypassing the MPB are rather 
difficult to ascertain because Information on the proportions of fixed and 
variable costs within the MPB-margin are not available. Currently, the MPB 
allots marketing costs of about KSh 12 per bag of maize excluding railage. 
Overhead on administration, storage and operation is calculated at KSh 6 per 
bag and financing costs at another KSh 6 per bag which includes costs of 
holding the national reserve. In the absence of a detailed study on the 
operation and cost structure of the MPB, one is not far off the target 
to assume a net saving of Ksh 2 per bag of maize or beans as a result 
of bypassing the MPB. Also, the expansion of storage and handling capacities 
could be done at a much lower pace than at present, thus reducing total 
costs of the MPB even further. Even assuming a net saving of KSh 2 per bag, 
the potential for reducing total marketing costs on the basis of 1976/77 
figures would be in the order of KSh 3 million, assuming only 25% of current 
MPB sales were sold directly to mills and/or wholesalers without passing 
through the MPB. Reduction of private costs would be even higher since 
maize buyers would save about KSh 12 for each bag they purchase from 
sources other than the MPB. 
Costs could be further reduced because agents and other private 
traders do not utilise storage capacity fully and agents are not supposed 
to perform any genuine storage function, as reflected in a uniform MPB 
buying price throughout the year. Moreover, no financial support Is given 
to agents for storage. Therefore, It is not surprising that, except when 
the MPB is unable to accept any further intakes, agents deliver their maize 
I 
as soon as possible and buy back from depot during the off-season to sell 
to consumers. The average storage capacity per agent was 404 bags which 5 
leads to a total capacity of 65,000 to 100,000 metric tons. In 1976/77 
this capacity was on average used to only 33 per cent for about 8 weeks. 
A comparison of the storage costs of agents with those incurred 
by bringing maize to the depot and later buying it back at a higher price 
shows that storage efficiency would' be much higher if agents stored their 
own stocks. On the basis of 1979 MPB prices, agents' storage costs for a 
5. The estimate of total storage capacity depends on ones assumption 
of the number of MPB agents. Figures given range between 1,800 and 
2 , 6 0 0 . 
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period of 6 months range between KSh 13.33 and 21 per bag depending on the 
kind of store and the degree of capacity utilization. These are contrasted 
against opportunity costs of KSh 26 to per I?ag (depending on the zone) 
if storage Is performed by the MPB. At subsidized prices, opportunity 
costs for agents range roughly between KSh 24 and 36 per bag. Estimates of 
total potential savings are rather difficult because total storage costs 
also depend on, among other things, the efficiency of the inter-regional 
exchange which is important under production patterns prevailing in Kenya. 
Total storage and transport costs would have to be determined simultaneously 
under different assumptions which was beyond the scope of this study. But 
if one assumes that MPB agents would be allowed and financially supported 
to utilize their storage facilities, agents would, with the total storage g 
capacity available and under assumptions suggested by the survey, retain 
an additional 20,000 to 25,000 tons which corresponds to the amount they buy 
from the MPB during the off-season. This would reduce marketing costs in 
the order of KSh 2 - 3 million annually assuming a conservative estimate 
of opportunity costs of KSh 24 per bag. 
i 
Savings are likely to be higher, especially because a number of 
MPB agents keep stocks simply because the MPB stop buying due to insufficient 
storage. If allowed, they would directly dispose of these supplies to 
deficit areas, thereby avoiding storage losses. Furthermore, in selling 
maize, the MPB first tries to get rid of old stocks, i.e. it operates on 
.1 
a policy of 'first in first out'. With such a policy, the MPB has to concern 
itself with moisture content because the maize bought might be stored for 
a considerable period. High moisture content leads to higher storage losses 
or to additional drying costs In the case of artificially dried maize (driers 
are available In two depots). The MPB currently charges KSh 5 to 6 per bag 
for drying. Thus, considerable savings would be made If direct disposals 
to mills or other areas were allowed. The MPB could also reject consign-
ments where no drying facilities exist, without additional costs which 
suppliers currently incur. 
Forcing all supplies through the MPB leads to further costs. It 
Is common knowledge that congestion at depots during the peak periods is a 
major problem, sometimes causing transporters to wait for several days. To 
6. The survey assumes an extra 40 per cent utilization of storage 
capacity (65,000 tons) with storage costs of about KSh 13 to 16 per 
bag for a period of 6 months. 
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avoid waiting, bribing is quite common. The situation becomes even more 
critical when storage capacities at the depots get filled up as has been 
the case in Kenya since 1976/77. Agents and farmers bribe their way into 
the depot since no other legal outlet exists. 
Bribing is necessary for virtually all steps involved in getting 
maize into the depots: obtaining movement permits, passing the gate, passing 
the moisture test, getting the lorry off-loaded, etc. For some depots 
in Western Kenya, bribes were reported to range between KSh 300 and 350 
per lorry of KSh 3 to 3.50 per bag. For some depots in Central Kenya, 
bribes at peak season can be as high as KSh 500 per lorry. Thus, bribes 
are a major cost item for agents. If one compares the level of bribes 
with the commission agents get, about KSh 2.50 per bag, it is quite 
obvious that during the peak season, this commission does not even cover the 
bribing costs necessary for delivery to the depot. Only after the situation 
relaxes does the commission cover the bribes which then decline to about 
KSh 1 per bag. 
In order to avoid these problems at the depot, agents often sell 
to lorry traders who have arrangements with the depots or ship the maize 
to pther areas with the risk of being caught in a police road check, which 
in the past has meant bribing or confiscation of the maize and lorry. 
Apparently, the per unit bribing costs on the road were lower than at the 
depot. From figures given by lorry traders, they range between one and 
two shillings per bag taking into account the fact that lorry traders were 
caught in about 20-25 per cent of their transactions. Bribing costs reported 
by seven lorry traders totalled more than KShs 350,000 per year. 
Bribing on the road is a problem, not only for lorry traders, but 
also for itinerant market traders particularly inter-regional itinerant 
traders, who pay KSh 5 to 10 per bag if caught. However, in total, 
these costs are negligible compared to transport opportunity costs created 
by movement controls. 
The movement controls have severe implications for the mode of 
transport used by market traders and consequently on transport costs. Due 
to the restrictions, market traders and farmers are forced to break down 
their shipments into small lots and use buses and matatus (taxi) or for 
short distances, animals, Lorries and pick-ups are mostly out of question, 
because their loading caracity cannot be economically utilized. 
- 169 - IDS/OP 32 
Transporting small volumes by bus and matatu means paying a 
fare and an extra fare for the produce which, for one bag 
especially in Western Kenya, sometimes exceeds the personal fare. Consequently, 
the transport costs are extremely high. This is worsened by the fact that 
traders reduce the transported volumes to below one bag because they(the 
traders) and the police are not well informed about the regulations and, 
due to the limited transport capacity of matatus and buses, it is easier to 
get a ride the less you have to transport. Finally, the fare for the 
produce is often less for a partly filled bag rather than a full one. 
All these factors contributed to the fact that itinerant maize 
! " r • 
traders paid (before the increase in petrol prices in 1978) an average of 
KSh 6.4-6 per ton/km for transport compared to KSh 2.9 5 per ton/km which 
MPB agents or produce storeholders who use lorries and pick-ups had to pay. 
Therefore, transport costs could be reduced considerably if more economic 
modes of transport are encouraged rather than discouraged as under the 
present controls. A shift from buses and matatus to pick-ups would cut 
down transport costs by half, i.e. to about KSh 3.50 per bag. A shift to 
lorries would bring costs down further to almost one third though this would 
not be possible for all parts of the informal subsystem. Nevertheless, under 
a marketing system without any movement restrictions, even a significant 
shift to lorries is possible within a reasonable period of time. 
As can be seen from Fig. 2, pick-ups and lorries are not only 
cheaper on medium and long hauls but even on short hauls. Only for distances 
below 4.4 km (point D) do buses and matatus seem to be more economical , 
distances which are usually covered by human headloads. On long hauls, 
e.g. 150 km, transport costs for lorries come down to 0.85 Shs/ton/km (0.08 
Shs/bag/km) as can be derived from the transport cost function in Figure 2. 
This has further implications for possible savings. Under the present 
situation, only short distances are linked together. Free movements of 
maize would connect distant regions and thus bring down transport costs 
further. If we assume that, initially, for about 10 per cent of the 
transported volumes, traders would take advantage of less expensive modes 
of transport such as pick-ups, we would expect savings in the informal 
system of the order tof KSh. 3.5 to 4 million per year, i.e. 5-6 per cent 
of total transport costs. 
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In addition, possible savings within the formal system are envisaged 
though on a much smaller scale. The question is whether the inter-regional 
flow pattern of maize handled by the MPB, i.e. shipments between depots and 
areas, minimises transport costs. This is questionable. Between the Meru 
and Kitui depots, for example, no direct link exists. These impediments to 
inter-regional flows and their impact on total transport costs require further 
research.^ 
To summarise, opportunity costs of controls on the maize marketing 
system are quite substantial. If our indicators of potential savings in 
various areas are added together, the total savings exceed KSh 10 million. 
In the long run, they must be even higher. 
(ii) Pricing Efficiency 
The analysis of pricing efficiency is concerned with excess profits 
earned in the marketing system and their effects on resource allocation. We 
will therefore attempt to assess the extent to which the pricing process is 
distorted and in what ways marketing controls contribute to this. 
. . . . 
In microeconomic theory, pricing efficiency is achieved if price 
differences between two areas correspond to transfer costs (and therefore 
prices in the two areas are correlated with each other); seasonal price 
differences reflected storage costs; and price changes are passed on to 
other market channel levels. Under such conditions, the potential for 
excess profits is rather small. In Kenya, two different price structures 
exist, the control price within the formal system and the price in the 
informal system which depends on supply and demand conditions. The two 
price sets should be interrelated if controls are effective and the price 
structure in the formal system should reflect transfer costs through space and 
time. 
At present, the formal price structure reflects the transfer 
costs of the MPB which are based on the railway infrastructure and assumes 
that all surplus maize throughout the year comes from western Kenya. This 
neglects the fact that rural deficit areas in Eastern Kenya, for example, 
get major supplies from adjacent areas in Central Province and surplus zones 
7. H.K. Maritim is currently working on an inter-regional model of 
the Kenya maize market for his Ph.D. thesis (Maritim, 1978). 
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of Mer'u and Embu. During the survey period, the official price spread between 
the farmers' selling price in Meru at MPB agents' stores and Kitui ex-depot 
wholesale price was about KSh 46 per bag compared to transfer costs of not 
more than KSh 17 to 23 per bag. The actual price spread was even higher 
because prices in the markets in Meru fell to as low as KSh 30 per 
bag be cause the MPB failed to take all surplus in that area, making the 
actual price spread between ex-depot wholesale price at Kitui and actual 
farm prices at Meru as much as KSh 86 bag. This clearly shows that maize 
marketing controls does not prevent 'exploitation' but rather create the 
conditions which make exploitation possible. Similar price spreads can be 
observed in Western Kenya. At a time when market prices in Kisii fell down 
to KSh 30 to 50 per bag and MPB agents were paying around KSh 70 per bag, 
the ex-depot price at Kisumu was KSh 102/05 per bag, compared to private 
transfer costs using lorries of not more than KSh 15 per bag. Retail market 
prices at Kakamega, Siaya and Busia District markets ranged between KSh 90 
and 180 per bag. 
Market price differences of this magnitude can only be explained by 
impediments In inter-regional exchange which do not allow free flow of maize 
on a sufficient scale. Inter- and intra-regional exchange is mostly carried 
out on a small scale by itinerant traders so that the overall integration 
g 
effect is likely to be insufficient. This was tested by correlation analysis. 
Market integration and inter-regional pricing efficiency is assumed to be high 
if time series correlation coefficients of prices are 0.7 or above (Gsaenger, 
1975; Jones, 1972; and Lele, 1968). Coefficients of this magnitude are 
expected between adjacent surplus and deficit areas e.g. markets within 
Central or within Western Kenya. With increasing distances between markets 
or areas, the integration and correlation decreases because of increasing 
transfer costs and influence of local conditions. Thus, if seasonal patterns 
are very different, even negative correlations are possible. But markets 
within one area should have a significant number of high correlations if 
there is free inter-regional exchange. However, results of the correlation 
analysis show that market integration, and thus inter-regional pricing 
efficiency, is rather low. In CBS sample markets in Central and Eastern 
provinces, only 0.5% and in Western Kenya (including Rift Valley) only about 
6% of correlation coefficients were higher than or equal to 0.7; 21.7% and 
8. Using market prices collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 
a correlation and time series analysis was carried out. See Schmidt,* et a_l, 
1979. 
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about 30% of the correlation coefficients respectively ranged between 0.3 and 
0.69, indicating a medium degree of correlation, and 70% and 66% of the 
coefficients respectively showed weak or no relationship between markets. 
Altogether 2041 meaningful coefficients were computed on weekly 
price series. Visual inspection of time series suggest that for a small 
number of markets, a time lag would improve correlations, although the 
9 
general pattern would not change. Thus for Central and Western Kenya, 
seasonal values calculated on a 13-week moving average provided only 13,4% 
and 16.9% correlations coefficients respectively higher than or equal to 0.7. 
That traders' arbitrage transactions affect market prices is indicated 
by the degree of correlation between trend (computed as a linear regression 
line on the original data) and seasonally corrected prices (residuals). 
Significant correlation coefficients of residual ranging between 0.3% and 
0.7 for markets within Western, Central and between Western and Central 
Kenya were 6.9%, 5.1% and 3.8% of the correlations respectively. But as the 
correlations of the original series suggest, arbitrage transactions generally 
seem insufficient for market integration. Even prices in adjacent markets e.g. 
Karatina and Kerugoya, less than 20 km away from each other, were negatively 
correlated, with r = - 0,35 at 1% level of significance. Inter-regional 
pricing efficiency is insufficient and allows excess profits to be earned by 
traders. Arbitrage activities are severely affected by movement controls and 
private storage is discouraged, which affects intertemporal pricing efficiency. 
Evidence for the latter is found by comparing seasonal price differences with 
private storage costs. In order to classify seasonal patterns using the data 
available, seasonal indiees"^ were calculated (Schmidt, et al, 1979). The 
seasonal index was above 10 in more than 60% of the CBS sample markets and 
above 20 in about 15%, which corresponds to seasonal price spreads of between 
KSh 25 to more than 100 per bag depending on the average price level. Actual 
price spreads of up to KSh 145 per bag were observed in 1977/78. Even for 
9. Arbitrage activities usually take place within one week with traders 
moving between markets with different market days, 
10. The seasonal index (SI) was defined as standard deviation of seasonally 
adjusted values (13-week moving average) as percentage of the mean for the 
original prices, i.e. 
SI = 1/n (Pst - Ps)2 x 100 
P 
P ^ = seasonally adjusted price, 
Ps = mean seasonally adjusted price, 
P = mean original price. 
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Indices below 5, which covers 8.2% of the markets, seasonal price spreads of 
KSh 25 to 35 per bag were observed. When these figures are compared with average 
storage costs of MPB agents of KSh .13 to 21 per bag for a period of six months, 
it is quite clear that in most cases, inter-temporal pricing efficiency is far 
from achieved. 
Altogether, pricing efficiency is low. Estimates of excess profits 
11 
(defined as profits over and above opportunity costs of labour and capital ) 
showed that about 60% of all maize and beans market traders earned excess 
profits of about 50% of their gross profit, which on average ranged between 
KSh 11.50 and 17.25 per bag of maize. Lorry traders showed a similar pattern, 
assuming the opporcunitycost of their labour is the consolidated salary of 
Grade I MPB depot manager, i.e. KSh 3,500 per month, Thus, potential savings 
from intensifying competition .are substantial, if the present control system 
is revised. 
The low pricing efficiency is usually blamed on traders who are often 
described as exploitative and unscrupulous by newspaper editorials, letters 
12 
to the editor, and Government officials. However, these allegations ignore the 
fact that excess profits appear where the market structure is distorted by 
price and marketing controls for which traders are not to blame. That excess j 
profits in the Kenyan maize marketing system are largely due to market distortions 
is supported by a relatively high pricing efficiency at channel interfaces. 
With an exploitative or monopolistic pricing behaviour, profits margins would 
not be expected to remain constant with changing prices,indicating that traders 
generally do not pass on price changes to other channel levels. This can be 
statistically tested by regression analysis of traders' selling and buying prices 
(Ruttan 1968, p. 84; Schubert, 1973«, p. 48-49). If the slope coefficient 
of the respective regression equation Is not significantly different from or is 
very close to 1, we can conclude that traders work with constant profit margins 
and thus pass on price changes. 
11, The opportunity cost (shadow price) of labour Is the minimum wage in the 
agricultural sector, i.e. KSh 175 per month for traders handling below 10 bags per 
week. In order not to artificially increase excess profits for traders with 
a weekly turnover of 10 or more bags, a double amount, KSh 350 per month was 
assumed, which corresponds to the Nairobi minimum wage. The shadow price 
for working capital was taken as 10 per cent per annum for all market functionaries. 
12. See, for example 'Exploitation in Maize Trade', Daily Nation, 3rd 
August, 1978; 'Maize Prices Need Control', Daily Nation, 11th August, 1979 and 
'Exploitation of Small Farmers', editorial, The Standard, 23rd October, 1978. 
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As can be seen from Figure 3, the slope coefficient (0,916) is very 
close to 1 and if in addition we consider that the corresponding correlation 
coefficient between the profit margin and the buying price is r = - 0.137, the 
hypothesis that traders are exploitative is rejected. This can also be 
done for lorry traders taking into account the fact that at a time when the 
MPB was selling maize at Kitui for KSh 116.80 per bag, lorry traders were 
selling for as low as KSh 75 a bag. Therefore, increased competition under a 
free and undistorted marketing system would ensure that producers and 
consumers are not exploited by 'unscruplous' traders. 
(ill) Security of Outlets and Sources, and Price Stability 
The monopoly position of the MPB and its resulting failure to cope 
with all available supplies make controls destabilizing. Since private storage 
is discouraged, there is usually congestion at depots and strain on storage 
is discouraged, there is usually congestion at depots and strain on storage 
capacities. Moreover, because of moisture content, depots start accepting 
deliveries late and when filled to capacity stop buying altogether. Finally, 
if supplies do not meet specified standard, especially with regard to moisture 
content, the consignment is rejected rather than bought at a lower price. 
Present drying capacities are limited. Under the present situation, lack of 
sufficient drain of supplies results in low prices in surplus areas without 
any benefit to consumers in deficit areas. Even MPB agents, because of 
bribe costs to get maize into the depot (which cannot be accounted for), are 
not in a position to pay the official prices to the farmers. They therefore 
pay lower prices and should not be blamed. 
Altogether, the pi'esent control system has not•increased the security 
of outlets for small farmers. Rather, it has done the opposite. The most 
secure outlet for them are cooperatives though even cooperatives face the same 
problems as individual farmers and agents. Also, the cooperatives have only 
a limited market share in smallholder maize marketing and most small farmers 
only transact with private traders and MPB agents. 
Maize price and marketing controls seem to be ineffective in 
distribution as well. The channel analysis showed that the integration of the 
formal and informal system at the distribution level is not strong. This might 
partly explain why in certain markets maize prices were above controlled levels, 
which was even the case In the formal system, i.e. in retain shops, as shown 
by Mukui (1978, p„ 107). But on average, maize prices were usually below control 
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levels and above only for short periods, thus suggesting that supplies to 
markets are rather erratic and impeded inter-regional exchange affects the 
supplying markets. If one looks at the time series of maize prices in CBS 
sample markets, there are tremendous erratic price movements in most markets. 
Instability indices, calculated in the same manner as seasonal indices, were 
above 10 in 70 per cent of the markets and above 20 in 18.5 per cent of 
the markets. Thus, erratic movements were as strong or even stronger than 
the seasonal movements, leading to price fluctuations of up to more than 
KSh 1 per kg or KSh 90 per bag. The resulting uncertainty in farmers, con-
sumers and traders must therefore be immense. The objective of stabilizing 
prices is certainly not achieved. On the contrary, the availabbe information 
suggests that controls largely contribute to instability and resulting 
uncertainty. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
We have attempted to assess the effectiveness of maize marketing 
controls in Kenya based on research carried out during the 1978-79 period. 
The marketing controls were evaluated against their own objective, i.e. to 
benefit producers and consumers. This would have been achieved if the 
controls contributed to a higher efficiency, i.e. lower marketing costs, 
less exploitation, and greater security of outlets and sources for both 
producers and consumers. 
The analysis suggests that the objective was not achieved and the 
present system of controls contributes to inefficiencies. The control 
legislation creates a system which leads to low operation efficiency as 
reflected in increasing marketing costs, high excess profits and instability 
which particularly affects smallholder maize producers and rural consumers 
who are both low income sections of the society. 
With a relaxation of controls, major savings could be expected 
in assembling and distribution, storage, and transport costs, initially of 
over KSh 10 million per year. A similar potential for reducing marketing 
costs exists with regard to excess profits earned due to market distortions. 
All savings would particularly benefit small maize producers in surplus areas 
and consumers in rural deficit areas. Considerable savings in the milling 
industry can also be envisaged, which would in turn benefit low income urban 
consumers, 
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The present controls mainly benefit large scale farmers, who have 
direct access to MPB depots, and the milling industry which pass on higher 
costs to consumers, The most disadvantaged groups in society pay to benefit 
those who are already better off. This is contrary to the stated objective 
of the Government in the 1979--83 Development Plan which is to Improve the 
living standards of the poorer groups of the population. 
Some argue that relaxation of'controls would increase MPB's per 
unit costs but this is most unlikely. The present problem is the inadequacy 
of the capacity of the MPB~ The MPB has to expand considerably in order 
to be in a position to cope with future supplies and relaxation of controls 
would therefore save a substantial amount of public funds and the MPB would 
perform its functions with its existing capacities. After all, under a 
14 
decontrolled system, the MPB would have an important stabilizing function. 
What happens, if, for example, the MPB is not in the position to take 
surplus out of the market at guaranteed minimum prices? The consequences 
of this were observed during the 197 7-78 temporary relaxation of controls. 
Farm and market prices were depressed and farmers were no better off. It 
was a result of the MPB situation; because the depn+s were f ill M up to 
capacity, domestic demand was satisfied, exports were not permitted, and the 
MPB was virtually unable to stabilize producer prices. Under a decontrolled 
system, unless the minimum producer price is fixed at unappropriately high 
levels, this situation is not likely to arise since the MPB would not be 
forced to take all supplies. 
In conclusion, the time seems right to relax maize marketing 
controls (originally Introduced to discriminate against African farmers) 
in order to improve marketing efficiency and income distribution. Farmers, 
traders and cooperatives should be free to sell either to the MPB or any 
other outlet they think fit. Private storage activities should be supported 
and movement controls removed completely without any new permit system even 
on short term basis. Maize prices should be decontrolled because controlled 
maize prices are a major source of distortions. Cooperatives should be 
encouraged and supported to handle distribution and provide the source and 
outlet for their members. Finally, market transparency should be improved 
in order to supplement the other policy actions mentioned above. The 
research findings show that this would have considerable positive effects 
on marketing efficiency, Improve incomes of smallholder maize producers and 
low income consumers, and would be In concurrence with one of the major 
objectives of the present development strategy, namely, to alleviate rural 
and urban poverty. 
14. See Gsaenger and Schmidt, 1977, for the role to be played by the MPB 
under a decontrolled maize market in Kenya. 
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MARKETING AND PRICING POLICIES IN THE KENYA DAIRY INDUSTRY 
By 
George Ruigu 
Institute for Development Studies 
University of Nairobi 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses marketing and pricing policies in the Kenya 
dairy industry with specific attention to statutory control and the need 
for greater flexibility in pricing by incorporating seasonal and spatial 
considerations in price determination. 
The dairy industry plays a very important role in the Kenyan 
economy and is essential for the survival of a large section of the 
population. In the 1964-77 period, the dairy industry accounted for 
22% to 30% of marketed agricultural production, 29% to 35% of livestock 
and livestock products, or 8% to 10% of the total contribution of agriculture. 
All livestock products, including dairy products, account for about 8% of total 
exports and dairy products account for 24% of total livestock exports. In 
1972, formally marketed milk amounted to 272 million litres valued at K£10.4 
million while exports of milk and milk products earned K£3.8 million. 
Commercial milk production is dependent largely on grade and exotic 
cattle of which there were an estimated 485,000 in 1974 and with the number 
expected to reach 661,200 in 1980 (Ryanga, 1975). Ninety per cent of all 
adult female cattle in Kenya consists of the indigenous zebu that yields 
very little milk. The herds of the large scale and settlement farms are 
composed of 85% to 90% grade cattle while those of smallholders consist of 
some grade cattle, zebu crosses and the unimproved zebu cattle (Mbanja and 
de Graaf, 1978). 
Results of the Integrated Rural Survey indicate that about 60% of the 
smallholders have one or more milk cows and on average derived 20% of their 
total value of output from the dairy activities in 1974/75 (Kenya, 1977). 
The marketed surplus (over and above the quantity of milk consumed at home 
or fed to stock) was about 38% ~f total production (Smith, 1978). On the 
settlement farms, about 68% of total milk production is sold, compared to 
80% from large scale farms (Mbanja and de Graaf, 1978). It is estimated 
that small scale farms account for about 40% of all commercial milk while 
the large scale farms account for the other 60%. 
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The difficulties associated with trying to estimate total milk 
output and the production per animal are reviewed elsewhere (Hopcraft and 
Ruigu, 1976) and will not be repeated here. The wide variation in figures 
obtained by various government agencies indicate big margins of error and 
the data should therefore be used with caution. Table 1 shows milk output 
by province and type of farmer. 
Table 1. Milk Production by Province and Type of Dairy Farmer, 1974-75 
(Million litres) 





Rift Valley 153.3 
Western 46.5 
Total 756.8 
29.6 20.3 330.7 
2.7 20.8 
4.0 7.5 141.6 
0.6 128.6 
48.6 152.2 354.1 
1.0 0.3 47.8 
83.2 183.6 1023.6 
Source: Mbanja and de Graaf, 19 78, table 2, p.6. 
2. TRENDS IN MILK PRODUCTION 
Table 2 indicates the output of commercial milk in Kenya for the 
1968-75 period. Since milk is predominantly produced on grass, weather 
variation is a very strong determinant of milk output. Production declined 
in 1971, a dry year, but increased substantially in 1972 and 1973, years 
without drought. The cumulative effect of three dry years, 1974-76, has left 
dairy herds in very«poor shape. 
The increase in producer price by 45% in July 1971 and the abolition 
of the quota system also contributed to the substantial increase in milk output 
in the three subsequent years. Despite increasing costs of production and 
inflation in excess ,of 10% per year, there was no further producer price 
increase until an increase of 11% was granted in January 1975. This increase 
was not enough to stem the decline in output and the producer price had to be 
increased by another 12% in November 1975. 
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Table 2. Total Milk Intake in Milk Equivalents, 1962-1975 (Million Litres) 
Year Liquid Milk Butterfat Intake: Total KCC National Recordedb 
Intake Milk Equivalent3 Market 
1968 129.6 79.8 209.4 226.5 
1969 141.2 68.9 210.1 228.5 
1970 172.1 51.0 223.1 236.0 
1971 195.4 18.6 214.0 223.7 
1972 248.4 16.0 264.4 274.6 
1973 265.6 9.0 274.6 284.3 
1974 240.0 6.4 246.4 253.4 
1975 222.8 4.1 227.0 236.3 
a. The drastic decline in butterfat "deliveries is as a result of pricing 
policies with the abolition of the quota system. 
b. Includes the KCC and Mariakani plant intakes and of other licencees of 
the KDB. 
Source: The Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the Kenya Dairy Board 
(KDB). 
There has been a substantial increase in production costs especially 
since 1973. In 1974, the subsidy on feed maize was abolished1 and the prices 
of wheat bran, pollard, maize bran and daily cubes were increased. The lack 
of credit for the purchase of feed, pasture improvement, and fodder production 
aggravated the situation. Dairying became increasingly costly and unattractive 
to the farmers and the decline in output continued in 1976. In September 1976, 
the government announced a 41% increase in producer price which, together 
with a very wet 1977 and 1978 should restore the profitability of milk 
production and put milk deliveries on an upward trend again. The price 
changes are shown in Table 3. 
1. A subsidy of 25% was re-introduced in 1977 follow-ng a substantial 
maize surplus. While the Maize and Produce Board buys maize at KSh 80 
(now Ksh 65) per 90 kg. bag, it sells the same bag to feed-manufacturers 
for Ksh 60. 
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Table 3. Milk Producer Pr ,es, 1970-1976. 
Price (Ksh/lit: . ) 
Date Kshs/litre Kshs/gallon 
IDS/OP 32 
Change from Previous 
Period (%) 
1970 0.53 
July 1971 0,77 
January 1975 0.83 
November 1975 0,93 










Source: Own Compilation 
Table 4 indicates the spatial distribution of milk output among the 
creameries. The table shows KCC's marketed supply only. Since the major 
proportion of milk is not marketed,the elasticity of marketed supply is 
perforce different from that of the total output, There were substantial 
increases in output in both large scale and smallholder areas. The Kitale 
and Nyahururu creameries receive the bulk of their milk from large-scale 
farms and settlement schemes. The Kisumu deliveries, though small in 
absolute terms,showed a substantial increase. Eldoret, Nakuru and 
Naivasha which are predominantly large scale farm areas (but with some 
settlement schemes) and Nairobi where small scale farms play an important 
part all showed small increases. The Mombasa suppliers registered a net 
decline and were unlikely to have enjoyed a significant boost in price 
because of the loss of substantial quota and geographical premium. The 
data in Table 4 do not claim to represent an accurate supply response 
because the time period involved is too short. Capital requirements, 
availability of in-calf heifers and cows, land and management all tend to 
• . 2 militate against a short period adjustment, 
3. THE STRUCTU-:. OF THE KENYA DAIRY INDUSTRY 
In discussing the structure of the Kenya dairy industry it is 
necessary to recognize the existence of a dual marketing system: the 
formal or commercial system comprising the Kenya Co-operative creameries 
Ltd (KCC), the Mariakani Milk Scheme on behalf of the Kenya Dairy Board 
(KDB), and others with KDB licences to sell liquid milk in some remote or 
2. If a farmer, for instance, decides to increase his rilk output, 
and assuming a lack of in-calf he.'.fers, he waits for a period of about 




small markets; and the informal market system which exists largely in rural 
areas where prices are determined by the forces of supply and demand, with 
little or no constraints from the formal system- Most of the milk produced 
in Kenya does not enter the formal or recorded market. In 1975 for instance, 
only 25% of milk output reached the formal market while an estimated 75% was 
consumed on farms or sold to neighbours. Table 5 shows that KCC handles about 
96% of all commercial milk while Mariakani Milk Scheme (MMS) and the other 
licencees of KDB handle the remaining 4%. 
Table 5. Market Shares of Recorded Milk Sales by Type of Operator, 1968-74 
(Million Litres) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
KCC 209.4 210.1 223.1 214.0 264.4 274.6 
Percent of total 92.4 91.9 94.5 95.7 96.4 96.6 
Mariakani 6.7 6.8 5.4 3.7 7.1 7.4 
Percent of total 3.0 3.0 2.3 1.6 2.6 2.6 
Other Licence of the 
KDB 10.4 11.6 7.5 5.8 3.1 2.3 
Percent of total 4.6 5.1 3.2 2.6 1.1 0.8 
Total Milk Marketed 226.5 228.5 236.0 223.7 274.6 284.3 
Source: Ryanga, 19 75. 
Milk, probably the most perishable of all major agricultural products, 
presents some unique problems and must be sold from the farm on daily basis. 
The transporting of milk to the factories is the responsibility of the producer. 
The large scale farmers deliver their own milk to the processing plants or 
organize contracts with private transporters to ensure economic loads. On the 
other hand, the smallholder because of his low output, is forced to market his 
milk through co-operative societies which also arrange for the transport of milk 
to the processing plants. 
The distance each co-operative has to ship its products and the 
mode and condition of transport constitute an important marketing cost, and 
may indeed determine the amount of milk delivered. Some cooperatives operate 
in more severe environments than others in terms of location, infrastructure 
and physical conditions. Indeed some co-operatives can only deliver morning 
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milk. Many co-operatives, however, deliver milk twice a day. Obviously, 
the delivery of milk twice a day raises transport costs but makes it possible 
to get higher quality milk even in the absence of efficient cooling systems. 
About 25% of all milk sold by small-scale farmers is marketed through primary 
co-operative societies. In the 1974/75 financial year, 230 co-operatives 
delivered 105 million Uteres of milk to the KCC. Approximately 34% of the 
annual KCC intake is supplied by cooperatives (Mbanja and de Graaf, 1978). 
The KCC has a monopoly on distribution of milk and milk products 
in the urban areas. It operates through independent retailers to whom the 
products are delivered. Home deliveries that once used to be undertaken by 
independent dairies are undertaken by KCC's appointed agents. There appears 
to have been a decrease in quality and service by KCC agents in many areas. 
(Heyer, 1976, p. 333) Outside the main urban centres, substantial sales are 
undertaken by co-operatives and farmers who sell to individuals, restaurants 
3 
and local institutions. 
4. THE KENYA CO-OPERATIVE CREAMERIES LTD. (KCC) 
The KCC has a virtual monopoly on the formal market of dairy products. It is a countrywide producer controlled co-operative registered 4 
under both the Companies Act and the Co-operative Societies Act. The 
control of the Company is vested in a Board of Directors elected by the 
producer members. The preference share capital carries no voting rights or 
representation unless the company failed to pay the annual dividend. In 
1968, the KCC had 1,469 supplying members consisting of 1,254 individuals 
and 215 co-operatives. By 19 75 this number stood at 3,062 consisting of 
2,768 individual members and 294 co-operatives. 
The KCC Is also the sole exporter of dairy products. It owns and 
operates eight creameries at Naivasha, Nyahururu, Eldoret, Nakuru, Kitale, 
Nairobi, Kiganjo and Sotik and sales depots at Nairobi, Nakuru, Eldoret, 
Kisumu, Kericho, Nanyuki, Mombasa, Thika, Machakos and Kitale. The creameries 
are organized on a national basis and, theoretically, enables plants to 
specialize in the manufacture of particular products. 
3. About 400 producers are licensed to sell their milk to consumers or 
retailers or to process it into products like cheese and yoghurt. In Nairobi, 
about 60 licencees of the KDB supply about 3% of the city's fluid milk require-
ments. 
4. Under a special legal notice, the KCC affairs are exempt from the 
supervision of the Department of Co-operative Development. 
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Table 6 shows the milk and butterfat intake by KCC plants in the 
1968-74 period. It shows that as liquid milk deliveries increased, the 
proportion of milk disposed in liquid form declined with concomitant increase 
of manufactured milk. Changes in liquid milk consumption have played a 
small part in absorbing the increased output of milk and there has been a 
decline in deliveries of butterfat as a consequence of the disappearance of 
on-farm separation as a result of changes in the pricing system. These facors 
have resulted in a tendency of milk supplies delivered to KCC to rise more than 
proportionately. This has serious financial implications for KCC which has to 
dispose off a growing proportion of its milk in the less lucrative manufactured 
5 products market. 
The butter and ghee (clarified butter), is derived from the butter-
fat intake of the KCC, from standardization of milk to 2.3% butterfat and from 
processing of skim milk powder and condensed skim milk. All the milk delivered 
to KCC must, among other things, contain a minimum 3.5% butterfat and 8.5% 
solids-not-fat (SNF). Producers are likely to suffer financial loss if milk 
delivered does not fall in the first grade. In 1975, for instance, the price 
was reduced by 10 cents per kg for second grade. Any milk that fell below 8.5 
SNF or 3.5% butterfat was downgraded and paid 20 cents per kg compared to 80 cents 
per kg for first grade. The butterfat content of cream should be at least 35%. 
Most of the cream delivered falls in the range of 35-50% and falls into three 
grades. There Is no price inducement to produce cream above 50% butterfat. 
5. THE MARIAKANI MILK SCHEME 
The Mariakani milk scheme (MMS) was started by the Veterinary Depart-
ment in the 19 30s to organize the collection of milk from zebu cattle owned by 
Africans at the Coast. By that time, however, it did not have any pasteurizing 
equipment. The MMS has one of the most modern dairy plants in the country and 
is the only significant processing plant not owned by the KCC. It is now operated 
by the Kwale-Kilifi Co-operative Union which consists of eight primary co-opera-
tives at the Coast. 
5. The situation has slightly improved since .1974 because of drought. For 
the .1974/75, 1975/76 and 1976/77 years, liquid sales were 63, 67 and 61% of total 
intake respectively (Mbanja and de Graaf, 1978). 
6. Following financial and other problems, the Ministry of Agriculture has 
instructed the KCC to take over the plant. The scheme also lost milk supplies 
from large-scale milk producers at the Coast who, being members of the KCC, now 
take the ir milk to Kilifi Plantations Ltd., which processes and packs the milk for 
the Mombasa market. 
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Until recently the manufacture of dairy products did not depend on 
the availability of fluid milk surpluses over and above Mombasa demand but 
on the need to produce milk powder to pay for UNICEF equipment and an 
agreement with the KCC to supply a maximum of 12,750 litres of milk per 
day to the Mombasa market. Extra milk could be absorbed in the Mombasa 
market which took 19 million litres in 1973/74. MMS, with a total of 
11.5 million litres, would still be short which means that the KCC would 
still have to haul milk from up-country, a distance of at least 530 km. 
If MMS could dispose of all its milk in liquid form it would be a sure 
step towards economic viability and would reduce its financial deficit 
which stood at Ksh 3 million in 1976. As things stand, the creamery 
manufactures dairy products which could be obtained from the KCC more 
economically. 
6. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
The Kenya government is heavily involved in the activities of the 
Kenya dairy industry such as pricing, research, credit, and provision of 
inputs. Various laws such as the Public Health Act govern the safety of 
milk and milk products. The Dairy Industry Act governs the dairy industry 
and the Cooperatives Act govern the co-operative movement. The government 
has the responsibility of protecting the consumer against products which may 
be dangerous to health or do not have the characteristics claimed by the 
seller. The Kenya Bureau of Standards is expected to set standards and 
consolidate those under the Health and the Dairy Industry Acts. In addition, 
the government has instituted a regulatory arm of the dairy industry, the 
Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) 
The Kenya Dairy Board was established in 1958, a year of particularly 
low butter prices in international markets, by the Dairy Industry Ordinance 
of 1958. Its general functions are to (i) organize, regulate and develop 
efficient production, marketing, distribution and supply of dairy produce, 
having regard to various types of dairy produce required by different classes 
of consumers; (ii) improve the quality of dairy produce; (iii) secure 
reasonable and stable prices for pr-'ucers of dairy produce; (iv) promote 
market research in relation to dairy produce; (v) permit the greatest 
possible degree of private enterprise in production, processing and sale 
of dairy produce consistent with the efficiency of producer and the interest 
of other producers and of consumers; and (vi) ensure either by itself or in 
association with any government department or local authority the adoption 




The KDB appointed the KCC as its agent and this privilege requires 
that the KCC accept all surpluses from producers. In addition, the KDB 
initiated a system of licensing of liquid milk sales in order to accommodate 
producer-retailers who were not members of the KCC. A licence, however, did 
not guarantee any market and the KDB adopted a liberal policy except for major 
urban markets; hence licences tended to (and still) dominate in the rural areas. 
Certain activities of the KDB overlap and it has always been felt 
that the dairy industry would realise substantial savings and enjoy greater 
policy coordination if the two bodies were merged. Echoing this policy, the 
Kibaki Commission Report (Kenya, 1965) recommended the establishment of a 
dairy authority, the Kenya Dairy Commission, as a statutory corporation along 
similar lines to the milk marketing boards of Britain. This would have,,inter 
alia, involved the nationalization of the KCC and would have permitted the 
articulation of both producer and consumer interests. The Commission maintained 
that it was undesirable to allow the existence of a private producer-controlled 
monopoly which operated only in producer interests. When the bill incorporating 
most of the Kibaki Commission Report was presented in Parliament it was 
defeated. Despite this defeat, the Ndegwa Commission Report (Kenya, 1971) 
strongly endorsed the Kibaki Commission Report and reiterated the call for the 
amalgamation of KDB and the KCC into a statutory commission like the Kenya Meat 
Commission.^ 
In addition to the Kibaki Commission, an official Dairy Working Party 
was set up in 1970/71 to examine the pricing policy, the competitiveness, 
and the longrun development of the dairy industry. The members of the Dairy 
Working Party saw their duty as formulating a pricing and marketing policy 
for the dairy industry that would encourage the growth of the industry in the 
19 70s in the national interest (Kenya, 1970, p.2). However, while the 
working party was sitting,' the KCC announced the abolition of the independent 
dairies based on Tentoni (1969) recommendations. The so-called 'rationalization 
of distribution resulted in the consolidation and entrenchment of the KCC's 
7. The merger has never taken place. In 1971 the Minister for Agricultur 
referred the question of the 'dairy authority' to KDB and KCC with instructions 
that the two agencies attempt to reach an agreement and report directly to him. 
The Chairmen of KCC and KDB recommended the continuation of KDB with certain 
changes in its Board. At the end of 1971/72, the appointed members and top 
executives of the KDB were retired and the day-to-day management of the Board 
devolved to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) which attached several officers tc 
act in various capacities, eg. executive officer. The Head of Animal Productioi 
Division of MOA became chairman of an advisory or management committee which 
replaced the Board members. This meant that services of advocates and public 
relations consultants were dispensed with. The Nutrition Team was permanently 
transferred to the KCC. This is the position today. 
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monopoly position in major urban centres. The KCC eliminated all. private 
dairies and middlemen in Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, etc, and took over the 
sale and delivery of milk in bulk to institutions, The KCC thus took over 
a large portion of the milk business held by the dairies, contending that 
it would contribute to eliminating the incidence of milk adulteration, 
illegal sales by producers, etc (Kenya, .1970, p. 6). The KCC in fact wanted 
to increase its revenue substantially in order to start the manufacture of 
spray-dried milk powder. Although several attempts have been made to control 
the monopoly powers of the KCC, it has a powerful lobby which has resisted 
such efforts. 
The KDB has made a number of efforts to rationalize the pricing 
system and to exert some control over the.marketing system. Thus far these 
efforts have not been successful. "/he ADB came info being at the instigation 
of the K.CC, principally for the purpose of controlling non-KCC producer/retailers 
and distributors of dairy produce. With the virtual abolition of non-KCC 
9 
distributors in the scheduled markets, the role of the KDB has been reduced. 
The political power of the producers, and the requirement that the KCC maintain 
financial viability in the face of a given producer price, have been responsible 
for poor pricing in the industry. Political expediency tends to take precedence 
over careful economic analysis. The net effect of the structural and pricing 
policies is that there are inefficiencies in the processing and marketing 
system which eventually raise the fluid milk price to the consumer. This reduces 
the consumption of fluid milk particularly among the poorer consumers and 
more milk is diverted into manufacturing where the net price realized per litre 
is substantially lower. The .losses involved in the manufacturing of milk 
and in maintaing capacity are recouped from sales of fluid milk. 
8, Some members of the Dairy Working Party opposed the KCC's moves 
contending that the elimiantion of middlemen was not synonymous with reducing 
marketing costs; the elimination of competition was not conducive to effeciency; 
and the elimination of bottled milk interfered with consumer preference and 
was likely to have adverse effects. The Working Party called for a careful 
study of the system, including costs, margins, profits, and services but the 
KCC did not heed their call, 
9. The KDB concentrates on issuing producers' and retailers' licences, 
provides inspection services, and lends some assistance to Kenya Milk Records 
and Naivasha Dairy Training School. It also helps the KCC to maintain its 
monopoly in the scheduled markets (urban areas) where only pasteurised milk 
is permitted. The KDB operates an inspectorate that ensures that pirate 
milk sales do not occur. 
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7„ THE EXPORT OF DAIRY PRODUCTS 
Kenya is a net exporter of dairy products. Despite the rapid 
increase in local demand for milk at 8-9% per annum, supply has tended 
to outstrip demand. The lack of purchasing power by a substantial proportion 
of the population due to a very skewed distribution of income means the 
absorptive capacity for fluid milk and manufactured products in the Kenya market 
has been limited. 
Dairy exports have been an important source of foreign exchange. In 
1964, for instance, dairy exports were worth K£2 million and by 1972 this figure 
had reached K£3.8 million or about 4.8% of total agricultural exports. The 
majority of these products were sold to East African partner states of Uganda 
and Tanzania which, together with Kenya, have always been considered the Kenya 
dairy industry's primary market. The breakdown of dairy exports are shown 
in Table 7.' In the period 1969/70 to 1973/74, 46% of all cheese exports, 
Table 7. Dairy Products Exports, 1968-1974 
Year 
Milk 






1968 17 210 2,140 451 943 
1969 14 • 209 1,624 257 1,221 
1970 10 197 1,596 327 2,310 
1971 9 96 891 180 1,641 
1972 18 324 2,399 359 3,900 
1973 30 557 2,463 265 4,410 
1974 33 267 1,742 155 1,273 
Source: The Kenya Dairy Board 
54% of butter, 68% of milk powder and 31% of ghee exports were sold in the 
East African market, In the same period, 99% of all liquid milk exports 
were sold to Uganda and Tanzania with Uganda accounting for 85% of the 
total. The sales to Uganda showed spectacular growth, rising from 9,9 
million litres in 1969/70 to 31.1 million litres in 1973/74 period, but 
payment problems and trade impediments have greatly restricted the scope 
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Exports of dairy products outside East Africa are made at a 
loss, The domestic fluid milk market has always been under pressure 
to make high profits to subsidize the export of butter, cheese, ghee 
I 
and various powders, Kenya is not a successful competitor with major 
dairy product exporters such as New Zealand and Denmark, The fundamental 
reason for this is the low yields obtained from Kenya dairy herds and Pr'lc'f 
cutting due to ^eveloPec*eountries' ability to subsidize their dairy 
exports. For Kenyan dairy exports to compete in export markets without 
subsidy, yields would have to be increased substantially without a 
corresponding increase in costs. The potential fox1 high yield is present 
but it may take a long time to achieve those increases. 
As stated above, the 'realized price' per litre of milk is far 
higher for fluid milk sales than it Is for processed milk products. The 
consumer pricing system has been one of using the considerable profits 
derived from the sale of whole milk to, in effect, subsidize the sales 
of processed milk products. The consumer price of liquid milk, which 
requires relatively minimal processing, is roughly double the producer 
price. Processed milk products, on the other hand, are sold at prices that 
do not even cover the costs of purchasing and processing the milk, both in 
the domestic and export markets. KCC estimates that a net loss is made with 
10 of the 14 products, with fluid milk and butter as the only significant 
sources of profit. 
The problem of these losses and those made during the export of dairy 
products is relevant for the overall, pricing policy of dairy products. The 
recouping of such losses from domestic sales of liquid milk inflates the 
internal price and thus tends to reduce the domestic absorptive capacity of 
fluid milk.^ The high prices of fluid milk in effect serve to discourage 
10. The current insecurity in Uganda and Uganda's failure to pay Ksh 20 
million it owes the KCC means that this market is virtually lost. The closure 
of the Kenya-Tanzania border by Tanzania in February 1977 following problems 
arising from the now defunct East African Community also meant loss of the 
Tanzania market. In 1976 sales to Uganda and Tanzania were reduced to almost 
zero. In addition, exports to Malawi and Zambia were curtailed. 
11. The price elasticity of demand for fluid milk was estimated to be a 
low 0,6 5 (Ruigu, 1978, pp, 163-5) and the KCC can therefore increase its 
earnings by raising the price. Based on this estimate of elasticity, the 
36% increase in consumer price announced in March 1977 would be expected to 
reduce demand by 23.4%. 
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consumption among the poorer members of the population. 
8. PRICING POLICY IN THE KENYA DAIRY INDUSTRY 
One of the characteristic, features of the marketing system in Kenya 
is the high degree of centralized control dating back to the colonial period. 
The Kenya government fixes the price of dairy products at the producer and 
consumer level. Currently only the producer and consumer prices of fluid 
milk are being set. The prices of other dairy products are determined by 
manufacturers, subject to confirmation by the price controller. 
Prior to July 1970, an elaborate system of quotas and contracts was 
used to stimulate supplies of milk in the dry season by paying the farmer 
a higher pnca._for a, given,quantity of milk that had to be supplied, - otherwise 
the quota was forfeited0Quotas were replaced in July 1970 by a pool pricing 
system involving a guaranteed minimum price plus a bonus based on the amount 
12 realized by the KCC from the sale of liquid and manufactured products. 
Since July 1971, the producer price for milk has been set by Presidential 
decrees, A factory gate price of 7 7 cents per litre was set in 1971, This 
4-5% increase stimulated production in a wet year, led to a reduction in the 
amount of milk retained in rural areas, and reduced butterfat intake by 44%. 
In addition, the boost in price led'to the milking of beef cows which had 
implications for beef output. The fact that the boost in rnilk price reduced 
beef--«6utput which was more competitive in export markets than dairy 
manufactures implies a mlsallocation of resources and reduces foreign 
exchange earnings. Stotz (1975) notes that because of the favourable price 
of milk, and the desire to increase land productivity, beef ranches are 
shifting towards a combined milk and beef production system. He contends 
that beef ranches only produce milk during the flush season when grass is 
.available, thus further aggravating the seasonality of milk production. 
The requirement that KCC purchase all supplies offered at 77 cents per 
litre brought about a..major financial crisis .(with-a- net loss of K£721,376 
over the 1971/72 and 1972/73 years), because the 35% increase in the volume 
of fluid milk intake resulted in a greater volume being manufactured as low 
paying dairy products, A shortage of processing capacity forced the 
discarding of some skim milk after butterfat extraction. The KCC's financial 
12, For the rationale of abolition of the quota system, see Ruigu, 1978, 
pp. "69-74. 
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squeeze was only eased in 1975 as a result of increased demand for fluid milk, 
a shortfall in production because of drought in two consecutive years, and 
because of a decline in the real price of marketed milk (relative to prices of 
other products) and the consequent increase in rural consumption. In addition, 
other administrative and pricing measures were taken to improve the financial 
13 
position of the KCC. The producer price was increased from Ksh 0,83 to Ksh. 0.93 
per litre in November 1975 and to Ksh 1,32 per litre in September 1976. These 
recent increases have undoubtedly stimulated excess production during the wet 
season. Between September 1976 and March 1977, the KCC incurred a loss of Ksh 35 
million and by August/September 1977 it was unable to pay the farmers in Sotik, 14 Uasin Gishu and Kitale areas. 
(i) Seasonal Fluctuations of Milk Supply 
The seasonal fluctuations in milk supplied to the KCC increased markedly with 
the introduction of a uniform price in 1970. Hopcraft and Ruigu (1976) showed how 
the abolition of the quota pricing system with concomitant failure to replace it 
with an alternative system of premium pricing for the dry season production has 
led to a marked increase in the seasonality of milk supplied to the KCC. The 
increase from the lowest to the highest monthly intake was 28.7% in 1969/70 when 
the quotas were in operation, compared to 1973/74 when the fluctuation was 102.4%. 
The absence of price differentials between dry and flush season seems clrarly 
unjustified. The existence of real cost differentials between seasons was demonst-
rated by the estimates of informal market prices obtained from Veterinary Department 
officials and reported by Hopcraft and Ruigu (1976, p. 16). Out of 16 areas where 
artificial insemination services were operational and for which dry and wet season 
estimates were available, 12 (or 75% of the areas) showed some seasonal price, 
variation the simple average dry-season price being 28% over and above the wet 
season price,. 
13. These included: (i) The consumer price which had been raised from 70 cents to 
80 cents when the producer price went up to Ksh 3.50 per gallon on July 1, 1971 was 
further increased by 5 cents in May 1972 to 85 cents, (ii) The KCC was permitted to 
levy a one cent per litre cess to help finance payments for the expansion of Sotik, 
Kitale and Nyahururu plants. In addition, the KCC was permitted to retain 50% of 
the KDB cess of 2 cents per litre to help offset this deficit. (iii) The KCC liquid 
rnilk was standardized at 2.3% butterfat with no payment going to producers for the 
butterfat accrued by this method, (iv) The KDB Board of Directors including all 
sub-committees was suspended in May 1972 and the management drastically reduced 
in order to enable the Board to continue its operation within the one cent per litre 
cess. Effective management/t^e Board was devolved to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
14, These losses arose from .over-production and the loss of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
and Malawi markets after the closure of Kenya/Tanzania border and insecurity within 
Uganda, Also the KCC had to pay Ksh 1,32 per litre without any corresponding 
consumer price increase between September and March 1977. A government guaranteed 
loan was advanced to the KCC to tide it through the difficulties and to enable it 
to pay farmers. In addition to rising costs, there are allegations of shortcomings 
in the KCC's management which are yet to be disproved. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the dry and wet season supply curves with the demand 
curve superimposed on them. Producing milk Is a great deal cheaper in the wet 
than in the dry season because in the dry season, the producer undertakes fodder 
production and purchased feed at considerable expense to avoid sharp reduction 
in production. The supply curve for the dry season is further to the left of the 
flush season supply curve representing higher milk production costs. A uniform 
price, P , generates quantity Q^ in the dry season and Qw in the wet season. If 
Q^ represents the market equilibrium, it can be seen that the uniform price 
generates a deficit in the dry season and a surplus in the wet season. In some 
years dry season supply is inadequate to meet the demand for fluid milk at the 
official price. To generate sufficient quantities the producer price would have 
15 to rise to P , in the dry season and fall to P in the wet season. In the ed ew 
dry season, not only could the fluid milk market absorb additional supplies but 
the §ntir© stock of equipment for practising milk products is substantially idle. 
PHoe DRY SEASON WET (FLUSH) SEASON 
Substantial fixed costs are incurred whether or not KCC capacity is utilized. 
The problem is that the capacity of processing facilities must be capable of 
handling the peak output of the wet season. 
Substantial costs are imposed on the KCC by the extreme seasonality of 
production. The KCC is required to purchase all milk irrespective of whether 
it is financially appropriate or not. In general, large losses are 
®ade. in the flush season when a large portion of milk purchased 'must be 
processed-and sold at a loss. In the dry season, substantial financial 
15. In order to determine the extent to which the price should be reduced, KCC's 
costs of handling fluid milk, and elasticities of both supply and demand would be 
required. 
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gains are made as virtually all milk is sold as fluid milk at the high official 
price. The KCC requires a high consumer price for fluid milk in order to 
recoup its losses during flush season. This high price substantially curtails 
consumption and forces the KCC to divert more milk into unprofitable processing 
channels. 
Clearly what is needed is a seasonally differentiated price. This 
would require a reduction in the flush season producer price which would reduce 
flush season payout and surplus output while concomitantly reducing 
manufacturing costs. The price would be increased in the dry season to 
provide adequate incentives to farmers to maintain production in the dry 
season. 
(ii) KCC as a Buyer of Residual Surplus from Smallholder Areas 
In many smallholder areas, increased milk production goes to home 
consumption and the informal marketing channels, especially in areas where 
grade cattle are relatively recent innovation and only little milk is 
'exported'. In such areas, the local price of milk is higher than the 
price that would be obtained from the KCC (i.e. price paid minus the 
transport costs to the factory gate) (Mbanja and de Graaf, 1978; Ruigu, 
1976). As production increases, the local milk price declines and approaches 
the price at which KCC buys fluid milk. In the dry season, the milk cooperative 
societies dispose of all milk locally (except where the local market is 
insignificant) but when surpluses develop, the milk is sent to the KCC. At 
first, deliveries to the KCC are strictly seasonal and in some areas, they 
are likely to remain so. Even in areas where permanent surpluses are produced, 
the KCC tends to remain the residual buyer with local demand met first at a 
premium price. Mbanja and de Graaf (1978), in their survey of cooperatives, 
found that 8% of all societies in their sample did not send in milk to the 
KCC over the previous four years, 23% sold their milk to KCC only, while 
69% sold milk both locally and to the KCC. Overall 19% of all the milk 
collected by cooperatives was sold locally over the 1973/74 to 1976/77 while 
78% was delivered to the KCC. 
(iii) Spatial Effects of a Uniform Milk Price 
Unlike today, the prices paid to the producers prior to 1970 were not 
uniform throughout the country. They varied according to the distance from 
principal markets. In 1968, for instance, there was a premium of 35 cents 
per gallon in Nairobi area, 20 cents in Kisumu area and 65 cents in Mombasa 
(Ruigu, 1978, pp. 69-70). 
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The existing pricing structure pays a uniform price irrespective of 
the location of receiving plant (and regardless of the season of the year). 
The uniform price paid for all milk in different parts of the country has the 
effect of concealing transport costs involved in the delivery of milk to the 
consuming centres. Consequently, rather than encouraging the economically 
optimal location of milk production in the country, it promotes a misallocation 
of resources. The total cost of getting milk to the consuming centres differs 
widely depending on where it is produced. The KCC operates a transport pool 
for ferrying milk from the more distant areas at a very substantial cost 
which is not reflected in lower price to producers in those areas. Production 
in more remote areas therefore receive excessive stimulation while production 
in the areas where hidden transport costs are a great deal less receive 
inadequate stimulation. Areas near the main markets are thus subsidizing the 
areas that are more remote. There is thus an economic case to recommend the 
abandonment of the transport pool. 
Table 8 shows the inter-plant raw milk movements effected by the KCC 
fleet of tankers. About 80% of all milk processed in the Nairobi plant is 
hauled from other areas. These movements have important cost implications 
for the industry. Most of the milk is transported relatively long distances 
and transport costs are high because of the weight and volume of liquid milk 
relative to value, high perishability and cost of refrigeration. 
If whole milk is being transported to an urban area such as Nairobi, 
the value of milk at any given distance from Nairobi is the Nairobi price 
less the cost of transport.^ economic terms, surplus milk produced in 
consuming centres has a lower value and therefore processing facilities in 
those locations is justified as long as adequate supplies are forthcoming so 
as to benefit from economies of scale. Processing reduces the physical bulk 
of the product and enhances its value, making it suitable for long distance 
17 
transportation. Thus processed milk products - cream, butter, cheese and 
dried condensed milk - involves lower transport costs. 
16. If the price at the market in P and the cost of transportation to the 
market is T, which a function of the distance, d, then the price at given 
location, P^ is given by the formula: 
P = P - T (d). 1 m 
17. Transporting raw milk costs about 10 times as much as transporting 
butterfat (Kenya, 1965). 
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Table 8. KCC Inter-Creamery Milk Shipments, 1975/76 
From To Distance (Km) Quantity (Litres) 
Naivasha Nairobi 83 8,000,000 
Nyahururu Kiganjo 109 368,000 
Nyahururu Nairobi 168 8,855,700 
Nakuru Nairobi 155 39,000,000 
Kiganjo Nairobi 162 5,000,000 
Kitale Eldoret 68 7,000,000 
Eldoret Nairobi 308 14,000,000 
Sotik Nakuru 166 162,000 
Total Shipments 82,385,700 
Source: KCC files 
The KCC creameries are organized on a national asis in the interest 
of efficiency so that they can specialize in the manufacture of particular 
products, although no regional differences in producer or consumer prices 
exist, There is certainly an economic case for differentiated producer 
(and consumer) prices based on the existence of surplus and deficit areas 
and differential transport costs. In determing the price paid to the producer, 
a premium might be paid for milk supplied to creameries where there is a 
large demand and considerable quantities of milk are currently 'imported' 
(e.g, Nairobi and Mombasa) from other plants, often over large distances. 
The KCC does not appear to have exploited the advantages, of a national 
18 
marketing system fully. For instance, there are sustential manufacturing 
activities such as cheese in the Nairobi plant that would result in substantia-
savings if relocated up-country, 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The dairy industry has operated under a mantle of government administered 
prices, rules and regulations. Government administered prices have not been 
efficient. Efficiency in pricing cannot be achieved without flexibility 
which permits (a) seasonal variation of producer prices to account for 
variability in costs of production, (b) spatial variation in prices to promote 
18. Although the industry is organized on a national basis, it is not always 
possible to balance out regional shortfalls against regional surpluses for 
processing because of the large distances involved. 
- 201 -
IDS/OP 32 
efficient allocation of resources, and (c) frequent revision of the producer 
prices to ensure adequate incentives to farmers and revision of consumer 
prices to ensure reasonable consumption of milk to facilitate efficient 
operation. The setting of both producer and consumer prices without careful 
analysis of KCC operating costs and overheads creates financial problems for 
the KCC and does not allow it to perform efficiently. Using the cooperative 
processers as the dumping grounds at fixed prices for seasonal surpluses 
imposes a tax on the co-operative that is ultimately paid by its members (in 
form of lower returns or delayed payment) and by the consumer (in the form 
of higher average prices). 
There is an urgent need to reduce the extreme seasonality of milk 
production in order to reduce surpluses (and KCC losses) in the flush season. 
The elaborate system of quota pricing that existed prior to July 1970 ensured 
adequate supplies in the dry season but is not feasible today given the large 
number of smallholders who produce milk for sale. A higher producer price for 
milk in the dry season could be effected without quotas. Prices paid to farmers 
should be made on the basis of a clearly stipulated formula relating KCC milk 
intake to sales of fluid milk and manufactured products. In the dry season 
when milk is scarce, a high proportion of milk intake is sold in fluid form 
which is more lucrative and farmers could be paid more. By contrast, in the 
flush season a high proportion of milk intake is manufactured and sold in this 
less lucrative form. 
The possibility of introducing a spatially differentiated producer 
price should be re-examined along the lines of the recommendations of Kibaki 
commission. There is ample precedent (by KCC) and economic justification for 
producer prices to vary over space. 
Current pricing milk only requires a minimum content of 3.5 butterfat. 
There is no incentive to produce milk of higher butterfat content. A basic 
price could be paid for milk 3.5% butterfat content with an additional payment 
for higher percentage or a deduction for milk below 3.5% butterfat. In the 
longrun, pricing on the basis of protein or solids-not-fat (SNF) components 
should be considered since protein is the major deficiency in local diets. 
The domestic demand for fluid milk is price inelastic. This 
rationalizes the practice of maintaining high fluid milk prices to subsidise 
manufactured dairy products. Milk pricing tends to favour producers at the 
expense of consumers. The degree of exploitation of fluid milk consumers by 
producers through the KCC remains a controversial issue given KCC's monopoly 
powers. However, it is obvious that the present policy limits the consumption 
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of milk by low income consumers. Granting monopoly rights to a nation wide 
farmer co-operative as has been done in the Kenya dairy industry may be 
excused on grounds of economies of scale but does not protect consumer 
interests. The Kenya Dairy Board should be strengthened in order to 
effectively carry out its supervisory role in the dairy industry. 
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PRICE AND MARKETING POLICIES ON MEAT AND EGGS 
By 
I.D, McArthur S C. Smith 
Planning Division 
Ministry of Agriculture 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Government intervention in pricing and marketing at the producer 
or consumer level might be deemed to benefit the economy if it led to any of 
th® f©Hewing : = 
i-. A—reduction in-price, volume and income instability; 
ii. An improvement in resource allocation; 
iii. Increased economic self-sufficiency in meat production; 
iv. The provision of low-priced meat to low income consumers, provided 
that this did not inhibit supplies or lead to resource misallocation. 
From the producer's point of view, an absolute increase in producer 
prices leading to increased incomes would find favour, while consumers would 
favour policies which lead to a reduction in consumer prices. Other government 
interventions such as deficiency payments, buffer stocks, quotas, stabilisation 
funds, subsidised consumption, export rebates, income stabilisation funds, 
subsidies on inputs, tariffs, health and other restrictive regulations may be 
used to fulfil the same objective. Although some of these policy instruments 
are used in Kenya, price control is the main government intervention in the 
meat industry because, unlike many of the other possible measures, it does not 
qse government funds to execute (except when there is a need to finance losses 
incurred by the Kenya Meat Commission which might arise as a result of price 
control). 
There is no formal statement of the objectives of price control on 
meat in Kenya. However, one can assume that it is supposed to ensure regular 
and sufficient supplies of meat to the consumer at prices which even the low 
income family can afford, while at the same time ensuring a 'fair' return to 
the producer so as not to discourage supply. Such a desideratum is of course 
difficult to achieve: does price controlled beef get from the producer to the 
consumer more efficiently than unregulated poultry meat? The constant upward 

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
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The legal basis for price and marketing controls on meat and eggs 
given by numerous Acts of Parliament which include the following:-
a. The Agriculture Act, Cap. 318, which provides the basis for marketing 
of scheduled agricultural and livestock produce (including cattle and 
sheep for slaughter) and the basis for guaranteed prices. Section 8 
of the Agriculture Act states that the Minister may, before January 
1st each year, fix prices for scheduled animal products for the 
coming year, as well as prices for the two subsequent years. In 
practice, a Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) buying schedule for producer 
prices is set annually. 
b. The Agricultural Produce (Export) Act, Cap. 319, which includes the 
regulation of animals for slaughter and sets the requirements for 
registration of premises. All produce must be inspected prior to 
export, and the Minister may set standards and grades specifically 
for exportable produce. 
c. The Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, Cap. 320, which provides the 
basis for the creation of marketing boards. 
d. The Crop Production and Livestock Act, Cap. 321, which includes rules 
for poultry inspection. 
e. The Branding of Stock Act, Cap. 351, the Cattle Cleansing Act, Cap. 
358, and the Animal Diseases Act, Cap. 364. By the establishment 
of quarantine areas and other regulatory procedures, these Acts have 
> 
an important influence on the marketing of cattle, sheep and goats. 
Also, under Section 8 of the Animal Diseases Act, the Director of 
Veterinary Services may prohibit or regulate the importation of meat 
or animals. 
f. The Pig Industry Act, Cap. 361, and the Uplands Bacon Factory Act, 
Cap. 362. The former established the Pig Industry Board as the 
regulatory authority for the industry and sets the requirements for 
the licensing of slaughter houses. 
g. The Kenya Meat Commission Act, Cap. 363, sets the framework in which 
KMC must operate, including the specification of a grading system 
for beef. Under Section (1) (b) of this Act, no person or company may 
export meat unless in possession of a licence issued by KMC. 
There are almost no legislative rules on egg marketing, however. 
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h. The Meat Control (Local Slaughterhouses) Act, Cap. 356, which 
provides for the regulation and licensing of slaughterhouses 
selling to the domestic market only. 
i. The Customs Tariff Act, Cap. 472, and the Cistoms and Excise Act 
(No. 10 of 1978). Under this Act, a 25% duty on important meat 
and edible offals and a 50% duty on imported sausages and canned 
beef are currently levied. 
j. The Sales Tax Act, Cap. 476, applies a sales tax on local sales 
of canned beef (among many other products) and the Local Manufac-
turers (Export Compensation) Act, Cap. 482, provides a 10% subsidy 
on the f.o.b. price of canned beef for export. 
k. Under the Price Control Act, Cap. 504, the Minister for Finance 
and Planning sets maximum prices for beef, sheep and goat meat at 
the wholesale and retail levels. 
Thus, there is a large number of legislative means by which the 
marketing and pricing of meat Is regulated in Kenya, with the Agriculture 
Act, Cap. 318, and the Price Control Act, Cap. 504, as the main instruments 
for regulating prices. Greatest emphasis has been on price control on beef 
at the producer, wholesale and retail levels, with lesser emphasis on sheep 
and goat meat. Poultry meat, pork, and eggs are not subject to price control. 
3. THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SITUATION, AND GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT 
Figures for livestock population and offtake are extremely 
difficult to obtain and the numerous estimates from different sources vary 
widely. Table 1 shows, that beef is by far the most important meat product 
and is the preferred choice for both urban and rural consumers in many parts 
of the country. However, on-farm slaughter of small-stock rather than beef 
is preferred, because of the more manageable quantity of meat obtained and 
the lower amount of income foregone. Sheep and goats are preferred by 
Muslims and some other religious and social groups. A survey of lower income 
households (Kenya, 1977) showed the average household expenditure per month 
in the four largest Kenya towns at KSh. 62 for meat and KSh. 7 for eggs, out 
of a total household expenditure of KSh. 394. Another survey of four main 
towns showed average purchases across the spectrum of income at KSh. 18 per 
month for poultry meat and KSh. 10 for eggs (Smith, 1979). 
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Note: 1. Includes offals. 
Source: Kenya, 1978 and Smith, 1979, 
Nearly all projections (e.g. Shah, 1978, p. 7) show a static or 
only a slowly increasing supply of meat in Kenya over the next 10 years. 
With a human population increase of 3.5% per year, average real income 
growth of 2.5% per year and a high income elasticity of demand (in the 
region of 0.9), demand will far outstrip supply. In the absence of dramatic 
production increases, the most likely outcome is continued upward pressure 
on this price of meat and eggs and it is in this connection that price 
control assumes such importance. Given that beef is the least likely of all 
meat products to increase dramatically in the short term, a concerted 
effort to boost sheep and goat and poultry meat production is justified. 
Government support to the various meat and dairy industries 
totalled K£16.391 million in the 19 78-79 Development Budget, with the 
largest single allocation going to livestock improvement (K£6.954 million), 
followed by disease and pest control (K£3.789 million). Specific assistance 
to the beef, sheep and goat, pig and poultry industries has been identified 
in table 2. It can be seen from this table that the beef industry is 
considerably regulated in both production and marketing and that there is a 
much lower level of intervention with sheep and goats, poultry and pigs. 
However, none of the industries has a system of market intelligence and market 
organisation, and product grading (except for beef) and price monitoring is 
not well developed. Almost no attention is paid to the camel industry which 
has a potential for supplying greater quantities of meat in the northern 
areas of Kenya. Because some of the meat industries are subject to price 
control (albeit with varying levels of effectiveness) and others are not, it 
is necessary to look at the marketing chains for beef, sheep and goat meat, 
pork and poultry meat separately in an effort to compare the relative 
efficiencies of the various systems. 
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Husbandry extension APB 
Dipping DVS, IADP 
Research SRD 
Disease control DVS 
Ranch and grazing block 
establishment RMB, AFC 
Guaranteed prices MOA 
Marketing Movement regulations DVS 
Marketing organisation and 
purchase LMB 
Guaranteed purchase KMC 
Grading KMC 
Slaughtering and Market inspection DVS 
Regulated prices MF 
Compilation of statistics CBS 
Production Husbandry extension APB 
Disease control DVS 
Supply of improved stock - sheep and 
goat project APB 
Marketing Slaughtering and market 
inspection DVS 
Regulated prices MF 
Poultry Production Husbandry extension (NPDP) 
Poultry development project 
(NPDP) 
Disease control 





Pig Production Husbandry extension 





Marketing Slaughtering and market inspection DVS 
Note: APB = Animal Production Branch; DVS = Department of Veterinary Services; 
IADP = Integrated Agricultural RMB = Range Management Branch; 
Development Program; LMB = Livestock Marketing Branch; 
AFC - Agricultural Finance Corporation; MOA = Ministry of Agriculture; 
MF = Ministry of Finance; CBS = Central Bureau of Statistics; 
KMC = Kenya Meat Commission; DPD = Development Planning Division; 
NPDP = National Poultry Development Programme, 
Source: Own compilation. 
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4. PRICING OF BEEF 
As indicated above, beef is the most important meat product and 
the one subject to most strict price and marketing controls. Kenya Meat 
Commission (KMC) is a government statutory board and the government's 
main modus operandi in the beef industry. KMC has been in financial 
difficulties in recent times, and its problems are well documented 
(Chemonics International, 1977; Matthes, 1979). It has experienced a 
considerable drop in throughput at the three factories from 228,000 head of 
cattle in 1976 to about 60,000 in 1978. Producer sales of drought-affected 
stock in 1976 explain part of this difference, but there has also been a 
large drop in the number of high quality cattle slaughtered. 
Since 197 3 when KMC's control over the domestic beef market was 
2 . . relaxed, KMC has faced increasing competition from at least 14 private 
slaughterhouses which also supply the Nairobi market, KMC's biggest outlet. 
Throughput of these slaughterhouses has been estimated at 73,000 in 1978 
(White and Meadows, 1978). None of these slaughterhouses operate a grading 
system and several do not meet the government's regulated standards for 
hygiene and humane killing. They are therefore able to operate on smaller 
margins than KMC and are able and required to sell meat at the wholesale 
level at a price below KMC. 
Minimum producer prices are set on a CDW (cold dressed weight) 
basis for carcasses graded from FA0 (fair average quality) to manufacturing 
quality. There is a deduction if beef measles cysts are identified. In 
practice, traders buy live animals and the controlled prices only apply to 
purchases by KMC. However, in order to be competitive and attract through-
put, KMC purchases live animals at prices above the minimum CDW equivalent. 
Table 3. Beef Producer Prices in March 1979, KShs/Kg CDW 
Prime and choice carcasses open 
FAQ carcasses 8.25 
Standard carcasses 6.9 5 
Commercial carcasses 5.45 
Manufacturing carcasses 2.95 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
2. This was done with KMC's consent as it had a large share of the 
domestic market at the time and, because of the buoyant world beef prices, 
wished to concentrate on the export market. 
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Maximum wholesale prices are set for both forequarters (FG) and 
hindquarters (HQ), and graded from prime to commercial quality. There are 
separate schedules for KMC and for all other abattoirs and the KMC schedule 
is up to 28% higher for prime forequarter. KMC is at a disadvantage 
relative to the lower cost wholesalers who are able and required to sell 
meat at considerably lower prices. 
Table Beef Wholesale Prices in March 1979, KShs/kg 
KMC All other abattoirs 
Forequarter Hindquarter Forequarter Hindquarter 
Prime 11.50 13.05 9.00 11.00 
Choice 8.50 12.20 8.00 10.00 
FAQ 8.15 11.15 7.25 9.50 
Standard 8.60 9.00 7.70 8.10 
Commercial 7,10 7.60 6.20 6.70 
Source: Legal Notice No. 36/1978 
There are some anomalies in these schedules. For example, the 
price of FAQ forequarters for both KMC and other abattoirs is less than 
the corresponding price for standard beef. In addition, the price differen-
tial between forequarters and hindquarters is KSh 3.70 for KMC choice, but 
only KSh 1.55 for KMC prime. The most important wholesale prices (because 
they influence the retail price of meat bone-in) are the FAQ and standard 
forequarter prices. KMC commercial hindquarters are used for canning; all 
other KMC hindquarters are used by butchers for speciality cuts, as even 
standard hinderquarter (at KSh 9.00 per Kg) is too expensive to be resold 
at the retail level as meat bone-in (at KSh 10.30 per Kg). 
The majority of meat consumers do not differentiate between 
standards or grades, and abattoirs other than KMC do not grade meat, 
A butcher could therefore make considerable profit if able to buy standard 
hindquarters from other abattoirs at KSh 8,10 per Kg and sell a large part 
of the meat as speciality cuts like fillet and sirloin which sell for up to 
KSh 19 per Kg. KMC's average processing costs for an annual throughput of 
150,000 head is stated to be KSh 1.85 per Kg, and KSh 2.20 per Kg CDW for 
the present rate of throughput of approximately 60,000 per year. KMC there-
fore makes losses on higher grades e.g. FAQ. 
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Table 5. KMC's Average Processing Costs, KSh per Kg CDW 
Purchase price KSh 4.50 
liveweight (48% dressing) 9.38 
Add processing cost 2.20 
Less sale of byproducts 0.50 
Total 12.08 
Less unweighted average 
wholesale price (FQ and HQ) 9.71 
Loss 2.37 
Source: Own compilation. 
Maximum retail prices are set for different areas of the country 
3 
for a range of graded cuts and for meat bone-in and bone-out. The prices 
for graded cuts are largely ignored by the trade, and in many cases the 
market prices are considerably higher than the regulated prices e.g. fillet 
sometimes sells for up to KSh 30 per Kg or even higher. According to the 
KMC Act, KMC cannot operate at the retail level (but does have one outlet in 
Mombasa and sells special 20 Kg packs in Nairobi). 
Table 6. Beef Retail Prices, Nairobi, KShs/Kg 
Graded Beef Ungraded Beef 
Fillet 19.00 Beef with bone 10.30 
Sirloin 19 .00 Beef without bone 12.00 
Sirloin on bone 18.00 Liver, heart, tongue, 
Rump steak 18.00 kidney 10.00 
Silverside 14.30 Tripes 6.00 
Topside 15.50 
T. bone steak 19.00 
Stewing steak 14.00 
Brisket 9.30 
Mince 11.00 
Source: Legal Notice No. 36/1978. 
3. Geographical differentiation of prices has some anomalies. For 
example, the controlled price for beef bone-in is KSh 9.30 per kg in Meru 
district and KSh 7.00 per kg in Isiolo district. It is over 300 km from 
the south of Meru district to the north of Isiolo and such a price differen-
tial may therefore be justified. However, the main towns (and beef markets) 
in the two districts are about 30 km apart, with an insignificant difference 
in transport costs. 
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Price control on ungraded beef also has some anomalies. Beef with 
bone is not a uniform product; bone as a percentage of CDW varies from 16% 
in choice carcasses to 23% or more in commercial carcasses. There are even, 
wider variations between cuts from the same carcass. One kg of meat bone-in 
purchased by consumers can therefore vary considerably in bone content.- Beef 
without bone is almost unobtainable and when obtained is :usually from very 
low quality carcasses. This is because one kg of beef without bone sells for 
KSh 12, plus a small amount for the bones (20 cents) whereas if this kg was 
sold as meat bone-in, it would have weighted kg 1.30 and sold for KSh 10.60 
per kg, i.e. it would have fetched KSh 13.40. There is therefore no benefit 
to be made from boning out such meat. 
The Livestock Marketing Branch (LMB) has been surveying 16 markets 
in Kenya since late 1978. Prices in some of these markets are shown in 
'.Sable- 7.. In all cases, the estimated retail prices as set by the saleyard 
price plus processing costs and profit and minus the value of the fifth 
quarter were above the maximum regulated retails prices. 




















S. Nyanza 3.40 8.10 8.90 8.80 1 
Kisii 3.70 8.80 9.70 8 .80 10 
Narok 4.10 9.80 10.70 8.80 22 
Kericho 3.40 8.10 8.90 8.80 1 
Machakoy 5.50 13.10 14.40 9. 30 ' 55 
Samburu 3.40 8 .10 S , 90 7 .00 27 
Kaj iado 4.40 10.50 11.50 8.80 31 
Laikipia 4.60 11.00 12.00 9 . 30 29 
Ongata Rongai 5.40 12.90 .14.10 9.80 44 
Kiambu 4.40 10.50 11.50 9.80 17 
Notes: 1. Assume equal numbers of standard and commercial carcasses. Dressing 
out percentage could be higher in Laikipia and Kiambu (up to 48%) 
because the cattle are of higher quality. This would reduce the 
difference between regulated and estimated prices. 
2. This is the estimated CDW price plus 20% profit margin less 10% 
fifth quarter. This.assumes that all meat is sold bone-in and none 
goes to cuts. 
Source: Livestock Marketing Branch, Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Consider the market at Kibiko, Ngong, which supplies meat to 
Nairobi and which was surveyed by the LMB on ten different occasions in 
December 1978 „ 172 animals were involved, 94 indigenous and the rest 
crossbreed or exotic, 153 were males. The liveweight ranged between 105 
and 350 kg and the price range was KSh 2,86 to 6,39 per kg liveweight, 
with an average of KSh 5,00. Assuming a 42% dressing percentage, this would 
imply KSh 11,90 per kg CDW, With allowances for costs and profit and the 
value of the fifth quarter, this would mean a retail price (assuming no 
additional wholesale margins) of KSh 13.10 per kg, compared to the regulated 
retail price for meat bone-in of KSh 10,30 per kg in Nairobi, That this 
price structure does prevail is confirmed by interviews at Dagoretti market 
in November 1978 when hindquarters were selling at KSh 12 per kg wholesale. 
Clearly, only the lowest quality animals in these markets could be sold 
profitably as meat bone-in in Nairobi. The other animals would be slaughtered 
at least partly for speciality cuts or resold to KMC as FAQ or higher quality, 
thus attracting a higher price per kg. 
If a butcher bought a 250 kg steer for KSh 1250 at Kibiko, he would 
have to sell the meat for KSh 1375 in order to cover costs and make a profit. 
Assuming favourable 48% dressing, he would have 120 kg CDW. If half was sold 
as meat bone-In, this would make KSh 618. The rest of the meat would therefore 
have to make KSh 757 from speciality cuts at KSh 12,62 per kg, This could 
easily be done, as graded bone-in cuts are sold above this price and graded 
bone-out cuts e,g. fillet, sell for much higher and price control is generally 
not enforced. Fillet has a red meat percentage of 77% and KSh 12.62 bone-in 
therefore translates to KSh .16,40 bone-out, compared to the regulated price 
of KSh 19 per kg. Thus some aspects of price control are evaded by butchers 
who even profitably sell animals they buy at prices well above the published 
minimum producer prices. 
Finally, consider an average butcher who purchases a 170 kg. CDW 
steer in Naivasha and sells it in Nairobi. With lower slaughtering costs in 
particular, this private butcher can profitably handle meat whereas KMC 
operates at a loss. As a buyer of last resort and with the canning operation 
which takes the otherwise unmarketable animals especially during drought, KMC 
has a social function which makes a certain level of government subsidy 




Table 8. Private Butchers' Costs and Margins for 170 Kg Steer Sold in Nairobi 
Total (KSh.) KSh per kg CDW 
Purchase price 1500 .00 8 .82 
Transport costs 51 .25 0 .30 
Slaughter costs 30 .00 0 .18 
Total costs to wholesale 1581 .25 9 .30 
Carcass wholesale value 1450 .00 8, .53 
Hide and offals 
wholesale value 170 .00 1, .00 
Total wholesale value 1620 .00 9 , .53 
Wholesale margin"'" 38 , .75 0, .23 
Meat retail price 1751. .00 10, .30 
Retail margin^ 131, .00 0. ,77 
Overall margin (including by 
products) 339 , .75 2. ,00 
Note: 1. The margin covers profit and overhead costs including 
wages. 
Source: Own compilation 
5. PRICING OF SHEEP AND GOAT MEAT 
Sheep and goat meat is to a large extent consumed on farms and in 
rural areas than in urban centres. KMC does handle sheep and goats but 
marketing is mainly by very small-scale local butchers. There is no price 
control on sheep and goat meat at the producer level. The wholesale prices 
are KSh 15 for KMC and KSh 13 for all other abattoirs. However, even KMC 
ignores this price schedule and even sells mutton A and B at KSh 20 per kg 
wholesale. There are different regulated retail prices for different districts 
as in the case of beef. In Nairobi ungraded sheep and goat meat sells for 
KSh 12 while the graded meat sells for KSh 19. The anomaly in this price 
schedule is that the retail price for ungraded meat is below the wholesale 
maximum price for other abattoirs. 
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Consider an 11 kg CDW sheep bought by a Nairobi butcher for KSh 
80 in one of the important producing areas and tracked or railed to Nairobi 
at a cost of KSh 29.40 (actual quotation from Lodwar to Nairobi was KSh 5000 
for 170 animals). The computation is shown in Table 9. As there are 
indications that the prices of live sheep have fallen but sheep meat prices 
have not, the overall margins may be even higher than the table shown. 
Table 9. Private Butcher's Costs and Margins for 11 Kg Sheep Sold in Nairobi 
KSh Total KShs per Kg CDW 
Purchase price 80.00 7 .27 
Transport costs 29.40 2 ,67 
Slaughter costs 6.00 0 .55 
Total costs to wholesale 115.40 10 .49 
Carcass wholesale value 115.50 10 .50 
Intestines, skin, liver, head 17 .00 1 .55 
Total wholesale value 132.50 12 .05 
Wholesale margin"'" 17 .10 1 .56 
Meat retail price 132.00 12 .00 
Retail meat margin"'" 16.50 1 .50 
Overall margin (including byproducts) 33.60 3 .06 
Note: 1. The margin covers profit and overhead costs including wages. 
Source: Own compilation. 
6. PRICING OF PIG MEAT 
Pig meat is mainly consumed by high income urban consumers, either 
in the form of pork and bacon or as processed meat or sausages. It is not 
therefore easy to work out an 'average' retail price for pig meat. Of the 
recorded slaughterings of 51,000 in 1978, over 40,000 were handled by Uplands 
Bacon Factory, a private company which sets its own producer prices. The 
producer and retail prices of pork are not regulated, but processed pig meat 
prices are subject to confirmation by the price controller. Due to high 
feeding costs and the limited demand from high income consumers, pig products 
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are more expensive than meat from other animals. While processed products 
are certainly expensive, pork prices compare favourably with prices of beef 
and mutton. The following is a calculation of costs and margin for a small 
butcher buying a 60 kg CDW pig in Nyeri and selling the meat in Nairobi. 
Table 10. Private Butcher's Costs and Margin for 60 Kg Pig Sold in Nairobi 
KSh Total KSh per Kg CDW 
Nyeri purchase price 
Transport 
Slaughter^ 
Total costs to wholesale 
Byproducts 
Meat retail price 
Total retail value 
















Note: 1. Uplands Bacon Factory slaugher costs are close to KSh 250 per 
animal (including all overheads) but the value of the products 
(including processed meats) is very much higher than for a small 
butcher. 
Source: Own compilation. 
7. PRICING OF POULTRY MEAT AND EGGS 
Poultry production in Kenya can be divided into four main groups: 
hatcheries, commercial laying stock, broiler stock and local stock (Matthes, 
1979). Egg production is almost equally divided between commercial and 
local birds, but only about 10% of eggs from local birds is sold through 
commercial channels. In contrast, about 80% of poultry meat is produced from 
local birds and only 20% from hatcheries, commercial laying stock and 
broilers. Forty per cent of meat from local stock is marketed. Whereas the 
marketing of eggs and local birds meat is highly diversified, about 60% of 
broiler production is marketed by BAT Kenya Development Limited. There is 
no price control on eggs or poultry meat, although the price of poultry 
meat is obviously influenced by the cross elasticity of demand for alter-
native meats. The prices of feed, a major determinant of production costs 
for commercial layers and broilers, are subject to confirmation by the 
price controller. 
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A series of surveys of the main urban markets is being conducted, 
Since the data for Nairobi is not yet available, results for Mombasa and 
Kisumu are presented in Table 11. The calculations assume a 75% dressing 
and as there is no broiler industry in Kisumu, the calculations use 
Mombasa prices. 
Table 11. Costs and Margins for Poultry Meat 
Exotic Birds (Mombasa) Local Birds (Kisumu) 
Total KSh KSh per kg 
CDW 
Total KSh KSh per kg 
CDW 
Producer price 13.50 10.00 
Transport 0.90 0.67 
Processing and feeding 







Total costs to whole-
sale level 20.70 15.34 
Wholesale price 22.50 16.67 
Wholesale margin 1.80 1.33 
Retail price 25.20 18.67 











Note: In transit feeding costs are a significant proportion of marketing 
costs for poultry. 
Source: Smith, 1979. 
Table 12. Costs and Margins for Eggs, KShs/Egg 
Exotic Birds (Kisumu) Local Birds (Kisumu) 
Producer price 0.48 
Transport 0.02 
Packing 0.01 
Total costs to wholesale 
level 0.51 
Wholesale price 0.51 
Wholesale margin 0.00 
Retail price 0.60 









In Nairobi, eggs retail at about 67 cents and at about 65 cents 
in Mombasa. 
Note 
Source: Smith, 1979. 
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The main constraints on the marketing of poutry produce are: 
i. The small amount of poultry produced per farmer and the irregularity 
of that production. 
ii. The unfavourable location of farms relative to markets and sources 
of supply of inputs. 
iii. Lack of transportation. 
iv. Lack of market information. 
v. Poor storage and slaughter facilities. (Smith, 1979) 
Marketing costs could be reduced if small farmers banded together to organise 
the collection, transport and sale of eggs and poultry meat on a cooperative 
basis. 
8. A COMPARISON OF PRICING OF BEEF, SHEEP AND GOAT MEAT, PORK, POULTRY MEAT 
AND EGGS 
The calculations in the four previous sections can be summarised 
to give a comparison of producer and retail prices for these products as in 
Table 13. 
Table 13. A Comparison of the Prices of Various Meats and Eggs 
Poultry Eggs 
Beef Sheep & Pork Exotic Local Exotic Local 
goat meat 
Producer 
price 8.82 7.27 8.00 10.00 6.09 48 35 
Retail 
price 10.30 12.00 10.00 18.67 9.13 60 56 
Marketing margin (%) 16.8 65,1 25.0 86.7 49.9 25 60 
Note: 1. In KSh per kg CDW for beef, sheep and goat meat, pork and poultry 
while egg prices are in cents per egg. 
Source: Own compilation. 
It is not easy to compare the marketing margins of these different 
products for a variety of reasons. The beef prices assume the animal is bought 
in Naivasha and the meat is sold at the regulated price, although the wide-
spread flouting of price control regulations and the existence of quality 
premiums mean that the marketing margin is in practice often higher. Sheep 
and goats are supplied from northern Kenya, which means high transport costs 
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and the tendency for the few enterprising traders to dominate the market. 
Pig meat is consumed by a relatively small percentage of the population. 
The marketing margin for eggs produced from local birds is considerably in 
excess.of that from exotic stock; the reverse is true for poultry meat. 
Nevertheless, some interesting points emerge. The product most 
subject to price control — beef bone-in — has the lowest marketing 
margin (although quality cuts have a higher mark-up). Retail price control 
on beef may be holding down the retail price of pork and local poultry 
meat to some degree (although the producer prices are lower than for beef) 
but this does not seem to be the case for sheep and goat meat. These 
marketing margins can be compared with those of some other agricultural 
products which ranged from 257% for wattleback to 3% for coffee (Aldington, 
1979). 
Price control on beef has obviously been used as a method of 
keeping down producer prices. Beef prices have not risen as rapidly as 
the consumer prices of other products. It has not therefore led to marketing 
inefficiency in the sense of excessive traders' margins, although the 
anticipation of regularly increased wholesale prices may have contributed 
to the lack of cost-consciousness on the part of KMC. However, price 
control on beef has had a longer term effect on the beef industry: prices 
held below free market levels have led to a lack of investment which 
manifests itself in reduced market supplies and an upward pressure on prices. 
9. CONCLUSION 
Price control has achieved its aim of holding down the consumer 
price of beef to the detriment of increased investment in, and output from, 
the industry. It also has had some effect in holding down the price of 
beef substitutes e.g. pork and local poultry meat. However, broiler meat from 
exotic stock and mutton are sold at higher market prices because they are 
luxuries rather than stable meats. This situation has led to increased 
investment in sheep and goat production which might help to alleviate the 
anticipated deficit in meat supply. The production of broiler meat is 
increasing through the assistance of the National Poultry Development Project 
(NPDP). The establishment of more slaughter facilities (to reduce marketing 
margins) and the Improvement of production methods are necessary to hold down 
costs within the Industry. An increase in the supply of poultry meat from 
local birds could be stimulated by improved transport and slaughtering facilities, 
which would lead to reduced marketing costs. 
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KMC has been in financial difficulties, partly as a result of 
price control whereby it has had to contend with increasing producer prices 
in the face of static wholesale prices and partly because of competition 
from low-cost slaughterhouses, which ignore also in many instances price 
control regulations. A new look at meat pricing in Kenya seems warranted, 
with the aim of redefining KMC's role, encouraging production, lessening 
some of the more restrictive aspects of price control, and developing 
market intelligence and coordination within and between the meat industries. 
Price policies which do not encourage an increase in supplies will lead 
(in combination with a rapid human population increase) to a reduction 
in per capita meat availability. 
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PRICE ORDERS MADE UNDER THE PRICE CONTROL ACT, JANUARY 1964 TO JUNE 1979d 
Price Order Legal Notice No. 
1. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) (No.2) 6/1964 
2. Maximum Retail Prices 51/1964 
3. Nairobi Area 63/1964 
4. Mombasa District 81/1964 
5. S ugar (Amendment) 91/1964 
6. Thika District (Amendment) 97/1964 
7. Mombasa District (Amendment) 98/1964 
8 . Nairobi Area (Amendment) 99/1964 
9. Nakuru District 121/1964 
10. Sugar (Amendment) (No.2) 154/1964 
11. Revocation of order 169/1964 
12. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 170/1964 
13. Meru District 171/1964 
14. Maize (Marsabit District) 172/1964 
15. Uasin Gishu District 178/1964 
16.. Central Nyanza District 234/1964 
17. Trans Nzoia District 246/1964 
18. Central Nyanza District (Amendment) 259/1964 
19. Central Nyanza District (Amendment) (No. 2) 302/1964 
20. Nyeri District 344/1964 
21. Kericho District 5/1965 
22. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 18/1965 
23. Sifted Maizemeal* 81/1965 
24. Maize and Maizemeal (Marsabit District) 82/1965 
25. Maize and Maizemeal (Baringo District) 83/1965 
26. Maize and Maizemeal (Elgeyo-Marakwet District) 84/1965 
27. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 2) 85/1965 
28. Maize and Maizemeal (Kitui District) (Amendment) 86/1965 
29. Maximum Retail Prices (Revocation of Order) 113/1965 
30. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 132/1965 
31. Brazilian Sugar (Temporary Provision) 140/1965 
32. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 2) 324/1965 
33. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 3) 325/1965 
34. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 4) 337/1965 
a. Culled from Kenya Gazette Seupplement, relevant issues, by J.T. Mukui. 
The price of milk is made under the Dairy Industry Act and is determined by 
the Kenya Dairy Board. Orders marked with an asterisk (*) show when the 
particular commodity or group of commodities was first put under price 
control. 
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Price Order Legal Notice No, 
35. Bread5'' 
36. Sugar (Amendment) 
37. Maize and Maizemeal (Marsabit District) (Amendment) 
38. Sugar (Amendment) (No. 2) 
39. Sugar (Amendment) 
40. Rice-' 
41. Meat5'' 
42. Marking Price of Goods 
43. Woodfuel (Amendment) 
44. Sugar 
45. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 
46. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
47. Rice 
48. Sugar (Amendment) 
49. Rice 
50. Maize and Maizemeal 
51. Sifted Maizemeal 
52. Rice 
53. Bread 
54. Sifted Maizemeal 
55. Sugar 
56. Beer and Stouts5'' 
57. Meat 
58. Rice 
59. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
60. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 
61. General Prices (Temporary)-' 
62. Sugar 
63. Beer and Stouts 
64. Beer and Stouts 
65. Rice 
66. Rice (Amendment) 
67. Soft drinks5'' 
















































Legal Notice No. 
74. Nails* 
75. Tooth Pastes and Tooth Brushes* 
76. Barbed Wire* 
77. Salt* 
78 . Soaps and Detergents* 
79. Beans, Peas, Grams and Njahi* 
80. Fats and Edible Oils* 
81. Toilet Paper* 
82. Cement* 
83. Wines and Spirits 
84. Cement (Amendment) 
85. Tooth Pastes and Tooth Brushes (Amendment) 
86. Soaps and Detergents 
87. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) 
88. Wheat Flour* 
89. Bread 
90. Baby Foods* 
91. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
92. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 
93. Wines and Spirits 
94. Sugar (Amendment) 
9 5. Cement 
96. Beans, Peas, Grams and Njahi (Revocation of Order) 
97. Salt 
98. Beer and Stouts 
99. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) 
100. Soaps and Detergents (Amendment) 
101. Salt 
102. Soft Drinks 
103. Wines and Spirits 
104. Matches 
105. Galvanised Iron (Amendment) 
106. Nails (Amendment) 
107. Barbed Wire (Amendment) 
108. Wheat Flour (Amendment) 
109. Rice (Amendment) 
110. Bread (Amendment) 
111. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
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Legal Notice No. 
113. Cement (Amendment) 
114. Tooth Pastes and Tooth Brushes (Amendment) 
115. Baby Foods (Amendment) 
116. Matches (Amendment) 
117. Toilet Paper (Amendment) 
118. Beer and Stouts (Amendment) 
119. General Prices 
120. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 
121. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
122. Wheat Flour (Amendment) 
123. Bread (Amendment) 
124. Meat 
125. Rice (Amendment) 
126. Sugar 
127 . Wines and Spirits 
128. Cement 
129. Tooth Pastes and Tooth Brushes (Amendment) 
130. Soaps and Detergents (Amendment) 
131. Toilet Paper (Amendment) 
132. Bread (Amendment) (No. 2) 
133. Beer and Stouts (Amendment) 
134. Charcoal (Amendment) 
135. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
136. Soft Drinks 
137. Cement (Amendment) 
138. Baby Foods (Amendment) 
139. Tooth Pastes and Tooth Brushes (Amendment) (No. 2) 
140. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) 
141. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
142. Sugar 
143. Rice 
144. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) 
145. Meat (Amendment) 
146. Toilet Paper (Amendment) 
147. General Prices 
148. Beer and Stouts (Amendment) 
149. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
150. Charcoal (Amendment) 
151. Galvanised Iron (Amendment) 











































153. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) 
154. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
155. Bread (Amendment) 
156. Meat 
157. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
158. Wheat Flour (Amendment) 
159. Soft Drinks 
160. Salt 
161. Sugar (Amendment) 
162. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) 
16 3. Beer and Stouts (Amendment) 
164. Charcoal 
165. Soft Drinks (Amendment) 
166. Salt (Amendment) 
167. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
168. Fats and Edible Oils (Amendment) (No. 2) 
169. Maize and Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 2) 
170. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) (No. 2) 
171. Soft Drinks (Amendment) 
172. Sifted Maizemeal (Amendment) 
173. Cement (Amendment) 
174. Nails (Amendment) 
175. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) 
176. Meat 
177. Rice (Amendment) 
178. Rice (Amendment) (No. 2) 
179. Beer and Stouts 
180. Wines and Spirits (Amendment) (No. 2) 
181. Soft Drinks 
182. Maize and Maizemeal 




187. Baby Foods (Amendment) 
188. Baby Foods (Amendment) 
189. Galvanized Iron (Amendment) 
190. Nails (Amendment) 
191. Beers and Stouts (Amendment) 
192. Cement 
19 3. Soaps and Detergents (Amendment) 
194. Soft Drinks (Amendment) 
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